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A Comparative Analysis of Minnesota Products Liability Law and the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
Abstract
This Article compares the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability with Minnesota products liability
law. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability provides a yardstick for measuring products liability
law in each individual state. Minnesota's law is largely similar to the rules set out in the Restatement. While
Minnesota has not yet adopted all of the positions in all of the rules, the Minnesota Supreme Court has taken
positions on the rules governing liability, which are substantially the same. It no longer seems possible to
argue that negligence principles do not control in cases involving design defect and failure to warn. The strict
liability vernacular may still be used in design defect cases, but the important question is whether the supreme
court's statement in Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., that proof of a feasible alternative is not part of the plaintiff 's
prima facie case in a design case, establishes a meaningful wall between the theories. This article proceeds on a
section-by-section basis, explaining each section of the Restatement (Third) and comparing it to Minnesota
law.
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INTRODUCTION 
Minnesota adopted strict products liability law in 1967 in 
McCormack v. Hankscraft Co.
l 
McCormack sanctioned section 402A of 
the Restatement (Second) of Tarts as the law in Minnesota.2 Since 
then, the Minnesota courts have developed a comprehensive, yet 
incomplete, products liability scheme. In so doing, the courts have 
addressed issues such as the basic liability rules applicable in prod-
ucts liability cases, the relationship between negligence and strict 
liability theories, the interaction between the Uniform Commercial 
Code and products liability law, and the principles of loss alloca-
• 8 
llon. 
1. 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967). 
2. See id. at 338, 154 N.W.2d at 500. 
3. See, e.g., Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1984) (addressing 
the basic liability rules applicable in products liability cases and the relationship 
between negligence and strict liability theories); SJ. Grove & Sons V. Aeropatiale 
Helicopter, 374 N.W.2d 431 (Minn. 1995) (addressing the interaction between 
the U.C.C. and products liability law); Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 
377 (Minn. 1977) (addressing principles ofloss allocation). 
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The Restatement (Second) of Torts was the Reporters' vision of the 
law, as it existed in 1965. Section 402A and its seventeen com-
ments stated the law of strict liability.4 It was a rudimentary effort 
to solidify basic products liability principles. The Restatement (Third) 
of Torts: Products Liability, building on thirty years of case law, over-
shadows the Restatement (Second) in its comprehensiveness. It at-
tempts to reach consensus on the status of products liability law in 
a politically charged environment pOfulated by interest groups 
with distinct and conflicting interests. The Restatement (Third) of 
Torts includes twenty-one sections that discuss liability standards for 
sales of products by commercial sellers, post-sale obligations of 
sellers, and loss allocation principles.6 It offers detailed guidance 
on the kinds of transactions and products to which products liabil-
ity law will apply. 
7 
Generally speaking, current Minnesota law and the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts seem to be a good fit. Both deal with the perpetual 
tension between negligence and strict liability principles. The Re-
statement (Third) emphasizes that negligence concepts are at the 
base of design defect and failure to warn claims in its rules.8 Min-
nesota law helps to reinforce that conclusion. 
There are gaps, however, between Minnesota law and the Re-
statement (Third). For example, Minnesota law regarding post-sale 
obligations of product sellers is not fully formed, despite its simi-
larities to the Restatement (Third).9 As well, there are some differ-
ences in the way claims for economic loss and property damage are 
10 treated. 
This Article will compare the Restatement (Third) of Torts with 
4. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OFToRTS § 402A (1965). 
5. See Products Liability Symposium, 30 MICH.J.L. REF. 197 (1997). 
6. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 1-21 
(Proposed Final Draft, April 1, 1997) [hereinafter Proposed Final Draft]. 
7. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 19 (defining a product); §§ 3, 6, 
8,11-14 (addressing various transactions). 
8. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2. 
9. The Restatement (Third) imposes a post-sale duty to warn only when a rea-
sonable person in the product seller's position would provide the warning. See 
Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 10. Similarly, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
held that a continuing duty to warn post-sale arises only in special cases where the 
circumstance create the duty. See Hodder v. Goodyear Rubber & Tire Co., 426 
N.W.2d 826, 833 (Minn. 1988) (holding that Goodyear's continued sale of tires 
fitting a discontinued tire rim created the duty to warn), ceTt. denied, 492 U.S. 926 
(1989). 
10. See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Nishika Ltd., 565 N.W.2d 16 (Minn. 
1997) (explaining that purchasers of goods may sue for economic damage but 
other parties must show physical injury). 
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Minnesota products liability law. The comparison proceeds on a 
section-by-section basis, explaining each section and comparing it 
to Minnesota law. 
§ 1. LIABILI1Y OF COMMERCIAL SELLER OR DISTRIBUTOR FOR HARM 
CAUSED BY DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS 
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distribut-
ing products who sells or distributes a defective product is subject 
to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the product 
defect. II 
Commentary 
Section 1 "states a general rule of tort liability arplicable to 
commercial sellers and other distributors of products. "I It is based 
on both warranty and tort law. ls Likewise, Minnesota products li-
ability law has both tort and warranty origins. 14 
Section 1 does not use the term "strict liability," unlike section 
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 15 This reflects the ALI's 
judgment that true "strict liability" principles are not readily appli-
cable to cases involving defective design and failure to warn cases: 
"[S] trict products liability" is a term of art that reflects the 
judgment that products liability is a discrete area of tort 
law which borrows from both negligence and warranty. It 
is not fully congruent with classical tort or contract law. 
Rather than perpetuating confusion spawned by existing 
doctrinal categories, §§ 1 and 2 define the liability for 
each form of defect in terms directly addressing the vari-
ous kinds of defects. As long as these functional criteria 
are met, courts may utilize the terminology of negligence, 
strict liability or the implied warranty of merchantability, 
or simgly define liability in the terms set forth in the black 
letter. 
Justice Simonett posited essentially the same argument in his 
11. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § l. 
12. [d. cmt. a. 
13. See id. 
14. See, e.g., McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 
(1967); Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64 (1970); Beck 
v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543,99 N.W.2d 670 (1959). 
15. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
16. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 1 cmt. a. 
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concurring opinion in Bilotta v. Kelley CO.,17 which was later incor-
porated in the Minnesota Civil Jury Instructions.
ls 
With that in 
mind, one need not determine whether the theory of recovery is 
negligence or strict liability, so long as the plaintiff receives the 
benefit of the strongest and broadest theory of recovery, at least in 
design and failure to warn cases. 19 
Ultimately, Section 1 reflects the general treatment of product 
defects by the Minnesota Supreme Court, dividing products liabil-
ity cases into manufacturing flaw, design defect, and failure to warn 
• 20 
categones. 
Minnesota limits the application of strict liability to product 
sellers, including product manufacturers and other parties in the 
chain of distribution.21 In certain situations, however, Minnesota 
statutorily exempts sellers in the chain of manufacture and distri-
bution from liability. Section 544.41 of the Minnesota Statutes 
reads as follows: 
Subdivision. 1. In any product liability action based 
in whole or in part on strict liability in tort commenced or 
maintained against a defendant other than the manufac-
turer, that party shall upon answering or otherwise plead-
ing file an affidavit certifying the correct identity of the 
manufacturer of the product allegedly causing injury, 
death or damage. The commencement of a product li-
ability action based in whole or part on strict liability in 
tort against a certifying defendant shall toll the applicable 
statute of limitation relative to the defendant for purposes 
of asserting a strict liability in tort cause of action. 
Subd. 2. Once the plaintiff has filed a complaint 
against a manufacturer and the manufacturer has or is re-
quired to have answered or otherwise pleaded, the court 
shall order the dismissal of a strict liability in tort claim 
against the certifying defendant, provided the certifYing 
defendant is not within the categories set forth in subdivi-
sion 3. Due diligence shall be exercised by the certifying 
17. 346 N.W.2d 616, 626 (Minn. 1984). 
18. See MINNESOTA DrST. JUDGES Ass'N COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDE:S, 
MINNESOTA JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES (CIVIL) JIG 117-119 (Michael K. Steenson, 
rep.) in 4 MINN. PRACTICE 1, at 81-90 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter JURY INSTRUCTION 
GUIDES]. 
19. See JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, supra note 18,jIG 117, Authorities at 83. 
20. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 6 cmt. a. 
21. See Hudson v. Snyder Body, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 149, 156 (Minn. 1982); 
O'Laughlin v. Minnesota Natural Gas Co., 253 N.W.2d 826,830-32 (Minn. 1977); 
Sorenson v. Safety Flate, Inc., 298 Minn. 353, 361,216 N.W.2d 859, 864 (1974). 
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defendant in providing the plaintiff with the correct iden-
tity of the manufacturer and due diligence shall be exer-
cised by the plaintiff in filing a law suit and obtaining ju-
risdiction over the manufacturer. 
The plaintiff may at any time subsequent to dismissal 
move to vacate the order of dismissal and reinstate the 
certifying defendant, provided plaintiff can show one of 
the following: 
(a) That the applicable statute of limitation bars the 
assertion of a strict liability in tort cause of action against 
the manufacturer of the product allegedly causing the in-
jury, death or damage; 
(b) That the identity of the manufacturer given to 
the plaintiff by the certifying defendant was incorrect. 
Once the correct identity of the manuf~cturer has been 
given by the certifYing defendant the court shall again 
dismiss the certifying defendant; 
(c) That the manufacturer no longer exists, cannot 
be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, or, 
despite due diligence, the manufacturer is not amenable 
to service of process; 
(d) That the manufacturer is unable to satisfy any 
judgment as determined by the court; or 
(e) That the court determines that the manufacturer 
would be unable to satisfy a reasonable settlement or 
other agreement with plaintiff. 
Subd. 3. A court shall not enter a dismissal order 
relative to any certifying defendant even though full com-
pliance with subdivision 1 has been made where the plain-
tiff can show one of the following: 
(a) That the defendant has exercised some signifi-
cant control over the design or manufacture of the prod-
uct, or has provided instructions or warnings to the manu-
facturer relative to the alleged defect in the product 
which has caused the injury, death or damage; 
(b) That the defendant had actual knowledge of the 
defect in the product which caused the injury, death or 
damage; or 
(c) That the defendant created the defect in the 
product which caused the injury, death or damage. 
Subd. 4. Nothing contained in subdivisions 1 to 3 
HeinOnline -- 24 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 7 1998
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shall be construed to create a cause of action in strict li-
ability in tort or based on other legal theory, or to affect 
the right of any person to seek and obtain indemnity or 
contribution.22 
Minnesota requires proof of three basic elements in a prod-
ucts liability case: (1) that the defendant's product was in a defec-
tive condition unreasonably dangerous for its intended use, (2) 
that the defect existed when the product left the defendant's con-
trol, and (3) that the defect was the proximate cause of the injury 
sustained.2s The elements in Section 1 are similar to Minnesota 
law, but a subtle difference exists. Section 1 eliminates use of the 
term "unreasonably dangerous" and now requires proof that the 
product was in a "defective condition.,,24 The Minnesota Supreme 
Court traditionally adheres to the "unreasonably dangerous" re-
quirement,25 but has not used it as a dispositive element in all 
products liability cases.
26 
Even so, whether the term "unreasonably 
dangerous" is used seems irrelevant. The critical factor is how the 
term is defined, rather than the term itself.
27 
Consequently, elimi-
nating the "unreasonably dangerous" language from jury instruc-
tions would not change the substance of the standards used to de-
termine liability issues. 
§ 2. CATEGORIES OF PRODUCT DEFECT 
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, 
it contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is de-
fective because of inadequate instructions or warnings. A product: 
(a) contains a manufacturing defect when the product de-
parts from its intended design even though all possible care was 
exercised in the preparation and marketing of the product; 
(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of 
22. MINN. STAT. § 544.41 (1996). 
23. See Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 623 n.3 (Minn. 1984); Aby v. St. 
Paul Union Stockyards, 373 N.w.2d 810, 812 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Smits v. E-Z 
Por Corp., 365 N.W.2d 352, 354 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); see also Worden v. 
Gangelhoff, 308 Minn. 252, 254-55, 241 N.W.2d 650, 651 (1976) (stating that 
these basic elements are common to strict liability, negligence, and implied war-
ranty theories ofrecovery). 
24. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 1 cmt. a. 
25. See Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 623 n.3. 
26. See, e.g., Hudson, 326 N.W.2d at 155; Kerr v. Coming Glass Works, 284 
Minn. 115, 117, 169 N.W.2d 587, 588 (1969). 
27. See Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 626 (Simonett,j., concurring specially). 
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harm posed by the product could have been reduced by the 
adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or 
other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of 
distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders 
the product not reasonably safe; 
(c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or warn-
ings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product 
could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of rea-
sonable instructions or warnings by the seller or other distribu-
tor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, 
and the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the 
28 
product not reasonably safe. 
Commentary 
The Restatement (Thinl) utilizes different standards for each 
type of product defect. With respect to manufacturing defects, the 
Restatement (Third) imposes liability even if the manufacturer exer-
cises reasonable care in its quality control efIorts.29 Strict liability in 
this context fosters several objectives such as promoting safety, dis-
cussing consumption of defective products, and reducing litigation 
costs. Specifically, the Restatement (Third) notes: 
On the premise that tort law serves the instrumental func-
tion of creating safety initiatives, imposing strict liability 
on manufacturers for harm caused by manufacturing de-
fects encourages greater investment in product safety than 
does a regime of fault-based liability under which, as a 
practical matter, sellers may escape their appropriate 
share of responsibility. Some courts and commentators 
also have said that strict liability discourages the consump-
tion of defective products by causing the purchase prices 
of products to reflect, more than would a rule of negli-
gence, the costs of defects. And by eliminating the issue 
of manufacturer fault from plaintiff's case, strict liability 
reduces the transaction costs involved in litigating that is-
30 sue. 
In addition, there are important fairness concerns that sup-
port the imposition of liability on a manufacturer. Liability results 
28. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2. 
29. See id. cmt. a. 
30. [d. 
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even when the plaintiff cannot prove that the manufacturer's qual-
ity control standards are unreasonable. The Restatement (Third) 
provides: 
In many cases manufacturing defects are in fact caused by 
manufacturer negligence but plaintiffs have difficulty in 
proving it. Strict liability therefore performs a function 
similar to the concept of res ipsa loquitur, allowing de-
serving plaintiffs to succeed notwithstanding what would 
otherwise be difficult or insuperable problems of proof. 
Products that malfunction due to manufacturing defects 
disappoint reasonable expectations of product perform-
ance. Because manufacturers invest in quality control at 
consciously chosen levels, their knowledge that a predict-
able number of flawed products will enter the market-
place entails an element of deliberation about the amount 
of injury that will result from their activity. Finally, many 
believe that consumers who benefit from products with-
out suffering harm should share, through increases in the 
prices charged for those products, the burden of un-
avoidable injury costs that result from manufacturing de-
fects. 31 
While not clearly articulated in Minnesota cases, some of the 
above reasons have motivated the supreme court's application of 
strict liability in products liability cases involving manufacturing de-
fects. 32 
31. Id. 
32. See, e.g., Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Minn. 321, 327-28, 
188 N.W.2d 426, 431 (1971); McConnack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 338, 
154 N.W.2d 488, 500 (1967). In McCormack, the supreme court adopted the the-
ory of strict liability and noted: 
This rule of strict tort liability, as it is appropriately called, qualifies as a 
tested legal theory along with the traditional theories of negligence and 
breach of warranty where the latter meet the purpose for which liability 
should be imposed upon a supplier of a product. However, in our view, 
enlarging a manufacturer's liability to those injured by its products more 
adequately meets public-policy demands to protect consumers from the 
inevitable risks of bodily hann created by mass production and complex 
marketing conditions. In a case such as this, subjecting a manufacturer 
to liability without proof of negligence or privity of contract, as the rule 
intends, imposes the cost of injury resulting from a defective product 
upon the maker, who can both most effectively reduce or eliminate the 
hazard to life and health, and absorb and pass on such costs, instead of 
upon the consumer, who possesses neither the skill nor the means nec-
essary to protect himself adequately from either the risk of injury or its 
disastrous consequences. 
McCormack, 278 Minn. at 338, 154 N.W.2d at 500. 
In Lee, the court summarized the policy concerns noted in McCormack and 
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The Restatement (Third) posits that liability cases involving de-
sign defects and defects based on inadequate instructions or warn-
ings are predicated on concepts different from manufacturing de-
fect cases.33 Whether there is a design defect cannot be decided 
using the manufacturer's own design standards, as in manufactur-
ing defect cases, because the plaintiff attacks the standard itself as 
unreasonable.34 Therefore, some form of risk-utility balancing is 
necessary to determine whether the design standard is unreason-
able.35 Furthermore, a product is not defective just because it pres-
ents an element of danger.36 A manufacturer must balance a vari-
ety of factors when selecting a particular design, and any standard 
of liability should focus on those tradeofIs to determine if the de-
sign is flawed or the warnings or instructions are inadequate. 
The Restatement's definition of "defective condition" coincides 
with the Minnesota definition adopted in Bilotta.37 The policy con-
siderations are the same. Both permit a jury to evaluate the utility 
as well as the risk created by a particular product in order to de-
elsewhere, as follows: 
(1) The public interest in safety will be promoted by discouraging the 
marketing of defective products which constitute a menace to consumers 
not equipped to protect themselves from products they are induced to 
purchase through modern advertising methods by persuasive representa-
tions that the product is suitable and safe for its intended use; (2) the 
burden of loss caused by placing a defective product on the market 
should be borne by the manufacturer, who is best able to distribute it by 
insuring against inevitable hazards as a part of the cost of the product; 
(3) maximum legal protection should be afforded the consumer to 
promote product safety and to encourage the growing practice of repu-
table manufacturers and sellers of settling valid claims without litigation; 
and (4) one injured by a defective product should be entitled to bring 
action directly against the party responsible for putting the product on 
the market without becoming involved in the delay and expense of join-
ing other sellers in the chain of distribution, as frequently occurs when 
liability is sought to be determined under warranty provisions of the Uni-
form Commercial Code. 
Lee, 290 Minn. at 327-28, 188 N.W.2d at 431-32. 
The Lee court noted that the greatest impediment to establishing strict liabil-
ity under the Restatement (Second) rule is proving that the product was defective 
and that the defect existed when it left the manufacturer's hands. See id. at 329, 
188 N.W.2d at 432. The court held that the core of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is 
sufficient to take a case involving an exploding bottle to a jury on a theory of strict 
liability, as well a negligence theory. See id. at 329-30, 188 N.W.2d at 432-33. The 
court intended to ease the plaintiff's burden of proof in such cases. 
33. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2 cmt. a. 
34. See id. § 2 cmt. d. 
35. See id. 
36. See id. 
37. See id. § 2; Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 622 (Minn. 1984). 
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termine which costs should be fairly borne by the manufacturer.38 
The &statement (Third) rejects the consumer expectation standard 
as a means of determining whether a product is defective.
s9 
The 
Minnesota Supreme Court did the same in Bilotta.4O 
Prior to Bilotta, the standard approach to products liability 
cases was reflected in the second edition of the Civil Jury Instruction 
Guides. 
A product is in a defective condition if, at the time it 
leaves the seller's hands, it is in a condition which is un-
reasonably dangerous to the ordinary user. 
A condition is unreasonable dangerous if it is dangerous 
when used by an ordinary user who uses it with the 
knowledge common to the community as to the product's 
characteristics and common usage. 
The defect may be in the design of the product itself or in 
the instructions necessary for its safe use.
41 
The instruction, although rudimentary, appeared all-
encompassing. Use of the instruction, when coupled with other 
standards, occasionally resulted in inconsistent jury verdicts.
42 
Prior to Bilotta, the Minnesota Supreme Court edged toward a 
comprehensive theory in defective design cases. In 1982, the su-
preme court rejected obviousness of a product danger as a bar to 
recovery in Holm v. Sponco Mfg., Inc.
4s 
The Holm decision overruled 
Halvorson v. American Hoist & Derrick CO.,44 which held only six years 
earlier that obviousness could bar recovery.45 The current Minne-
sota approach is reflected in the Restatement.46 Obviousness of the 
danger is only one factor among many in determining whether a 
d . d £ . 47 pro uct IS e ectIve. 
38. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2 cmt. a; Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 
622. 
39. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2 cmt. a. 
40. See Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 622. 
41. MINNESOTA DlSf. JUDGES Ass'N COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, 
MINNESOTA JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES (CML) JIG II 118 (Hetland & Adamson, 
reps.) in 4 MlNN. PRACTICE 1, at 98 (2d ed. 1974). 
42. See, e.g., Halvorson v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 307 Minn. 48, 240 
N.W.2d 303 (1976) (reversing jury verdict that danger of electrocution was obvi-
ous), overruled on other grounds by Holm v. Sponco Mfg., Inc., 324 N.W.2d 207 
(Minn. 1982). 
43. 324 N.W.2d 207 (Minn. 1982). 
44. 307 Minn. 48, 240 N.W.2d 303 (1976). 
45. See id. at 57,240 N.W.2d at 308. 
46. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2 cmt. d. 
47. See Holm, 324 N.W.2d at 212. 
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Bilotta was a design defect case involving an allegedly defective 
dockboard.
48 
The manufacturer made conscious design choices 
when it adopted the design in question.
49 
The trial court instructed 
the jury using the Restatement (Second) of Torts' consumer expecta-
tion standard. The result was in a plaintiff's verdict.
50 
On appeal, 
the supreme court reversed, holding that the standard was unduly 
narrow in design cases: 
JIG II 118 was formulated for the qualitatively different 
product defect of inadvertent manufacturing flaws. In 
such a case an objective standard exists-the flawless 
product-by which a jury can measure the alleged defect. 
Thus, in manufacturing-flaw cases, the defect is proved by 
focusing on the condition of the product. The JIG II 118 
consumer expectation instructions, which focus only on 
the condition of the product, are appropriate for this type 
of case, since the manufacturer's conduct is irrelevant. 
In a design defect case, however, there is no doubt that 
the product is in the condition intended by the manufac-
turer. In such a case, the "defect" lies in a consciously 
chosen design. The manufacturer has deliberately added 
or omitted the challenged component and has presuma-
bly made that decision after balancing a variety of factors. 
A jury must, appellant contends, be told to weigh these 
same factors and decide whether the risk-utility balance 
struck by the manufacturer was or was not reasonable. In 
Holm v. Sponco, we adopted as an objective standard the 
reasonable care balancing test, which focuses on the con-
duct of the manufacturer in evaluating whether its choice 
of design struck an acceptable balance among several 
• c: 51 competmg J.actors. 
The position taken in the Civil Jury Instruction Guides attempts 
to outline the court's decision. The instruction reads as follows: 
A manufacturer has a duty to use reasonable care when 
designing a product, so as to avoid any unreasonable risk 
of harm to (anyone who) (property that) is likely to be 
exposed to harm when the product is put to its intended 
use or to any use that is unintended but is reasonably 
foreseeable. 
48. See Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 619 (Minn. 1984). 
49. See id. 
50. See id. at 621. 
51. [d. at 621-22. 
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What constitutes reasonable care will vary with the sur-
rounding circumstances. Reasonable care is the care that 
a reasonably prudent person would exercise under the 
same or similar circumstances. 
The reasonable care to be exercised by a manufacturer 
when designing a product will depend on all the facts and 
circumstances, including, among others, the likelihood 
and seriousness of harm against the feasibility and burden 
of any precautions which would be effective to avoid the 
harm. You are instructed that the manufacturer is obli-
gated to keep informed of scientific knowledge and dis-
coveries in its field. 
If the manufacturer did not use reasonable care when 
designing the product in question, then the product is in 
a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the 
(user or consumer) (user's or consumer's property).52 
With this approach, the plaintiff receives the same instruction 
whether the theory alleged is strict liability or negligence. 53 The in-
struction informs the jury that the product is defective if the manu-
facturer failed to use reasonable care in designing the product.
54 
Unless other distinctions between strict liability and negligence sur-
face, these theories are simply different labels without any substan-
tive distinctions between them.
55 
In Bilotta, the court stated that, 
"the distinction between strict liability and negligence in design-
defect and failure-to-wam cases is that in strict liability, knowledge 
of the condition of the product and the risks involved in that con-
dition will be imputed to the manufacturer, whereas in negligence 
these elements must be proven. n56 The implication is that knowl-
edge of product dangers is imputed to product manufacturers irre-
spective of whether they reasonably know or should have known of 
the dangers. The issue is whether the court really meant what it 
said. 
The Restatement (Third) notes that foreseeability of the risk is 
rarely an issue in design defect cases that involve mechanical prod-
uct: 
Once the plaintiff establishes that the product was put 
52. JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, supra note 18,JIG 117, at 82. 
53. See id. Authorities at 83. 
54. See id. Authorities at 82-83. 
55. See id. 
56. Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 622; see also JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, supra note 
18, JIG 117, Authorities at 83. 
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to a reasonably foreseeable use, physical risks of injury are 
generally known or reasonably knowable by experts in the 
field. It is not unfair to charge a manufacturer with 
knowledge of such generally known or knowable risks. 
The issue of foreseeability of risk of harm is more 
complex in the case of products such as prescription 
drugs, medical devices, and toxic chemicals. Risks atten-
dant to use and consumption of these products may, in-
deed, be unforeseeable at the time of sale. Unforeseeable 
risks arising from foreseeable product use or consump-
tion by definition cannot specifically be warned against. 
Thus, in connection with a claim of inadequate design, 
instruction, or warning, plaintiff should bear the burden 
of establishing that the risk in question was known or 
should have been known to the relevant community. 57 
The Civil Jury Instruction Guides take the following position on 
the issue: 
In a case where the design defect was the result of an er-
ror, or where the decision was not made with clear knowl-
edge of its ramifications, it may be appropriate to add to 
the jury instruction language incorporating the imputed 
knowledge concept. The following addition to the jury 
instruction would incorporate that concept: 
You are to assume that the manufacturer knew of the 
condition of the product and the risks involved in the 
product's condition in determining whether reason-
able care was exercised in the design of the product.58 
The concern expressed in the accompanying comments lS 
similar to the Restatement So 
If the imputed knowledge language is applied literally 
in either design defect or failure to warn cases, then the 
manufacturer's conduct in either design defect or failure 
to warn cases would be judged according to knowledge of 
product dangers that the manufacturer did not discover 
and could not have discovered. However, the Committee 
is of the opinion that the supreme court did not intend to 
impute to a product manufacturer knowledge of a danger 
that was not and could not have been discovered at the 
time the product was manufactured. To avoid applying 
the imputed knowledge language in such cases, the sug-
57. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2 cmt. m. 
58. JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, supra note 18,jIG 117, Authorities at 84. 
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gested instruction incorporating the imputed knowledge 
language should be utilized only where there is evidence 
that the manufacturer either knew or should have known 
of the dangers created by the product in question. 59 
Under the Restatement standard, the plaintiff must show that 
foreseeable risks of harm could be reduced by the adoption of "a 
reasonable, safer design."60 The Restatement notes that "state of the 
art": 
has been variously defined to mean that the product de-
sign conforms to industry custom, that it reflects the safest 
and most advanced technology developed and in com-
mercial use, or that it reflects technology at the cutting 
edge of scientific knowledge. This Section states that a 
design is defective if the product could have been made 
safer by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design. 
If such a design could have been practically adopted at 
time of sale and if failure to adopt such a design rendered 
the product not reasonably safe, the plaintiff establishes 
defect under Subsection (b). When a defendant demon-
strates that its product design was the safest in use at the 
time of sale, it may be difficult for plaintiff to prove that 
an alternative design could have been practically adopted. 
Defendant is thus allowed to introduce evidence with re-
gard to industry practice that bears on whethe.r an alter-
native design was practicable. Industry practice may also 
be relevant to whether the omission of an alternative de-
sign rendered the product not reasonably safe. While 
such evidence of industry practice is admissible, it is not 
necessarily dispositive. If plaintiff introduces expert tes-
timony to establish that a reasonable alternative design 
could practically have been adopted, a trier of fact may 
conclude that the product was defective notwithstanding 
that such a design was not adopted by any manufacturer, 
or even considered for commercial use, at the time of 
61 sale. 
In apparent contrast, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Kallio 
v. Ford Motor CO. 62 took the position that "existence of a safer, prac-
tical alternative design is not an element of an alleged defective 
59. Id. 
60. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2 cmt. d. 
61. Id. 
62. 407 N.W.2d 92 (Minn. 1987). 
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product design prima facie case.,,63 In Kallio, the trial court used 
JIG 117 of the third edition as the base instruction and instructed 
the jury that it could consider other factors, including "state of the 
art" and the "practices of the automotive industry" at the time the 
truck was sold.
64 
The court approved the instructions, noting that 
the "tenor, if not the literal wording, of the instructions permitted 
the jury to consider availability of, and failure to use, an alternative, 
safer design as a factor.,,65 
Ford Motor Co. 's requested instruction was lengthier, and it 
was framed in mandatory terms: 
For you to conclude that the design of the park system in 
the subject Ford vehicle was defective and unreasonably 
dangerous at the time of sale by Ford Motor Company, 
the plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that, at the time the vehicle was designed, there was 
available to the defendant a feasible practicable alterna-
tive design and that that design, if it had been chosen by 
Ford, would have avoided or materially reduced the plain-
tiff's injury. If the plaintiffs fail to prove the existence of 
such a feasible, practicable alternative design, they will be 
unable to prove that Ford's choice of design was unrea-
sonable. The plaintiff cannot carry his burden in this re-
gard merely by showing that an alternative design was 
possible. To succeed in this case the plaintiffs must estab-
lish that such a design would have been feasible and prac-
ticable, and that it would have avoided or materially re-
duced the plaintiff's injury.66 
63. Id. at 97. 
64. See id. at 96. 
65. Id. at 97. 
66. Id. at 94 nA. The Civil Jury Instruction Guides contain a suggested jury in-
struction on the feasible alternative issue, should a court choose to instruct on the 
issue: 
In deciding if the suggested alternative design was feasible at the 
time the product in question was manufactured, there are several factors 
you must consider. First, was the suggested alternative design techno-
logically feasible? This means that, given the technology available at the 
time the product was manufactured, the suggested alternative was tech-
nicallyavailable. 
Second, you must consider the safety of the suggested alternative. 
Does it provide overall safety as good as or better than that of the prod-
uct in question, and does it provide better protection against the particu-
lar hazard or risk of injury created by the product in question. 
Third, you must consider the cost of the suggested alternative. Will 
the suggested alternative significantly increase the cost of the product in 
question. 
HeinOnline -- 24 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 17 1998
1998] RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS UABlliTY 17 
The supreme court found the requested instruction overly 
broad for two reasons. First, it elevated the feasible alternative re-
quirement to part of the plaintiff's prima facie case. Second, it 
tended to overemphasize the reasonable alternative factor.67 
The supreme court sanctioned the trial court's instruction, be-
cause it included "state of the art" as a factor in design defect cases. 
Despite this sanction, the court clearly noted the importance of 
state of the art evidence in design litigation.68 First, the court noted 
that "as a practical matter, successful plaintiffs, almost without fail, 
introduce evidence of an alternative safer design.,,69 Second, the 
court noted that a plaintiff normally presents such evidence, and it 
is appropriate for the jury to consider state of the art evidence. 
The court explained: 
As in other tort cases, plaintiffs asserting a strict liability 
tort claim based upon alleged defective design of a prod-
uct ultimately have the burden to prove the elements of 
the asserted claim. Generally in a case based upon al-
leged improper design, one of those elements requires 
production of evidence that the design employed was un-
reasonably dangerous. To establish a prima facie case 
that it was unreasonably dangerous normally requires 
production of evidence of the existence of a feasible, al-
. d' 70 ternatIve eSlgn. 
The court concluded that while the evidence is relevant and 
may be pivotal in deciding design cases, "it is not necessarily re-
quired in all cases. "71 If there is any potential difference between 
the Restatement and Minnesota positions on design defect, it is in 
Fourth, you must consider whether the suggested alternative will af-
fect the performance of the product. 
Before you find the suggested alternative to be feasible, you must 
find that any increases in the cost of the product or changes in the per-
formance and function of the product are outweighed by the added 
safety of the alternative design. 
JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, supra note 18, JIG 117, Authorities at 85. The instruc-
tion is based on Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322 (Or. 1978). See id. 
67. See Kallio, 407 N.W.2d at 97. The Minnesota pattern jury instructions in-
clude an instruction on custom, stating that the evidence is not conclusive on the 
due care issue, but is to be considered by the jury, "along with all the other evi-
dence in the case in deciding whether the (plaintifi) or (defendant) exercised 
reasonable care." JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, supra note 18,JIG 101.1, at 51. 
68. See Kallio, 407 N.W.2d at 96-97. 
69. [d. at 96 n.6. 
70. [d. at 96. 
71. [d. at 96-97. 
HeinOnline -- 24 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 18 1998
18 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24 
this language in Kallio. The court footnoted the statement
72 
and 
referred to two cases: Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,73 a 1978 Oregon 
Supreme Court case, and O'Brien v. Muskin Corp.,74 a 1983 New Jer-
sey Supreme Court case. The court prefaced the citation to those 
cases by stating that, "[c]onceivably, rare cases may exist where the 
product may be judged unreasonably dangerous because it should 
be removed from the market rather than be redesigned.,,75 
Wilson reflects the Minnesota Supreme Court's concern, but 
without being specific. The court stated: 
If, for example, the danger was relatively severe and the 
product had only limited utility, the court might properly 
conclude that the jury could find that a reasonable manu-
facturer would not have introduced such a product into 
the stream of commerce. We hold here only that, given 
the nature of the product and of the defects alleged, it was 
improper to submit the issue of a defect in the engine de-
sign to the jury in the absence of appropriate evidence 
that the safer alternative design was practicable.76 
O'Brien, however, is more specific.77 Central to the case was the 
feasible alternative requirement.
7s 
The court rejected the necessity 
of proving a feasible alternative in all cases. It stated: 
The evaluation of the utility of a product also involves 
the relative need for that product; some products are es-
sentials, while others are luxuries. A product that fills a 
critical need and can be designed in only one way should 
be viewed differently from a luxury item. Still other 
products, including some for which no alternative exists, 
are so dangerous and of such little use that under the 
risk-utility analysis, a manufacturer would bear the cost of 
liability of harm to others. That cost might dissuade a 
manufacturer from placing the product on the market, 
even if the product has been made as safely as possible. 
Indeed, plaintiff contends that above-ground pools with 
vinyl liners are such products and that manufacturers who 
market those pools should bear the cost of injuries they 
cause to foreseeable users. 
72. See id. at 97 n.B. 
73. 577 P.2d 1322 (Or. 1978). 
74. 463A.2d 298 (NJ. 1983). 
75. Kallio, 407 N.W.2d at 97 n.8. 
76. Wilson, 577 P.2d at 1328 n.5. 
77. See O'Brien, 463 A.2d at 298 (involving an above-ground swimming pool 
that utilized a vinyl liner). 
78. See id. at 306. 
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A critical issue at trial was whether the design of the 
pool, calling for a vinyl bottom in a pool four feet deep, 
was defective. The trial court should have permitted the 
jury to consider whether, because of the dimensions of 
the pool and slipperiness of the bottom, the risks of injury 
so outweighed the utility of the product as to constitute a 
defect. In removing that issue from consideration by the 
jury, the trial court erred. To establish sufficient proof to 
compel submission of the issue to the jury for appropriate 
fact-finding under risk-utility analysis, it was not necessary 
for plaintiff to prove the existence of alternative, safer de-
signs. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
plaintiff, even if there are no alternative methods of mak-
ing bottoms for above-ground pools, the jury might have 
found that the risk posed by the pool outweighed its util-
ity. 
In a design-defect case, the plaintiff bears the burden 
of both going forward with the evidence and of persua-
sion that the product contained a defect. To establish a 
prima facie case, the plaintiff should adduce sufficient 
evidence on the risk-utility factors to establish a defect. 
With respect to above-ground swimming pools, for exam-
ple, the plaintiff might seek to establish that pools are 
marketed primarily for recreational, not therapeutic pur-
poses; that because of their design, including their con-
figuration, inadequate warnings, and the use of vinyl lin-
ers, injury is likely; that, without impairing the usefulness 
of the pool or pricing it out of the market, warnings 
against diving could be made more prominent and a liner 
less dangerous. It may not be necessary for the plaintiff to 
introduce evidence on all those alternatives. Conversely, 
the plaintiff may wish to offer proof on other matters 
relevant to the risk-utility analysis. It is not a foregone 
conclusion that plaintiff ultimately will prevail on a 
risk-utility ana~sis, but he should have an opportunity to 
prove his case. 
The Restatement disagrees. The fourth illustration, in comment 
d to section 2, reads as follows: 
XYZ Co. Manufactures above-ground swimming pools 
that are four feet deep. Warnings are embossed on the 
outside of the pools in large letters stating "DANGER-DO 
NOT DIVE." In disregard of the warnings, Mary, age 21, 
79. Id. 
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dove head first into an XYZ pool and suffered serious in-
jury. Expert testimony establishes that when Mary's out-
stretched hands hit the pool's slippery vinyl bottom her 
hands slid apart, causing her to strike her head against the 
bottom of the pool. For the purposes of this Illustration it 
is assumed that the warnings were adequate and that the 
only issue is whether the above-ground pool was defec-
tively designed because the bottom was too slippery. All 
the expert witnesses agree that the vinyl pool liner that 
XYZ utilized was the best and safest liner available and 
that no alternative, less slippery liner was feasible. Mary 
has failed to establish defective design under Subsection 
(b) .80 
The next comment and illustration of the Restatement (Third) 
outline its position on the issue. The comment explains that a 
product might be defective even though there is no feasible alter-
native that would not impair the product's utility: 
Several courts have suggested that the design of some 
products are so manifestly unreasonable, in that they have 
low social utility and high degree of danger, that liability 
should attach even absent proof of a reasonable alterna-
tive design. In large part the problem is one of how the 
range of relevant alternative designs is described. For ex-
ample, a toy gun that shoots hard rubber pellets with suf-
ficient velocity to cause injury to children could be found 
to be defectively designed within the rule of Subsection 
(b). Toy guns unlikely to cause injury would constitute 
reasonable alternatives to the dangerous toy. Thus, toy 
guns that project ping pong balls, soft gelatin pellets, or 
water might be found to be reasonable alternative designs 
to a toy gun that shoots hard pellets. However, if the real-
ism of the hard-pellet gun, and thus its capacity to cause 
injury, is sufficiently important to those who purchase and 
use such products to justify the court's limiting considera-
tion to toy guns that achieve realism by shooting hard pel-
lets, then no reasonable alternative will, by hypothesis, be 
available. In that instance, the design feature that defines 
which alternatives are relevant - the realism of the hard-
pellet gun and thus its capacity to injure - is precisely the 
feature on which the user places value and of which the 
plaintiff complains. If a court were to adopt this charac-
terization of the product, and deem the capacity to cause 
80. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2 illus. 4. 
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injury an egregiously unacceptable quality in a toy for use 
by children, it could conclude that liability should attach 
without proof of a reasonable alternative design. The 
court would declare the product design to be defective 
and not reasonably safe because the extremely high de-
gree of danger posed by its use or consumption so sub-
stantially outweighs its negligible social utility that no ra-
tional, reasonable person, fully aware of the relevant facts, 
would choose to use, or to allow children to use, the 
81 product. . 
The flfth illustration, following comment e, reads as follows: 
ABC Co. manufactures novelty items. One item, an 
exploding cigar, is made to explode with a loud bang and 
the emission of smoke. Robert purchased the exploding 
cigar and presented it to his boss, Jack, at a birthday party 
arranged for him at the office. Jack lit the cigar. When it 
exploded, the heat from the explosion litJack's beard on 
flre causing serious bums to his face. If a court were to 
recognize the rule identifled in this Comment, the flnder 
of fact might find ABC liable for the defective design of 
the exploding cigar even if no reasonable alternative de-
sign was available that would provide similar prank char-
acteristics. The utility of the exploding cigar is so low and 
the risk of injury is so high as to warrant a conclusion that 
the ciJPr is defective and should not have been marketed 
at all. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has not yet had its exploding 
cigar case, but the court has structured desiW defect law in Minne-
sota to provide for it when the match is lit. That does not mean 
that the need for a reasonable alternative design is irrelevant in 
Minnesota. The court's decision in Kallio clearly notes the general 
need for that proof in a design case.84 While Minnesota differs in 
minor respects, Minnesota law in general seems consistent with the 
Restatement (Third) position on design defect cases. The Restatement 
does not take a position on "the specifics of how a jury should be 
instructed."85 As long as the instructions "are generally consistent 
with the rule of law set forth in Subsection (b), their specific form 
81. Id. cmt. e. 
82. Id. illus. 5. 
83. See Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 96 (Minn. 1987). 
84. See id. 
85. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2 cmt. f. 
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and content are matters of local laW.,,86 Minnesota's instructions 
seem to incorporate the important elements of the Restatement view. 
Failure to Warn 
The Restatement requires a seller to warn only of dangers that 
87 
were or should have been known by the manufacturer. The 
Bilotta court stated that in design defect and failure to warn cases 
"knowledge of the condition of the product and the risks involved 
in that condition will be imputed to the manufacturer."ss The su-
preme court's decisions in failure to warn cases, however, are 
equivocal. The supreme court has stated that strict liability princi-
ples apply in failure to warn cases and has required claimants to 
elect between negligence and strict liability theories. Yet, the court 
has also stated that negligence principles apply in strict liability 
context.89 As a result, absent any indication that the court intends 
to establish real distinctions between negligence and strict liability 
in failure to warn cases, the underlying basis of recovery is the 
same, regardless of the label. At a minimum, it seems clear that the 
court's statement that negligence principles govern in failure to 
warn cases means that knowledge of the risks created by the prod-
uct will not be imputed to the product manufacturer.
90 
The duality of the court's approach to failure to warn theory is 
reflected in the pattern jury instructions. The instructions state 
that a claimant is entitled to a single instruction on failure to warn 
theory and receives the same instruction for either a strict liability 
or negligence claim.91 The instructions attempt to accommodate 
the court's requirement that plaintiffs elect one theory by the close 
of the case,92 where a distinction between the theories has not been 
86. Id. 
87. See id. § 2. 
88. Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 622 (Minn. 1984). 
89. See Forster v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Minn. 
1989); Huber v. Niagara Mach. and Tool Works, 430 N.W.2d 465, 467 n.1 (Minn. 
1988); Germann v. F.L. Smithe Co., 395 N.W.2d 922,926 nA (Minn. 1986). 
90. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
91. See JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, supra note I8,JIG 119, at 91. 
92. See Hauenstein v. Loctite Corp., 347 N.W.2d 272 (Minn. 1984): 
[W]e hold that ... where a plaintiff seeks damages for both negligence 
and strict liability based solely upon failure to warn, the plaintiff may 
submit the case to the jury on only one theory. The plaintiff can plead 
and prove at trial either or both theories, but by the time the parties rest, 
the plaintiff must announce whether the case will be submitted to the 
jury on negligence or strict liability. 
Id. at 275. The Hauenstein court faced an inconsistent verdict when the jury found 
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clearly established.93 
The warning obligation under the Restatement (Third) requires 
the instructions to inform users and consumers on ways to avoid 
risks. It also requires warnings that inform of the existence and na-
ture of product risks.94 Minnesota law is substantially similar. 95 
The Restatement declares that generally, a product seller is not 
subject to liability for failure to warn or instruct as to "risks and risk 
avoidance measures that should be obvious to, or generally known 
by, foreseeable product users. "96 The comment explains: 
When a risk is obvious or generally known, the prospec-
tive addressees of a warning will or should already know 
of its existence. Warning of an obvious or generally 
known risk in most instances will not provide an effective 
additional measure of safety. Furthermore, warnings that 
deal with obvious or generally known risks may be ig-
nored by users and consumers and may diminish the sig-
nificance of warnings about non-obvious, not-generally-
known risks. Thus, requiring warnings of obvious or gen-
erally known risks could reduce the efficacy of warnings 
generally. When reasonable minds may differ as to 
whether the risk was obvious or generally known, the issue 
is to be decided by the trier of fact. The obviousness of 
risk may bear on the issue of design defect rather than 
f::"':1 97 dllure to warn. 
The Minnesota courts take the same position, typically holdin~ 
that warnings are not required in such cases as a matter of law. 
the product in question was not defective, but the manufacturer was negligent in 
causing the injury. See id. at 275. The Hauenstein court held that the verdict was 
not reconcilable, but that the jury's finding of no causation on the negligence 
question made the inconsistency irrelevant. See id. at 276. 
93. The Hauenstein court held that under both strict liability and negligence 
theories a manufacturer's duty to warn extends to all reasonably foreseeable users. 
See id. at 275. 
94. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2 cmt. i. 
95. See Frey y. Montgomery Ward & Co., 258 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Minn. 1977) 
(stating that the duty to warn consists of the duty to give adequate instructions for 
safe use and to warn of dangers inherent in improper usage); JURY INSTRUCTION 
GUIDES, supra note 18,jIG 119, at 90. 
96. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2 cmt.j. 
97. [d. 
98. See Mix v. MTD Products, Inc., 393 N.W.2d 18, 19-20 n.2 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1986) (referring to Holm v. Sponco Mfg., Inc., 324 N.W.2d 207, 212 (Minn. 
1982), which states that obviousness of the risk is only one factor to consider in a 
design defect case, does not apply in a failure to warn case); Willmar Poultry Co. 
v. Carns Chern. Co., 378 N.W.2d 830, 835 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (explaining that 
plaintiff had knowledge of risk, and as a question of fact, the jury was instructed 
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There is probably no duty to warn a sophisticated product user of 
the dangers associated with the product.99 The Restatement (Third) 
notes that in an appropriate case the manufacturer may have a duty 
to warn the ultimate user of the product, rather than an intermedi-
ary, such as the plaintiff's employer.loo Minnesota law is to the 
same effect. 101 
Under Minnesota law, the supreme court has held that the ex-
istence of a duty to warn is a question of law"for the court.
102 
The 
adequacy issue is then for the jury. 103 Under the Restatement (Third) 
standard, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that adequate in-
structions were not provided. 1M The Restatement states that a prod-
uct "is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings 
when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could 
have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable in-
structions or warnings by the seller ... and the omission of the in-
structions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.,,105 
The Restatement does not indicate how the standard would be 
structured for jury instruction purposes, nor does it intend to do 
so. It does not state the issue in terms of either negligence or strict 
liability theory. Instead, the standard focuses on whether the fore-
seeable risks of harm created by the product could have been 
avoided by the provision of reasonable warnings or instructions. 106 
Arguably, the standard requires a focus on adequacy of the warn-
ing, once a foreseeable risk of injury is presented by the product. 
In addition, one could argue that because the issue is whether the 
provision of reasonable warnings or instructions would reduce or 
there is no duty to warn where the user knows the danger, which the court held 
was a jury issue as a matter oflaw). 
99. See, e.g., Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assoc. Architects, 
Inc., 354 N.W.2d 816, 821 (Minn. 1984); Todalen v. United States Chern. Co., 424 
N.W.2d 73, 78 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), overruled on other grounds by Tyroll v. Private 
Label Chems., Inc., 505 N.W.2d 54 (Minn. 1993). 
100, See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2 cmt. i. 
101. See Hill v. Wilmington Chern. Corp., 279 Minn. 336, 341-45, 156 N.W.2d 
898, 902-04, (1968); Todalen, 424 N.W.2d at 80; Cf. Huber v. Niagara Mach. & 
Tool Works, 430 N.W.2d 465, 468 n.2 (Minn. 1988) (recognizing the obligation to 
warn ultimate users, but holding that no duty existed in the instant case to warn 
the ultimate user of the consequences of the failure of the plaintiff's employer to 
follow certain safety regulations). 
102, See, e.g., Huber, 430 N.W.2d at 467; Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts, 354 
N.W.2d at 821; Todalen, 424 N.W.2d at 78. 
103. See]URYINsTRucnoN GUIDES, supra note 18,]IG 119, at 90. 
104. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2 cmt. i. 
105. [d. § 2(c). 
106. See id. § 2. 
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avoid the risk, the question must be one of the reasonableness of 
the warning. That, of course, is how adequacy is measured. 
The Restatement does not appear to say in the black letter of 
section 2 that liability for failure to warn is judged by a reasonable 
manufacturer or seller standard, one similar to a risk-utility stan-
dard. There are, however, situations where the Restatement clearly 
takes the position that warnings are not required.
l07 
For example, a 
warning is not mandated where the danger is obvious and gener-
ally known. l08 Another example is the Restatement's approach to a 
product manufacturer's responsibility in cases involving post-sale 
warning obligations. log 
Minnesota's standard seems to be consistent with the Restate-
ment (Third) standard. However, under both negligence and strict 
liability standards, adequacy is the only issue the jury will resolve. 
The jury will not determine whether a reasonable manufacturer 
would have provided warnings and if so, what warnings would have 
been adequate. The pattern jury instructions use the following 
language: 
A product (manufacturer) (seller) must 
(Provide adequate warnings of dangers inherent in 
improper use of the product, if the use is one that the 
(manufacturer) (seller) should reasonably foresee.) 
(Provide adequate instructions for the safe use of the 
product.) 
For a warning to be adequate it must be set out in such 
a way that heeding the warning will make the product rea-
sonably safe for use. [The warning must be in a form 
which could reasonably be expected to catch the attention 
of, and be understood by, the ordinary user.] 110 
The issue is whether the warnings render the product reasonably 
safe for consumer use. 
Justice Simonett, writing later on the warning issue, thought 
the key to the warning issue to be relatively simple. He stated: 
The trial court must decide, of course, based on the evi-
dence, whether to submit the issue of failure to warn to 
the jury. This is a question of law for the court. Put an-
other way, it is a question of law for the judge whether 
107. See id. 
lOS. See id. cmt. j. 
109. See id. § 10. 
1l0. JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, supra note lS,JIG 119, at 90. 
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there is a question of fact for the jury. In submitting a 
failure to warn claim to the jury, the trial court ordinarily 
is instructing the jury to determine from all the evidence 
if, in fact, the risk to be warned against was reasonably 
foreseeable, so that a duty to warn was necessary; and if so, 
whether any warnings were adequate or could have been 
effective (which relates to the scope of the duty); and, fi-
nally, whether the duty was breached and causation was 
present. In a particular case, one or more of these ques-
tions may be decided by the trial court as a matter of law 
and the jury so told. But otherwise, generally, the Jury de-
cides if a duty to warn exists and if it was breached. 11 
If Justice Simonett's approach is taken, the trial court will de-
cide whether there is sufficient evidence to submit the warning is-
sue to the jury. If so, the jury would then decide whether a reason-
able product manufacturer would have provided a warning, and if 
warnings were provided, whether they were adequate. The key 
conceptual question that has to be answered is whether the manu-
facturer's choices with respect to warnings will be evaluated accord-
ing to the same risk-utility standard that is utilized to evaluate the 
reasonableness of its design choices. 
If warning cases are treated similarly, the trial court's initial 
determination that a manufacturer has a duty to act reasonably 
with respect to product warnings means that the jury will be enti-
tled to evaluate the reasonableness of the manufacturer's actions 
with respect to product warnings, including any decision not to 
give a warning, unless, of course, the case is strong enough that the 
trial court would be prepared to direct a verdict on the warning is-
sue in cases where the manufacturer has not provided a warning. 112 
Ill. John E. Simonett, Dispelling the Products Liability Syndrome: Tentative Draft 
No.2 of the Restatement (Third), 21 WM. MITCHELLL. REv. 361, 365 (1995). 
112. See George W. Soule & Jacqueline M. Moen, Failure to Warn in Minnesota, 
The New Restatement on Products Liability, and the Application of the Reasonable Care 
Standard, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 389, 403-04 n.61 (1995) (citation omitted). 
The authors suggested the following instruction: 
A manufacturer has a duty to use reasonable care in providing an 
adequate warning of any danger involved in the use of a product which 
poses an unreasonable risk of harm to persons or property when the 
product is put to its intended use or to any use that is unintended but is 
reasonably foreseeable. 
What constitutes reasonable care will vary with the surrounding cir-
cumstances. Reasonable care is the care that a reasonably prudent per-
son would exercise under the same or similar circumstances. 
In determining whether reasonable care requires the manufacturer 
to provide a warning, you may consider all the facts and circumstances, 
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The Restatement (Third) says that there should not be separate 
instructions on multiple theories of recovery where there is a single 
allegation of design defect or failure to warn.1I3 If the plaintiff as-
serts a design defect theory, the plaintiff should be entitled to a 
single instruction on that theory, not one based on strict liability 
and one based on negligence.1l4 Minnesota takes the same posi-
tion. ll5 However, if the plaintiff asserts separate theories of defect, 
one based on design defect and the other on failure to warn, the 
plaintiff is entitled to instructions on both theories. ll6 In manufac-
turing flaw cases, the plaintiff is entitled to both negligence and 
strict liability instructions on the theory.ll7 Those cases do not in-
volve the risk-utility balancing approach that is at the core of both 
negli{!ence and strict liability analysis in design and warning 
'118 
cases. 
including, among others, the likelihood and seriousness of harm and the 
feasibility, burden and effectiveness of a warning. 
A manufacturer may be required to provide a warning only if the 
manufacturer knew or through the exercise of reasonable care could 
have discovered the danger involved in the use of the product. A manu-
facturer is not required to warn of a danger which would ordinarily be 
known and appreciated by those who would be expected to use the 
product. 
For a warning to be adequate it must be set out in such a way that 
heeding the warning will make the product reasonably safe for use. The 
warning must be in a form which could reasonably be expected to catch 
the attention of, and be understood by, the ordinary user. 
If the manufacturer did not use reasonable care in providing an 
adequate warning, then the manufacturer is negligent. 
[d. (citation omitted). 
113. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2 cmt. n. 
114. Seeid. 
115. See JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, supra note 18, JIG 117, Authorities at 81-87, 
and JIG 119, Authorities at 90-93. Implied warranty of merchantability is also 
merged with strict liability and negligence in design defect cases. See Westbrock v. 
Marshalltown Mfg. Co., 473 N.W.2d 352, 356 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); Gross v. 
Running, 403 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). The Eighth Circuit has 
taken the same position in interpreting Minnesota law. See Piotrowski v. South-
worth Prod. Corp., 15 F.3d 748, 751 (8th Cir. 1994). 
116. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2 cmt. n; Kallio v. Ford Motor 
Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 94 n.2 (Minn. 1987). 
117. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2 cmt. n; JURY INSTRUCTION 
GUIDES, supra note 18,jIG 118, Authorities at 88-89, and Special Verdict Forrn No. 
2, at 455-56. 
118. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2 cmt. n; JURY INSTRUCTION 
GUIDES, supra note 18,jIG 118, Authorities at 88-89, and Special Verdict Form No. 
2, at 455-56. 
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§ 3. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTING INFERENCE OF 
PRODUCT DEFECT 
It may be inferred that the hann sustained by the plaintiff was 
caused by a product defect existing at the time of sale or distribu-
tion, without proof of a specific defect, when the incident that 
hanned the plaintiff: 
(a) was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of prod-
uct defect; and 
(b) was not, in the particular case, solely the result of causes 





Minnesota law is the same.120 In Holkestad v. Coca-Cola Bottling 
Co.,l2l the Minnesota Supreme Court explained: 
When a plaintiff has proved that he was injured by a 
product claimed to have been defective, and where the 
claimed defect is such that there is circumstantial evi-
dence from which it can be inferred that it is more prob-
able than not that the product was defective when it left 
defendant's hands, absent plaintiff's own want of care or 
misuse of the product, there is an evidentiary basis for 
submitting the issue of liability to the jury on both the 
theory of negligence and strict liability in tort. Of course, 
the factor essential to the application of res ipsa loqui-
tur-that it must be the kind of event which does not oc-
cur in the absence of negligence-is a circumstance tend-
ing to prove a defect and not a prerequisite for the 
application of strict liability in tort. However, the infer-
ence from the circumstantial evidence taken as a whole, 
which we repeat is the underlying basis of the doctrine of 
res ipsa, would pennit recovery against both manufacturer 
119. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 3. 
120. See Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Minn. 321, 328-30, 188 
N.W.2d 426, 432 (1971); Holkestad v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Minnesota, 288 
Minn. 249, 254-55, 180 N.W.2d 860, 864-65 (1970); Kerr v. Corning Glass Works, 
284 Minn. 115, 117, 169 N.W.2d 587, 588 (1969); Western Sur. & Cas. Co. v. Gen-
eral Elec. Co., 433 N.W.2d 444, 447 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), review denied, (Minn. 
Feb. 22, 1989). 
121. 288 Minn. 249, 180 N.W.2d 860 (1970). 
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and retail seller on the theory of strict liability .... 122 
The supreme court, however, has noted restrictions on the use of 
the res ipsa concept. In Cerepak v. Revlon, Inc./ 23 the plaintiff was in-
jured while attempting to open the cap of a deodorant bottle 
manufactured by Revlon.124 The injury occurred when the bottle 
broke while she was trying to twist off the cap.125 The plaintiff al-
leged that the bottle was defective and that the defendant was neg-
ligent in its manufacture and design.126 The jury found that Rev-
Ion was negligent and that the plaintiff was not.
127 
The plaintiff offered no affirmative evidence demonstrating 
that Revlon was negligent in the manufacture of the bottle. I 
There was no expert testimony to establish any defect in the bot-
tle. l29 The only evidence was that introduced by the plaintiff and 
her mother concerning the purchase and use of the bottle, which 
showed that they had done nothing to cause the bottle to break. 130 
The court distinguished the exploding bottle cases in holding that 
the plaintiff had not met her burden of proof on the res ipsa issue: 
The dispositive issue is whether plaintiffs met their 
burden of proof on the factual issue of negligence where 
the issue was submitted solely on theory of res ipsa loqui-
tur, absent any affirmative evidence that the deodorant 
bottle was negligently manufactured. Plaintiff had the 
burden of proving that there was a defect in the bottle 
which caused it to break under normal use, that this de-
fect was present when defendant surrendered possession 
of the bottle to the retailer, and that the defect was the re-
sult of defendant's negligence in its manufacture. Al-
though the burden of proof has been less strict in cases of 
spontaneous explosion of carbonated beverage bottles 
than in the case of other glass containers, no case based 
on negligence has wholly removed this burden of proof or 
held it discharged merely by proof that the plaintiff had 
not mishandled the product. 
The reason for less strictness in adhering to this bur-
122. [d. at 257, 180 N.W.2d at 865-66. 
123. 294 Minn. 268, 200 N.W.2d 33 (1972). 
124. See id. at 269; 200 N.W.2d at 34. 
125. See id. 
126. See id. 
127. See id. 
128. See id. 
129. See id. 
130. See id. 
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den of proof in exploding bottle cases is more pragmatic 
than conceptual. Dean Page Keeton . . . after reviewing 
some of the defective bottle cases, concludes that courts 
have been less strict in requiring proof of negligence in 
cases involving explosions of beer bottles and carbonated 
beverage bottles. It is his view that 'the existence of a de-
fective in a bottle cannot be inferred simply from evi-
dence on the part of plaintiff of careful conduct coupled 
with an explosion or break' and that plaintiff, in order to 
get to the jury, must introduce 'direct evidence of a defect 
by an expert who examined the bottle. . . . He suggests 
that requiring that requiring less proof in cases involving 
explosions of beer bottles or carbonated beverage bottles 
may be justified by the fact that often the explosion de-
stroys the bottle, making it more difficult for plaintiff to 
th · de· 131 prove at It was eJ.ectlve. 
In Cerepak, the plaintiff had possession of the bottle and the 
ability to establish a specific defect in the bottle.
132 
Under the cir-
cumstances, the absence of direct evidence on the defect issue pre-
cluded the plaintiff from recovering. The moral of the story is 
clear. If the plaintiff has the ability to establish the existence of a 
defect by direct evidence, res ipsa loquitur will not be available. The 
Restatement (Third) approach, mirrored in Minnesota, does not cre-
ate an exception to the liability rules of section 2 that will be read 
or applied broadly by the courts. 
§ 4. NONCOMPLIANCE AND COMPLIANCE WITH PRODUCT SAFElY 
STATUTES OR REGULATIONS 
In connection with liability for defective design or inadequate 
instructions or warnings: 
(a) a product's noncompliance with an applicable product 
safety statute or administrative regulation renders the product 
defective with respect to the risks sought to be reduced by the 
statute or regulation; and 
(b) a product's compliance with an applicable product 
safety statute or administrative regulation is properly consid-
ered in determining whether the product is defective with re-
spect to the risks sought to be reduced by the statute or regula-
131. [d. at 270-71,200 N.W.2d at 35 (citations omitted). 
132. See id. at 273, 200 N.W.2d at 36. 
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tion, but such compliance does not preclude as a matter of law 
a finding of product defect.
133 
Commentary 
In Minnesota, violation of a statute is negligence per se if the 
statute satisfies the standard statutory purpose analysis: 
It is well settled that breach of a statute gives rise to negli-
gence per se if the persons harmed by that violation are 
within the intended protection of the statute and the 
harm suffered is of the type the legislation was intended 
134 
to prevent. 
The violation of regulations or ordinances may also result in negli-
135 
gence per se. 
The black letter of the Restatement (Third) refers to an 
"applicable product safety statute or administrative regulation. "136 
The Reporters' Note makes clear that the standard statutory pur-
pose analysis must be followed for a violation of the statute or regu-
lation to justifY a finding of product defect as a matter of law. 137 
The statute or regulation has to do more, however: 
[T]he safety statute or administrative regulation must be 
such that compliance reduces the risk that caused the 
plaintiffs harm. Thus, when a plaintiff complains that the 
design of a product should have been more stable to pre-
vent the product from tipping over, a safety statute or 
regulation is relevant if it addresses the issue of stability in 
such a way that compliance with the statute or regulation 
reduces the risk of the product tipRing over in the man-
ner that caused the plaintiffs harm. 38 
Compliance with a statute or ordinance is not conclusive evi-
dence on the negligence issue, but rather is only evidence of rea-
sonable care.
139 
The comments, however, suggest that in certain 
circumstances it may be appropriate for a court to hold that a 
133. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 4. 
134. Aldennan's Inc. v. Shanks, 536 N.W.2d 4, 8 (Minn. 1995). 
135. See id. at 7. 
136. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 4. 
137. See id. Reporters' Note, at 145 (stating that, "[iJn order for the violation 
to support a conclusion of defectiveness as a matter of law, the safety regulation in 
question must relate both to the risk that materializes in hann and to the person 
or persons who suffer that hann"). 
138. [d. § 4 cmt. c. 
139. See id. § 4(b). 
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product in compliance with a statute or regulation is not defective 
as a matter of law: 
Such a conclusion may be appropriate when the safety 
statute or regulation was promulgated recently, thus sup-
plying currency to the standard therein established; when 
the specific standard addresses the very issue of product 
design or warning presented in the case before the court; 
and when the court is confident that the deliberative 
process by which the safety standard was established was 
full, fair, and thorough and reflected substantial exper-
tise. Conversely, when the deliberative process that led to 
the safety standard with which the defendant's product 
complies was tainted by the supplying of false information 
to, or the withholding of necessary and valid information 
from, the agency that promulgated the standard or certi-
fied or approved the product, compliance with regulation 
is entitled to little or no weight. l40 
Minnesota has taken the position that compliance with a stat-
ute only evidences reasonable care and is not conclusive on the is-
sue.HI No Minnesota court has yet taken the position suggested in 
the Restatement comment, but such a position is not inconsistent 
with any settled principles in Minnesota products liability law. 
§ 5. LIABILI'IY OF COMMERCIAL SELLER OR DISTRIBUTOR OF 
PRODUCT COMPONENTS FOR HARM CAUSED BY PRODUCTS INTO 
WHICH COMPONENTS ARE INTEGRATED 
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distribut-
ing product components who sells or distributes a component is 
subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by a 
product into which the component is integrated if: 
(a) the component is defective in itself, under §§ 1-4, and 
the defect causes the harm; or 
(b) (1) the seller or distributor of the component substan-
tially participates in the integration of the component into 
140. Id. cmt. e. 
141. See, e.g., Hellman v. Julius Kolesar, Inc., 399 N.W.2d 654, 655-56 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1987) (holding a party may be negligent while complying with a statutory 
standard if special circumstances require additional instructions); Steinbrecher v. 
McLeod Coop. Power Ass'n, 392 N.W.2d 709,712 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding 
safety statute setting out requirements does not constitute final word on necessary 
measures). 
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the design of the product; and 
(2) the integration of the component causes the prod-
uct to be defective as defined under §§ 1-4; and 
(3) the defect in the product causes the harm.142 
Commentary 
Section 5 includes as product components "raw materials, bulk 
products, and other constituent products sold for integration into 
other products."143 In general, the Restatement (Third) says that 
component sellers should not be held liable unless the component 
itself is defective according to sections 1-4 of the Restatement. 
Comment b notes: 
If the component is not itself defective, it would be un-
just and inefficient to impose liability solely on the 
ground that the manufacturer of the integrated product 
utilizes the component in a manner that renders the inte-
grated product defective. Imposing liability would re-
quire the component seller to scrutinize another's prod-
uct which the component seller has no role in developing. 
This would require the component seller to develop suffi-
cient sophistication to review the decisions of the business 
entity that is already charged with responsibility for the in-
tegrated product. 
The refusal to impose liability on sellers of nondefec-
tive components is expressed in various ways, such as the 
"raw material supplier defense" or the "bulk 
sales/ sophisticated purchaser rule." However expressed, 
these formulations recognize that component sellers who 
do not participate in the integration of the component 
into the design of the product should not be liable merely 
because the integration of the component causes the 
product to become dangerously defective.
l44 
The same principles apply when the issue concerns the com-
ponent seller's obligation to warn. 
The component seller is required to provide instructions 
and warnings regarding risks associated with the use of 
the component product. . . . However, when a sophisti-
142. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 5. 
143. Id. cmt. a. 
144. Id. 
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cated buyer integrates a component into another product, 
the component seller owes no duty to warn either the 
immediate buyer or ultimate consumers of dangers aris-
ing because the component is unsuited for the special 
purpose to which the buyer puts it. To impose a duty to 
warn in such a circumstance would require that compo-
nent sellers monitor the development of products and sys-
tems into which their components are to be inte-
grated .... Courts have not yet confronted the question 
of whether, in combination, factors such as the compo-
nent purchaser's lack of expertise and ignorance of the 
risks of integrating the component into the purchaser's 
product, and the component supplier's knowledge of 
both the relevant risks and the purchaser's ignorance 
thereof, give rise to a duty on the part of the component 
supplier to warn of risks attending integration of the 
component into the purchaser's product. Whether the 
seller of a component should be subject to liability for 
selling its product to one who is likely to utilize it danger-
ously is governed by principles of negligent entrust-
145 
ment. 
Minnesota products liability law permits the imposition of li-
ability on component parts manufacturers.
l46 
The problems that 
arise are indicative of the concerns expressed in the Restatement 
(Third). The predominant problem is in failure to warn cases.
147 
Minnesota's solutions have been based on a common sense resolu-
tion of the ability of a manufacturer to warn of dangers in varied 
circumstances. The law seems to be consistent with the Restatement. 
§ 6. LIABILI1Y OF SELLER OR OTHER DISTRIBUTOR FOR HARM 
CAUSED BY DEFECTIVE PRESCRIPTION DRUGS AND MEDICAL DEVICES 
(a) A manufacturer of a prescription drug or medical de-
vice who sells or otherwise distributes a defective drug or medi-
cal device is subject to liability for harm to persons caused by 
145. [d. cmt. b. 
146. See Huber v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 430 N.W.2d 465,467 (Minn. 
1988); Hill v. Wilmington Chern. Corp., 279 Minn. 336, 342-44, 156 N.W.2d 898, 
903-04 (1968). 
147. See, e.g., Huber, 430 N.W.2d at 467 (holding that component part manu-
facturer only has a legal duty to warn against foreseeable misuses); Hill, 279 Minn. 
at 344, 156 N.W.2d at 904 (holding that where plaintiff had adequate knowledge 
of the dangerous propensities of the component product, defendant had no fur-
ther duty to give an additional warning). 
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the defect. A prescription drug or medical device is one that 
may be legally sold or otherwise distributed only pursuant to a 
health care provider's prescription. 
(b) For purposes of liability under Subsection (a), a pre-
scription drug or medical device is defective if at the time of 
sale or other distribution the drug or medical device: 
(1) contains a manufacturing defect as defined in § 
2(a); or 
(2) is not reasonably safe due to defective design as de-
fined in Subsection (c); or 
(3) is not reasonably safe due to inadequate instructions 
or warnings as defined in Subsection (d). 
(c) A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably 
safe due to defective design if the foreseeable risks of harm 
posed by the drug or medical device are sufficiently great in re-
lation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits that reasonable 
health care providers, knowing of such foreseeable risks and 
therapeutic benefits, would not prescribe the drug or medical 
device for any class of patients. 
(d) A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably 
safe because of inadequate instructions or warnings if reason-
able instructions or warnings regarding foreseeable risks of 
harm are not provided to: 
(1) prescribing and other health care providers who are 
in a position to reduce the risks of harm in accordance with 
the instructions or warnings; or 
(2) the patient when the manufacturer knows or has 
reason to know that health care providers will not be in a 
position to reduce the risk of harm in accordance with the 
instructions or warnings. 
(e) A retail seller or other distributor of a prescription drug 
or medical device is subject to liability for harm caused by the 
drug or device if: 
(1) at the time of sale or other distribution the drug or 
medical device contains a manufacturing defect as defined 
in § 2(a); or 
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(2) at or before the time of sale or other distribution of 
the drug or medical device the retail seller or other dis-
tributor fails to exercise reasonable care and such failure 
148 
causes harm to persons. 
Commentary 
Section 6 encompasses both traditional and nontraditional 
approaches to the question of manufacturer liability for the sale of 
drugs or medical devices. I49 It incorporates liability for manufac-
turing defects and recognizes that manufacturers may also be held 
liable for failure to properly warn health care providers or, where 
appropriate, directly warn patients. I50 It incorporates a new provi-
sion that justifies the imposition of liability on manufacturers for 
defective design,I51 but on the basis of legal principles separate and 
distinct from section 2 (b) . The rationale for the difference in 
treatment is as follows: 
The obligation of a manufacturer to warn about risks 
attendant to the use of drugs and medical devices that 
may be sold only pursuant to a health care provider's pre-
scription traditionally has required warnings directed to 
health care providers and not to patients. The rationale 
supporting this "learned intermediary" rule is that only 
health care professionals are in a position to understand 
the significance of the risks involved and to assess the rela-
tive advantages and disadvantages of a given form of pre-
scription-based therapy. The duty then devolves on the 
health care provider to supply to the patient such infor-
mation as is deemed appropriate under the circumstances 
so that the patient can make an informed choice as to 
therapy. Subsection (d)(l) retains the "learned interme-
diary" rule. However, in certain limited therapeutic rela-
tionships the physician or other health care provider has a 
much diminished role as an evaluator or decision-maker. 
In these instances it may be appropriate to impose on the 
manufacturer the duty to warn the patient directly. See 
Subsection (d)(2). 
The traditional refusal by courts to impose tort liability 
for defective designs of prescription drugs and medical 
148. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 6. 
149. See id. cmt. a. 
150. See id. 
151. See id. 
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devices is based on the fact that a prescription drug or 
medical device entails a unique set of risks and benefits. 
What may be harmful to one patient may be beneficial to 
another. Under Subsection (c) a drug is defectively de-
signed only when it provides no net benefit to any class of 
patients. Courts have concluded that as long as a drug or 
medical device provides net benefits to some persons un-
der some circumstances, the drug or device manufacturer 
should be required to instruct and warn health care pro-
viders of the foreseeable risks and benefits. Courts have 
also recognized that the regulatory system governing pre-
scription drugs is a legitimate mechanism for setting the 
standards for drug design. In part, this deference reflects 
concerns over the possible negative effects of judicially 
imposed liability on the cost and availability of valuable 
medical technology. This deference also rests on two fur-
ther assumptions: first, that prescribing health care pro-
viders, when adequately informed by drug manufacturers, 
are able to assure that the right drugs and medical devices 
reach the right patients; and second, that governmental 
regulatory agencies adequately review new prescription 
drugs and devices, keeping unreasonably dangerous de-
signs off the market. 
Nevertheless, unqualified deference to these regulatory 
mechanisms is considered by a growing number of courts 
to be unjustified. An approved prescription drug or 
medical device can present significant risks without corre-
sponding advantages. At the same time, manufacturers 
must have ample discretion to develop useful drugs and 
devices without subjecting their design decisions to the 
ordinary test applicable to products generally under § 
2(b). Accordingly, Subsection (c) imposes a more rigor-
ous test for defect than does § 2 (b), which does not apply 
to prescription drugs and medical devices. The require-
ment for establishing defective design of a prescription 
drug or medical device under Subsection (c) is that the 
drug or device have so little merit compared with its risks 
that reasonable health care providers, possessing knowl-
edge of risks, would not have prescribed the drug or de-
vice for any class of patients. Thus, a prescription drug or 
medical device that has usefulness to any class of patients 
IS not defective in design even if it is harmful to other pa-
tients. Because of the special nature of prescription drugs 
and medical devices, the determination of whether such 
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products are not reasonably safe is to be made under Sub-
sections (c) and (d) rather than under §§ 2(b) and 2(C).152 
The standard for manufacturing defects is section 2(a), which 
questions whether the product departed from its intended de-
sign.153 There are separate standards for determining liability for 
inadequate warnings or instructions and design defects. The de-
sign standard does not incorporate section 2(b)'s design standard, 
which states that a product is defective "when the foreseeable risks 
of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided 
by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design... and the 
omission of the alternative design renders the product not rea-
sonably safe. "154 Section 6 of the Restatement (Third) differs. It as-
serts that a prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably 
safe because of defective design only when the foreseeable risks of 
harm are sufficiently great in relation to its therapeutic benefits 
and when a reasonable health care provider would not prescribe 
the drug or device for any class of patients. 155 
The rationale for the difference is as follows: 
Subsection (c) reflects the judgment that, as long as a 
given drug or device provides net benefits for a class of 
patients, it should be available to them, accompanied by 
appropriate warnings and instructions. Learned interme-
diaries must generally be relied upon to see that the right 
drugs and devices reach the right patients. However, 
when a drug or device provides net benefits to no class of 
patients-when reasonable, informed health care provid-
ers would not prescribe it to any class of patients-then 
the design of the product is defective and the manufac-
turer should be subject to liabiiity for the harm caused. 
A defendant prescription drug or device manufacturer 
defeats plaintiffs design claim by establishing one or 
more contexts in which its product would be prescribed 
by reasonable, informed health care providers. That 
some individual providers do, in fact, prescribe defen-
dant's product does not in itself suffice to defeat plaintiffs 
claim. Evidence regarding the actual conduct of health 
care providers, while relevant and admissible, is not nec-
essarily controlling. The issue is whether, objectively 
152. Id. cmt. b. 
153. See id. § 2(a). 
154. Id. § 2(b). 
155. See id. § 6(c). 
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viewed, reasonable providers, possessing the knowledge 
that a reasonable drug manufacturer had or should have 
had about the risks and benefits attendant to the use of 
the drug or medical device, would prescribe it for any 
class of patients. Given this very demanding objective 
standard, liability is likely to be imposed only under un-
usual circumstances. The court has the responsibility to 
determine when the plaintiff has met the burden of pro-
duction for this demanding standard.
156 
The Reporters' Note expands on the position taken in the 
comments: 
Subsection (c) reflects the view that, as long as a given 
drug or device provides net benefits for some category of 
patients, it should be available to that group, albeit with 
adequate warnings and instructions supplied to learned 
intermediaries. Learned medical intermediaries must be 
relied upon to direct the appropriate drugs to the appro-
priate patients. However, when a drug or device provides 
no net benefits to any ascertainable patient class-when 
reasonably informed medical providers would not pre-
scribe the drug and no reasonable, informed manufac-
turer would place it on the market-then the product de-
sign is defective and the manufacturer should be liable for 
the harm caused by selling it. 
The proposed rule in § 6(c) best advances the policies 
and values explicated in Comment h. It shows appropri-
ate deference to the regulated market, where the FDA 
and learned intermediaries select which drugs should be 
available to the public generally and which drugs should 
be given to individual patients, respectively. It does not, 
on the other hand, wholly exempt defendants from liabil-
156. Id. cmt. f. The following illustration shows the application: 
ABC Pharmaceuticals manufactures and distributes D, a prescription 
drug intended to prolong pregnancy and thus to reduce the risks associ-
ated with premature birth. Patricia, six months pregnant with a history 
of irregular heart beats, was given D during a hospital stay. As a result, 
she suffered heart failure and required open heart surgery. In Patricia's 
action against ABC, her expert testified that, notwithstanding FDA ap-
proval of D, the drug did not prolong pregnancy for any class of patients 
and posed serious risks of heart failure in patients with a history of ir-
regular heart beats. Notwithstanding a finding by the trier of fact that 
ABC gave adequate warnings to the prescribing physician, the trier of 
fact can find that reasonably informed health care providers would not 
prescribe D for any class of patients, thus rendering ABC subject to liabil-
ity. 
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ity simply because other institutions have taken steps to 
improve product safety. Subsection (c ) is a significant 
departure from the general defective design rules es-
poused in §§ 1 and 2, in recognition of the unique char-
acteristics of prescription drugs and medical devices. Un-
like most products, which confer essentially the same 
benefits to all users, prescription drugs and medical de-
vices have the capacity to do great harm or great good 
depending on the particular patient. Accordingly, liabil-
ity will attach onl); if the design cannot be justified for any 
class of patients.! 
The liability of drug manufacturers for defective design and 
failure to warn was covered by comment k in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, section 402A:!58 
There are some products which, in the present state of 
human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made 
safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are espe-
cially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding ex-
ample is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, 
which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damag-
ing consequences when it is injected. Since the disease it-
self invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the market-
ing and use of the vaccine are fully justified, 
notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk 
which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, 
and accompanied by proper directions and warnings, is 
not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same 
is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many 
of which for this very reason cannot be legally sold except 
to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician. It 
is also tn,le in particular of many new or experimental 
drugs as to which, because of lack of time and opportunity 
for sufficient medical experience, there can be no assur-
ance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, 
but such experience as there is justifies the marketing and 
use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable 
risk. The seller of such products, again with the qualifica-
tion that they are properly prepared and marketed, and 
proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is 
not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate conse-
quences attending their use, merely because he has un-
[d. illus. l. 
157. [d. Reporters' Note, at 186-87. 
158. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
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dertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful 
and desirable product~ attended with a known but appar-
ently reasonable risk.
15 
The Minnesota courts, while dealing with drug cases involving 
the failure to warn,l60 have not had occasion to consider a drug or 
medical device company's liability for defective design. The 
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota made that 
determination in a diversity case against G.D. Searle & Co. for de-
fective design of an intrauterine device. 
In Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co. 161 the court predicted that 
Minnesota would adopt comment k, given the opportunity.162 The 
court also held that comment k was inapplicable to all prescription 
drugs as a matter of law,163 and that the issue had to be resolved by 
a jury according to the following factors: 
(i) whether the product could have been designed in a 
safer manner; 
(ii) whether a safer alternative product could have been 
available [at the time of manufacture and sale] to accom-
plish the same intended purpose as the product in ques-
tion; and 
(iii) whether the benefits of the product outweigh the in-
terest in promoting enhanced accountability on the part 
of the manufacturer.
l64 
In a second opinion on the issue, the Kociemba court con-
cluded that the policy considerations underlying its first order on 
the question were correct. l65 However, in a shift, the court said that 
it "now finds that these policy considerations are implicitly re-
flected in the negligence-based 'reasonable care' balancing stan-
dard adopted by the Minnesota Supreme Court in strict liability de-
159. Seeid. 
160. See, e.g., Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684, 698 (Minn. 1977) 
(affirming the trial court's dismissal of the drug manufacturer because the alleged 
deficiency in the manufacturer's warning did not cause the injuries); Mulder v. 
Parke Davis & Co., 288 Minn. 335-36, 181 N.W.2d 882, 885 (1970) (holding that a 
drug manufacturer was not liable for failure to warn because the doctor prescrib-
ing the drug was fully aware of the drugs hazards). 
161. 680 F. Supp. 1293 (D. Minn. 1988). 
162. See id. at 1300. 
163. See id. 
164. [d. at 1301 (citing Patten v. Lederle Lab., 676 F. Supp. 233 (D. Utah 
1987». 
165. See Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 695 F. Supp. 432, 433 (D. Minn. 
1988). 
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sign defect cases."I66 In addition, the court held that because of the 
importance of those policy considerations in prescription drug 
cases, the jury should be explicitly instructed "that it may consider 
the reasonable but unavoidable side effects of a prescription drug 




In its supporting analysis, the Kociemba court noted the history 
of Minnesota products liability law, beginning with the supreme 
court's sanction of Restatement (Second), section 402A in McCor-
mack.
l68 
The court noted the policy reasons for section 402A, in-
cluding the use of the Restatement (Second)'s consumer expectation 
standard to determine the defect issue, and the concern expressed 
in many jurisdictions about the problem of imposing unreasonable 
liability on drug manufacturers. The latter concern was blunted by 
the adoption of comment k, which in effect makes a manufacturer 
liable only if it fails to adequately warn of the dangers associated 
with the use of its drugs.
169 
The court noted the policy reasons un-
derlying comment k: 
First, manufacturers should be encouraged to develop 
products such as prescription drugs even though such 
products are incapable of being made safe given the pres-
ent state of knowledge. Such encouragement can only be 
accomplished by limiting the manufacturer's liability to 
instances where the manufacturer acted in an unreason-
able manner which, in comment k terms, occurs when the 
manufacturer fails to adequately warn the user of the rea-
sonable dangers inherent in the product. 
Second, holding drug manufacturers up to a consumer 
expectation standard for injuries caused by unavoidably 
unsafe but necessary prescription drugs can increase 
product liability insurance rates and litigation costs to the 
extent that drug manufacturers are not able to sell phar-
maceutical products at affordable prices.
170 
The court noted that the Minnesota Supreme Court had not 
adopted comment k, but that it had adopted a balancing test much 
166. [d. at 433 (citing Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1984) and 
Holm v. Sponco Mfg., Inc., 324 N.W.2d 207 (Minn. 1982». 
167. [d. 
168. See id. 
169. See id. 
170. [d. at 433-34. 
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like the one required by comment k.171 The court then concluded 
that the comment k policy considerations are, in effect, incorpo-
rated in Minnesota's negligence-based standards for design defects: 
Analysis of the texts of JIG 117 and comment k reveals 
that both require a risk/utility balancing test to determine 
the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct in pro-
ducing a given product. The major difference between 
the tests is that comment k explicitly provides that a 
manufacturer may act reasonably in manufacturing an 
unavoidably unsafe product while JIG 117 merely implies 
the same. 
Because the balancing tests are essentially the same, it 
became clear that the Court should not give separate spe-
cial verdict questions to reflect each balancing test. To do 
so would require the jury to conduct the same risk/utility 
balancing test twice. Moreover, the jury's possible deci-
sion to tip the balance in different directions could lead 
to perverse verdicts. 
Rather, this Court adopted a position in which the jury 
can consider unavoidable but reasonable risks of a desir-
able product at he same time it considers the reasonable-
ness of the manufacturer's conduct. To accomplish this, 
the jury received only one special verdict question on 
whether the Cu-7 was defectively designed. The jury was 
then given an instruction based on JIG 117 followed by an 
instruction which states: 
A product prescribed by a physician is not negli-
gently designed merely because it may have side ef-
fects. 
Some products, given the present state of human 
knowledge cannot be made totally safe for their in-
tended and ordinary use. Because of the nature of 
the ingredients or natural characteristics of the 
product, their use involves substantial risk of injury, 
and some users will necessarily be harmed. Thus a 
manufacturer is not negligent merely because it sup-
plies the public with an apparently useful and desir-
able product that has a known but apparently rea-
sonable risk. 
In taking this course of action, the Court reduces the 
possibility of perverse verdicts because the jury is only 
171. See id. at 434. 
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considering one balancing test. More importantly, these 
instructions strike a fair balance between the policy en-
couraging a manufacturer to produce useful but un-
avoidably dangerous products and the policy that a manu-
facturer be held accountable for unreasonable conduct. 
The manufacturer of a desirable yet unavoidably unsafe 
product is protected in that it will not be held liable if it 
uses reasonable care in manufacturing an inherently dan-
gerous product. On the other hand, the consuming pub-
lic is protected in that a manufacturer continues to be 
held accountable for its unreasonable behavior. 
The need for this balanced approach is readily appar-
ent given the evidence of this case. Defendant has 
brought forth evidence that all IUDs are unavoidably 
dangerous in that the insertion procedure unavoidably 
increases the chance of pelvic infection. Plaintiffs have 
brought forth evidence that the specific Cu-7 design un-
reasonably increases the risk of infection above and be-
yond the risk associated with the insertion procedure. If, . 
for example, the jury accepts the above-cited evidence as 
true, the jury can, and should, consider Searle's reason-
able conduct in developing an unavoidably unsafe but de-
sirable product as well as its unreasonable conduct in not 
developing the safest possible IUD.172 
The court's prediction of the position the Minnesota courts 
would take on the issue of defective design in drug cases has yet to 
be verified. The fact that the Minnesota Supreme Court has 
adopted a risk-utility standard to evaluate design cases does not 
mean that the Minnesota courts would strike the balance the same 
way as the court in Kociemba and reject comment k in favor of the 
risk-utility approach. 
The court's opinion in Forsterv. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co.J7g pro-
vides some insight into Kociemba's prediction. Forster claim was 
brought by a plaintiff suffering lung cancer against RJ. Reynolds 
and others.174 The suit alleged a variety of theories, including the 
defective design of cigarettes.
175 
The principal issue in the case 
concerned the preemption of the plaintiff's tort claims by the Ciga-
rette Labeling and Advertising Act.176 The supreme court held that 
172. Id. at 435 (citations omitted). 
173. 437 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1989). 
174. See id. at 656. 
175. See id. at 661. 
176. See id. at 657 (citing Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. 
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the plaintiffs claim for defective design was not preempted by the 
federal act.
177 
The defendant argued that the Minnesota design 
claim was preempted because Congress had performed its own risk-
utility analysis and concluded that cigarettes could be used.
178 
The 
court saw no conflict, however, because the congressional policy 
differed from "what products liability has in mind." The court 
noted: 
Strict liability assumes the product is useable and asks only 
if it has been safely designed. So understood we see no 
conflict between the state tort action and the Act. We 
hold that plaintiff's claim in strict liability for unsafe de-
sign is not preempted. The complaint also alleges that 
defendant's product was in a defective condition unrea-
sonably dangerous for use. It is unclear what plaintiffs 
have in mind here, but if plaintiffs can prove a defective 
condition or a defective design-apart from any claim of 
inadequa9' of warning-we see no conflict with the fed-
eral Act. 179 
In a footnote, the court explored the relationship between the 
plaintiffs claim and the Restatement (Second): 
The claims of unsafe design and defective condition 
remain exposed to defendants' asserted defense, yet to be 
ruled on, that they fail to state a claim for relief under 
state law. Defendants, for example, point to the discus-
sion of a defective condition for food and drink products 
in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). The Restate-
ment takes the position that products like tobacco and 
whiskey, though addictive and harmful to health, are not 
"defective," unless foreign substances are added. Id. 
comment i. In any event, the parties have not yet set out 
their positions on unsafe desi~ and defective condition 
beyond the pleading stage .... 80 
The court in Forster noted that the risk-utility approach is used 
in Minnesota to decide design cases.
181 
That fact alone seems insuf-
ficient to speculate on the issue of whether the Minnesota courts 
would adopt the Restatement (Second) position or reject it, whether 
the issue is comment k or comment i of the Restatement. 
§§1331-1339 (1994». 
177. See id. at 661. 
17S. See id. 
179. [d. 
ISO. [d. at 661 n.S. 
lSI. See id. at 661. 
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The Minnesota Supreme Court would assess its pOSItIon in 
light of what other jurisdictions have done. There is sugport else-
where for use of a risk-utility balancing approach, I perhaps 
stronger and more in accord with the risk-utility approach than 
that taken in Minnesota. However, any analysis of what the su-
preme court might do remains a prediction. Kociemba is a studied 
prediction, but nothing more. 
§ 7. LIABILl1Y OF COMMERCIAL SELLER OR DISTRIBUTOR FOR HARM 
CAUSED BY DEFECTIVE FOOD PRODUCTS 
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distribut-
ing food products who sells or distributes a defective food product 
under § 2, § 3, or § 4 is subject to liability for harm to persons or 
property caused by the defect. Under § 2(a) a harm-causing ingre-
dient of the food product constitutes a defect if a reasonable con-





The ordinary rules applicable to other defective products are 
also applicable to claims arising out of harm caused by defects in 
commercially distributed food products.
l84 
The potential defects in 
food are the same as in other products. Food products can contain 
manufacturing flaws or design defects, or they may be sold with in-
adequate warnings. Section 3 may permit recovery when the plain-
tiff is unable to point to a specific injury-causing defect, and section 
4 may apply if a food product does not conform to applicable safety 
regulations.185 If the plaintiff claims the harm suffered resulted 
from the presence of foreign matter in food, a pebble in a can of 
peas for example, then the claim is readily handled under section 
2(a). Section 2(a) deals with liability for manufacturing flaws.
186 
There are special problems, however, when the plaintiff is in-
jured by an ingredient in a food product and it is unclear whether 
the injury-causing ingredient is an inherent aspect of the product 
182. See Proposed Final Draft, sUfrra note 6, § 6 Reporters' Note, at 183-84. 
183. Id. § 7. 
184. See id. ernt. a. 
185. See id. 
186. See id. ernt. b. 
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or an unanticipated adulteration of the product.
187 
The &statement 
(Third) uses the example of a one-inch chicken bone in a chicken 
enchilada and asks whether it is a manufacturing defect or simply 
an inherent aspect of the product: 
The analytical problem stems from the circumstance 
that food products in many instances do not have specific 
product designs that may be used as a basis for determin-
ing whether the offending product component constitutes 
a departure from design, and thus a manufacturing de-
fect. Food recipes vary over time, within the same restau-
rant or other commercial food-preparation facility, from 
facility to facility, and from locale to locale. 
Faced with this indeterminacy, some courts have at-
tempted to rely on a distinction between "foreign" and 
"natural" characteristics of food products to determine li-
ability. Under that distinction, liability attaches only if the 
alleged adulteration is foreign rather than natural to the 
product. Most courts have found this approach inade-
quate, however. Although a one-inch chicken bone may 
in some sense be "natural" to a chicken enchilada, de-
pending on the context in which consumption takes 
place, the bone may still be unexpected by the reasonable 
consumer, who will not be able to avoid injury, thus ren-
dering the product not reasonably safe. The majority view 
is that, in this circumstance of uncertainty, the issue of 
whether a food product containing a dangerous but ar-
guably natural component is defective under § 2(a) is to 
be determined by reference to reasonable consumer ex-
pectations within the relevant context of consumption. A 
consumer expectations test in this context relies upon cul-
turally defined, widely shared standards that food prod-
ucts ought to meet. Although consumer expectations are 
not adequate to supply a standard for defect in other con-
texts, assessments of what consumers have a right to ex-
pect in various commercial food preparations are suffi-
ciently well-formed that judges and triers of fact can 
sensibly resolve whether liability should be imposed using 
th o d d 188 IS stan ar . 
Standards aside, the food cases present difficult proof prob-
lems. One of the issues is whether the defendant may introduce 
evidence that its quality control methods were such that the food 
187. See id. 
188. Id. 
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could not have been adulterated or contaminated.
189 
The Report-
ers' Note indicates that a substantial number of courts permit qual-
ity control evidence to be introduced as circumstantial proof that 
the food product was not contaminated at the time of sale. 190 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has not yet taken a position on 
the question of standards in this line of cases. The court of appeals 
visited the issue in Kneibel v. RRM Enterprises, 191 but without taking a 
clear position on the issue. The plaintiff in the case suffered dental 
injuries when he bit down on a hard object while eating ribs at a 
restaurant.192 He was unable to identify the object that allegedly 
broke his tooth because he reflexively swallowed the evidence after 
he was injured. 193 His negligence suit against the restaurant was 
dismissed by the trial court, aEparently because of his inability to 
satisfy the foreign-natural test. 1 4 
The court of appeals noted both the foreign-natural and rea-
sonable expectations tests.
195 
The foreign natural test distinguishes 
"'between injury caused by spoiled, impure, or contaminated food 
or food containing a foreign substance, and injury caused by a sub-
stance natural to the product sold. ",196 If the substance is natural, 
there is no liability.197 The reasonable expectation test determines 
the consumer's reasonable expectations of the food as it is served, 
rather than the natural occurrences in the food ingredients before 
preparation.198 The issue is usually decided by a jury. 199 
The court of appeals failed to take a position on the appropri-
ate test for Minnesota because of its conclusion that the plaintiff 
failed to satisfy either test.
200 
The plaintiff argued that the tests dif-
fer because under the reasonable expectations test the plaintiff 
need not identify the harmful object.
201 
He argued that there was a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether a person eating ribs 
189. See id. Reporters' Note, at 194. 
190. See id. 
191. 506 N.W.2d 664 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). 
192. See id. at 665. 
193. See id. 
194. See id. 
195. See id. at 661H>7. 
196. [d. at 666 (quoting Hunt v. Ferguson-Paulus Enters., 415 P.2d 13, 14 (Or. 
1966». 
197. See id. 
198. See id. 
199. See id. (citing Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp., 103 N.W.2d 64, 69 (Wis. 1960». 
200. See id. 
201. See id. at 667. 
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would expect to chew on a hard object that would break a tooth.
202 
The court of appeals concluded that where the reasonable ex-
pectations test is used in a negligence action, there must be a way 
of determining whether the defendant had breached its duty of or-
dinary care to eliminate or remove harmful objects in the prepara-
tion of the food.
203 
The court concluded that in absence of evi-
dence identifying the harmful object there was no way to prove that 
the restaurant breached its duty of care.
204 
The plaintiff relied on 
the exploding bottle cases to support his claim.
20 
The court of ap-
peals, however, distinguished those cases on the basis that explo-
sion of a bottle is circumstantial evidence that the product was de-
fective when it left the manufacturer's hands, but "it cannot be said 
that an order of spare ribs is clearly defective because an unidenti-
fied hard object causes harm.,,206 
Kneibel is framed in terms of a negligence claim, but the stan-
dards appear to be equally applicable to claims based on strict li-
ability. The supreme court's exploding bottle cases certainly de-
mand circumstantial proof of the defect that caused inj ury. 207 
However, it is also arguable that in referring to the foreseeability of 
the harm and the defendant's obligation to exercise ordinary care 
to eliminate or remove harmful bones in the preparation of food, 
the court of appeals understates the defendant's duty. Because 
there is no indication in the case that the plaintiff bit down on a 
piece of bone, the reasonable expectation test perhaps was inappli-
cable. Arguably, the case simply involved a defect resolvable under 
section 2(a) of the Restatement (Third), the provision applicable to 
manufacturing defects.208 If so, the court's concluding analysis is 
correct, and the preceding analysis is unnecessary. 
The court focused on the use of the reasonable expectations 
standard in a negligence action, concluding that there must be a 
way to determine whether the defendant breached its duty of ordi-
nary care to eliminate or remove harmful objects in the prepara-
tion of the food.
209 
The court held that there was no way to prove 
202. See id. 
203. See id. 
204. See id. 
205. See id. (citing Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Minn. 321, 
188 N.W.2d 426 (1971». 
206. See id. 
207. See, e.g., Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Minn. 321, 333, 
188 N.W.2d 426, 434 (1971). 
208. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2(a). 
209. See Kneibel, 506 N.W.2d at 667. 
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the defect without evidence identifying the harmful object.
21o 
IT the 
plaintiff pled the case as a strict liability claim, the issue is whether 
the standards would have differed or only the burden of proof on 
the reasonable care issue. 
The court's principal focus was on whether the object in the 
ribs was a foreign or natural substance.
211 
Requiring the plaintiff to 
prove a "clear defect" seemed unduly harsh under the circum-
stances. This may be a case that would be better handled under 
section 3 of Restatement (Third), under which the plaintiff might 
have been entitled to recover. 
Kneibel presents problems because it is unclear just exactly 
what caused the plaintiff's injury. The foreign-natural test presents 
problems because the plaintiff may have been injured by either a 
foreign substance or a piece of bone.
212 
A reasonable expectations 
test may create a jury issue as to whether he should reasonably ex-
pect such an injury while eating ribs. The trial court apparently 
used the foreign-natural test, which the plaintiff on appeal argued 
was improperly applied.213 The court of appeals affirmed the trial 
court, but on the basis that under either of standard the plaintiff 
was not entitled to recover because of his inability to show that the 
defendant breached its duty of due care.
214 
The flaw in the plain-
tiff's case, according to the court of appeals, was the plaintiff's fail-
ure to identify the harmful object.215 Absent that proof, there was 
216 
no proof of breach of duty. 
A question arises as to whether the plaintiff's claim would have 
failed under a strict liability theory as well, and whether it would 
have received different treatment under the Restatement (Third). 
Had the case proceeded under a strict liability theory, there still 
would have been a question as to the appropriate standard for 
resolution· of the food cases. Assuming the Restatement's consumer 
expectation standard applies, the issue is whether the case would 
have been decided differently. In Kneibe~ the court concluded that 
the plaintiff's inability to identify the harm-causing agent in the 
ribs foreclosed his ability to prove that the defendant failed to ex-
210. Seeid. 
21l. See id. 
212. See id. at 665. 
213. See id. at 667. 
214. See id. 
215. See id. 
216. See id. 
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ercise reasonable care.217 In a negligence case, the plaintiff has the 
burden of proving lack of due care on the part of the food seller. 
In a case under section 7, the plaintiff should be entitled to recover 
simply by proving that "a reasonable consumer would not expect 
the food product to contain" the ingredient that caused harm.218 
The defendant may introduce evidence that it exercised reasonable 
care, but only to prove that its exercise of reasonable care made it 
unlikely that the product that injured the plaintiff was not con-
. d th· f I 219 tammate at e orne 0 sa e. 
Section 7 of the Restatement (Third) notes that section 2(a) may 
be used to establish the existence of a manufacturing defect.22o If 
section 2(a) applied, the issue would be whether the plaintiff had 
sufficient circumstantial proof of the existence of the defect. 221 Of 
course, under section 3 the Elaintiff need not prove the specific de-
fect that caused the injury. 22 In Kneibel the Elaintiff was not re-
sponsible for the destruction of the evidence,23 and the critical is-
sue is then whether the plaintiff's circumstantial evidence of the 
existence of a defect in the ribs was sufficient to take the case to the 
JUry. 
There are two possible causes of the plaintiff's injury. One is a 
foreign object, in which case there would be a clear case under sec-
tion 2(a). The other is that the plaintlffwas injured by biting down 
on a piece of bone. Bones are common in spareribs. The prob-
abilities seem to be equally balanced. Even though the plaintiff 
may not have bitten a piece of bone, one potential explanation is 
that the plaintiff simply bit down on one of the ribs or a piece of 
rib. With respect to the circumstantial proof in the case, the issue 
is whether the plaintiff made a claim that a trier of fact should have 
resolved. 
The court of appeals rejected the Lee approach, concluding 
that explosion of a bottle is circumstantial evidence that the prod-
uct was defective when it left the defendant's hands, but that "it 
cannot be said that an order of spare ribs is clearly defective be-
217. See id. 
218. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 7. 
219. See id. Reporters' Note, at 194. 
220. See id. cmt. b. 
221. See id. § 2(a). 
222. See id. § 3. 
223. See Kneibel v. RRM Enterprises, 506 N.W.2d 664, 665 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1993). When the plaintiff bit down on the hard object, he swallowed reflexively 
and destroyed the evidence. See id. 
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cause an unidentified hard object causes harm. "224 The discussion 
of the burden of proof is somewhat confusing because of the 
court's note that there is no evidence in the case suggesting that 
the ribs were "clearly defective."225 The usual issue is not whether 
the plaintiff is able to prove that a harmful agent is "clearly defec-
tive," but rather whether the facts justify an inference that the 
product is defective. 
Section 7 of the Restatement seems to assume that the harm-
causing ingredient, whether foreign or natural, is identified. If it is 
not, then perhaps section 2(a), coupled with section 3, is appropri-
ately applied. If so, using the Restatement standard, the plaintiff 
would arguably have created a jury issue on the question. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has indicated the continuing 
validity of the consumer expectation standard in cases involving 
manufacturing flaws.226 There is no reason to think that the court 
will adopt a foreign-natural test instead of a consumer expectation 
standard in these kinds of cases. 
§ 8. LIABILI'IY OF COMMERCIAL SELLER OR DISTRIBUTOR OF 
DEFECTIVE USED PRODUCTS 
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distribut-
ing used products who sells or distributes a defective used product 
is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the 
defect if the defect: 
(a) results from the seller's failure to exercise reasonable 
care; or 
(b) is a manufacturing defect under § 2(a) or a defect that 
may be inferred under § 3 and the seller's marketing of the 
product would cause a reasonable person in the position of the 
buyer to expect the used product to present no greater risk of 
defect than if the product were new; or 
(c) is a defect under § 2 or § 3 in a used product remanu-
factured by the seller or a predecessor in the commercial chain 
of distribution of the used product. 
224. [d. at 667. 
225. /d. 
226. See Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 441 v. Bunn-O-Matic Corp., No. C0-96-594, 1996 
WL 689768, at *7 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 1996) (affirming the trial court's use of 
consumer expectation jury instructions as being appropriate for cases involving 
manufacturing flaws), review denied, (Minn. Jan. 29, 1997). 
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A used product is a product that, prior to the time of sale or 
other distribution referred to in this Section, is commercially sold 
or otherwise distributed to a buyer not in the commercial chain of 
distribution and used for some period of time.227 
Commentary 
The comments explain the reason for the deviation from the 
basic liability standards in section 2: 
American courts have struggled with the question of 
whether to hold commercial sellers of used products to 
the same legal standards of responsibility for defects as 
commercial sellers of new products. Judicial responses 
have varied. Some courts hold used-product sellers strictly 
liable for harm caused by product defects existing at the 
time of sale. A greater number of courts hold commercial 
sellers of used products to lesser standards of responsibil-
ity. Liability rules applicable to used-product sellers are 
less stringent than those applicable to new product sellers 
due to the wide variations in the type and condition of 
used products. For example, even in the minority of ju-
risdictions that generally hold commercial used-product 
sellers strictly liable for defects, disclaimers of liability may 
more readily be given effect in connection with sales of 
used products than in connection with sales of new prod-
ucts. Even in jurisdictions that generally apply more re-
laxed standards of responsibility for used products, factors 
that tend to raise a buyer's expectations regarding prod-
uct quality, such as a seller's advertising a used product as 
"re-built" or "re-conditioned," correspondingly tend to 
raise the level of the sellers' responsibilities for product 
defects.228 
There are several variations in the rules. The rules apply only 
when a used product is involved.229 To be "used" within the mean-
ing of the section, the product must have been commercially sold 
or otherwise distributed to a buyer who is not in the commercial 
chain of distribution, and it must have been used for some period 
of time, before the time of the sale or other distribution covered in 
section 8.230 The fact that a product has been tested, such as a rna-
227. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 8. 
228. [d. cmt. a. 
229. See id. § 8. 
230. See id. 
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tor vehicle test-driven at a dealership, does not cast the product as 
used within the meaning of section 8.
231 
Once a new product has 
been sold or distributed, "any use of the product by the buyer or 
other person not in the chain of distribution, for however short a 
period of time, transforms the product into a used product. "232 
Section 8 applies only to commercial sellers who are engaged 
in the business of selling used products.233 The section is inapplica-
ble to noncommercial private owners of used products who sell 
those products to others, nor is it applicable to commercial estab-
lishments that make only occasional sales of used equipment out-
side the regular course of business. 234 However, even though those 
sellers outside the scope of the Restatement (Third) may be liable 
d al 1· .. 1 235 un er gener neg Igence pnnClp es. 
A seller or distributor of used products is subject to liability 
under subpart (a) for harm caused by a used product that results 
from the seller's failure to exercise reasonable care. 236 Even if strict 
liability does not apply, the seller must exercise reasonable care, 
and a consumer of used products has a right to expect that the 
seller will do SO.237 
Subsections (b) and (c) subject a commercial seller of used 
products to liability only under limited circumstances.238 The rea-
son is that consumers generally do not, and should not, expect 
most used products that are sold in obviously used condition to 
perform as safely as new products. 239 Several factors influence con-
sumer expectations with respect to used products: 
For example, the age and condition of used products and 
the commensurate lower prices paid for such products 
alert reasonable buyers to the possibility of defects and 
the need to monitor the safety aspects of such products 
over time according to their age and condition. Given 
the awareness of buyers generally regarding the risks of 
harm presented by used products in varying stages of 
physical deterioration, primary responsibility for allocat-
ing these risks may, in the absence of fault on the part of 
231. See id. cmt. d. 
232. [d. 
233. See id. cmt. c. 
234. See id. 
235. See id. 
236. See id. § 8(a). 
237. See id. cmt. h. 
238. See id. 
239. See id. 
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the used-product seller or some special circumstance that 
justifies strict liability, be delegated to commercial mar-
kets for used products, in which the terms of sale vary 
widely depending on the apparent condition of such 
products at the time of sale.
24O 
However, when the used product is sold under circumstances 
where a reasonable buyer would expect the product to perform as 
a new product, the Restatement takes a different position: 
[U]nder the circumstances described in Subsection (b), 
many of the same rationales that support strict liability for 
harm caused by mechanical defects in new products sup-
port strict liability for mechanical defects in like-new used 
products. This section does not adopt the "consumer ex-
pectations test" as the governing standard for defining 
product defect. This Restatement has rejected that test as 
the sole test for defect in § 2 and does not adopt it in this 
Section .... The question addressed in this Section is un-
der what circumstances a plaintiff may hold the seller of a 
used product to the liability standard applicable to sellers 
of new products. When dealing with this more limited 
question, Subsection (b) takes the position that when the 
seller's marketing of the product would lead a reasonable 
consumer to expect the product to present no greater risk 
of defect than if the product were new that the law may 
treat the used product sale as the functional equivalent of 241 
the sale of a new product. 
For similar reasons, the remanufacture of a used product will 
subject the seller to strict liability. Subsection (c) includes manu-
facturing defects, design defects and defects that are based on in-
adequate instructions or wamings.
242 
The Reporters' Note follow-
ing section 8 discusses the difficulty in concluding with any 
certainty the exact degree of support for section 8 rules because of 
the varied opinion applicability of strict liability to the sale of used 
products.
243 
Minnesota groducts liability law is filled with cases in-
volving used products,2 although they have not raised the same 
240. Id. 
241. Id. 
242. See id. 
243. See id. Reporters' Note, at 213. 
244. See, e.g., Andrew v. White-Rodgers Co., 465 N.W.2d 102 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1991) (discussing the products liability issues arising from an accident involving a 
used space heater); Rients v. International Harvester Co., 346 N.W.2d 359 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1984) (discussing products liability issues arising from an accident involv-
ing a used tractor). 
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issues presented in section 8 of the Restatement. 
In Gorath v. Rockwell International, Inc.,245 the plaintiff suffered 
injuries when the blade of a guillotine paper cutter into which he 
was feeding paper at his place . of employment spontaneously 
turned around and cut off his hand.246 The plaintiff claimed he did 
not touch either of the two hand levers that activated the blade.247 
The paper cutter was manufactured and sold in 1947, and the first 
owner of the machine used it for over twenty years with no mis-
haps.248 In 1972, the seller sold the paper cutter with a thirty-day 
warranty to Gorath's employer, where it was used for over nine 
b eth 'd' . d 249 years elore e accl ent m question occurre . 
A two-handed start mechanism was the primary safety device 
on the machine.250 The right lever moved the blade, and the left 
lever was a safety feature that insured the operator could not oper-
ate the blade with one hand while the other was under the blade.251 
Three component parts of the safety lever were not the originally 
252 manufactured components. 
The plaintiff's experts attributed the accident to the product's 
defective design rather than to the parts that had been replaced on 
the paper cutter. The manufacturer's expert, however, testified 
that the replaced parts could have both prevented the effective use 
of the left-hand safety lever and prevented the safety lever from re-
turning to its proper position.253 The seller in the case denied hav-
. I d 254 mg ever rep ace any component parts. 
The plaintiff brought suit against both the manufacturer and 
seller of the paper cutter.255 The trial court granted the seller's mo-
tion for summary judgment on plaintiff's strict liability, negligence, 
and implied warranty claims against the seller.256 
On appeal, the court of appeals noted that Minnesota Statutes 
section 544.41 pennitted the dismissal of nonmanufacturing de-
245. 441 N.W.2d 128 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). 
246. See id. at 130. 
247. See id. 
248. See id. 
249. See id. 
250. See id. 
251. See id. 
252. See id. 
253. See id. 
254. See id. 
255. See id. at 129. 
256. See id. at 129-30. 
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fendants, including sellers of used products,257 from strict liability 
claims where the product manufacturer is solvent and subject to ju-
risdiction in Minnesota.258 The trial court, however, may not enter 
a dismissal order against a defendant if the plaintiff establishes one 
of the three following statutory exceptions: 
(a) That the defendant has exercised some significant 
control over the design or manufacture of the product, or 
has provided instructions or warnings to the manufacturer 
relative to the alleged defect in the product which caused 
the injury, death or damage; 
(b) That the defendant had actual knowledge of the de-
fect in the product which caused the injury, death or 
damage; or 
(c) That the defendant created the defect in the product 
which caused the i~ury, death or damage. 259 
The court of appeals concluded that because the paper cutter 
manufacturer's correct identity was known, the seller was not sub-
ject to strict liability in tort absent a finding that one of the statu-
. l' bl 260 tory exceptIons was app lca e. 
The court held that the seller did not exercise significant con-
trol over the product.
261 
The plaintiff argued that the seller's al-
teration constituted the exercise of significant control, although 
the seller denied any alteration and there was no evidence to the 
contrary.262 In a related argument, the plaintiff also argued that a 
factual dispute existed as to whether the original product defect 
was due to the manufacturer's design or the seller's modification.
263 
According to the court of appeals, the argument failed on the facts 
because the plaintiff did not present evidence that tended to show 
the seller made any modifications. Also, it failed because it did not 
establish a reasonable inference that any modification caused the 
plaintiff's injury.264 Without showing that the product seller cre-
ated the defect, the plaintiff also failed to show that the seller had 
actual knowledge of any defect in the product.
265 
As a result, the 
257. See id. at 132. 
258. See id. at 131. 
259. MINN. STAT. § 544.41, subd. 3 (1996). 
260. See Garath, 441 N.W.2d at 134. 
261. See id. at 131. 
262. See id. 
263. See id. 
264. See id. 
265. See id. 
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plaintiff did not meet the exception in subpart (b) of subdivision 
3.
266 
The court found its interpretation of the statute to be consis-
tent with the treatment of used product sellers in other jurisdic-
tions.267 The court noted that case law from other jurisdictions 
"holds that the seller of used products should be held in the case if 
the salesperson was more than a passive middleman and had some 
involvement with the condition of the product. "268 The cases noted 
269 
by the court of appeals, Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., a 
1975 Illinois Supreme Court case, and Crandell v. Larkin and Jones 
Appliance CO.,270 decided by the South Dakota Supreme Court in 
1983, take the general position that sellers of used products should 
not be held strictly liable based on the fact that they, unlike retail-
ers and wholesalers of new products, are ordinarily not in a posi-
tion to apply pressure on the product manufacturer to make its 
products safer.
271 
The South Dakota Supreme Court noted in 
Crandell that a product manufacturer of a reconditioned or rebuilt 
product could be subject to strict liability in order to protect the 
consumer's reasonable expectations of safety under those circum-
272 
stances. 
The plaintiff in Gorath also asserted that the seller was negli-
gent in failing to inspect the cutter, in failing to warn the purchaser 
about the product's design defects, and in selling a dangerous 
product.273 The court of appeals held that all three claims failed.
274 
First, the court held that sellers do not have an obligation to in-
spect the products they sell unless ther either know or have reason 
to know the products are dangerous.
27 
The statement is consistent 
with the position taken by the Restatement (Second) of Torts in section 
402. It provides: 
A seller of a chattel manufactured by a third person, who 
neither knows nor has reason to know that it is, or is likely 
to be, dangerous, is not liable in an action for negligence 
for harm caused by the dangerous character or condition 
266. See id. at 132. 
267. See id. (citations omitted). 
268. See id. (citations omitted). 
269. 329 N.E.2d 785, 787 (Ill. 1975). 
270. 334 N.W.2d 31,34 (S.D. 1983). 
271. See Peterson, 329 N.E.2d at 787; Crandell, 334 N.W.2d at 34. 
272. See Crandell, 334 N.W.2d at 34. 
273. See Corath, 441 N.W.2d at 132, 133. 
274. See id. 
275. See id. at 132. 
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of the chattel because of his failure to discover the danler 
by an inspection or test of the chattel before selling it.2 
In Crothers v. Cohen,277 also cited authority in Gorath,278 the court 
of appeals held that the seller could be held liable for failing to in-
spect the used car for latent defects before selling it to the plain-
tiff.279 The trial court instructed the jury that a seller "has a duty to 
use ordinary care to discover obvious defects which would consti-
tute a menace or source of danger. The seller is not required to 
disassemble the vehicle to make this observation.,,28o The court of 
appeals approved the instruction because it was based on Kothe v. 
Tysdale,281 a 1951 Minnesota Supreme Court case that established 
the basic duty of a vendor or lessor who intends to use the vehicle 
on the public highways.282 The duty is: 
[T] 0 exercise reasonable care in supplying the purchaser 
or the lessee with a vehicle that will not constitute a men-
ace or source of danger thereon; that liability attaches to 
such vendor or lessor for injuries which are the result of 
patent defects in the vehicle thus provided, or of defects 
therein which could have been discovered by the exercise 
of ordinary care; and that such liability exists irrespective 
of any contractual obligations between the parties to the 
"al . 283 ongm transactIon. 
The Kothe court also approved the position taken in Egan Chev-
rolet Co. v. Brunel84 by the Eighth Circuit:285 
A retail dealer who takes a used truck in trade and under-
takes to repair and recondition it for resale for use upon 
the public highways owes a duty to the public to use rea-
sonable care in the making of tests for the purpose of de-
tecting defects which would make the truck a menace to 
those who might use it or come in contact with it and in 
making the repairs necessary to render the truck reasona-
bly safe for use upon the public highways, and is charged 
276. RFsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 (1965). 
277. 384 N.W.2d 562 (Minn. Ct. App.), review denied, (Minn. June 13, 1986). 
278. See Gorath, 441 N.W.2d at 132. 
279. See Crothers, 384 N.W.2d at 562. 
280. [d. at 565. 
281. 233 Minn. 163,46 N.W.2d 233 (1951). 
282. See id. at 168, 46 N.W.2d at 236. 
283. [d. 
284. 102 F.2d 373 (8th Cir. 1939). 
285. See Kothe, 233 Minn. at 168, 46 N.W.2d at 236. See also McCleod v. Holt 
Motor Co., 208 Minn. 473, 477, 294 N.w. 479, 481 (1940) (approving of the 
Eighth Circuit's holding in Egan). 
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with knowledge of defects which are patent or discover-
able in the exercise of ordinary care . . . . The rule does 
not mean-as the appellant seems to fear-that a dealer 
in used motor vehicles, who undertakes to recondition a 
truck for resale, becomes virtually an insurer of the safety 
of the truck he sells, nor does it mean that he is required 




The duty noted in Egan, however, seems limited to used auto-
mobiles.
287 
If so, that means that sellers of used equipment owe a 
duty of care not subject to the Egan limitation for used motor vehi-
288 
cles. 
The court of appeals in Gorath also held that the seller in the 
case could not be held liable on the basis of a failure to warn 
claim. 289 Because of the multiple alterations to the paper cutter 
over its thirty year life, the court concluded that "the connection 
between the sale of this used product and the accident some 9 
years later is too remote to impose liability as a matter of public 
policy.,,290 The court concluded that the seller was not liable under 
the plaintiff's modified part theory because under that theory, a 
seller is liable only for the injuries resulting directly from modifica-
tions it made to the product.29 ! There was no evidence that the 
seller modified or replaced any of the parts on the paper cutter 
that may have caused the plaintiff's injuries.292 
Minnesota Statutes section 544.41 deviates from the general 
rule that a product seller in the chain of manufacture or distribu-
tion can be held strictly liable.
293 
Its opt-out provision permits dis-
missal from a products liability suit of a nonmanufacturing defen-
dant where the manufacturer is solvent and subject to jurisdiction 
in Minnesota.
294 
It does not specifically state what defendants are 
covered by the section, and it permits dismissal only of strict liabil-
ity claims, not claims based on negligence or warranty other than 
286. Egan, lO2 F.2d at 375-76. 
287. See id. at 375. 
288. See Sanders v. Strickler's Research and Eng'g Co., No. C3-92-1181, 1993 
WL 71645, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App.), review denied,( Minn. April 29, 1993). 
289. See Corath v. Rockwell Infl, Inc., 441 N.W.2d 128, 133 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1989). 
290. Id. 
291. See id. 
292. See id. 
293. See MINN. STAT. § 544.41, subd. 2 (1996). 
294. See id. 
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implied warranty of merchantability.295 However, Minnesota courts 
have held liable defendants who are product sellers other than 
manufacturers. 296 
To invoke section 544.41, the product manufacturer must be 
available and subject to suit.
297 
The claim against the manufacturer 
is based on the manufacturer's sale of a defective product.
298 
The 
claim against parties other than the manufacturer depends on 
proof that the non-manufacturing party is in the chain of distribu-
• 299 
llon. 
The exceptions in subdivision 3 of section 544.41 mean that 
the non-manufacturing defendant may be held in on the strict li-
ability claim asserted against it. Yet, it also means that as a prelimi-
nary matter a defendant may not be subject to Minnesota'sjurisdic-
tion unless it is part of the chain of distribution in the first place.
30o 
Furthermore, while the Gorath court held that the section applied 
to sellers of used products,301 it does so only when the seller is part 
of the chain of distribution.
302 
If not, the section would be inappli-
cable because there would be no product manufacturer who would 
be subject to jurisdiction in Minnesota.
303 
If the plaintiff establishes 
that the used product seller is actually the manufacturer, then the 
used product seller would be subject to strict liability, and the 
original manufacturer would be off the hook, and thus section 
544.41 would have no impact.304 
In sum, the exceptions in subdivision 3 establish that the 
product seller, including a used product seller, may be held liable 
under a strict liability theory, along with the original product 
manufacturer.
305 
If the product seller is in effect treated as the 
product manufacturer, then the original manufacturer would not 
295. See id. 
296. See, e.g., Frey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 258 N.W.2d 782, 786-87 (Minn. 
1977) (holding that there was sufficient evidence to establish retail sellers' duty to 
warn against improper use of a space heater); Anderson v. Shaughnessy, 519 
N.W.2d 229, 232-33 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (reversing district court's dismissal of a 
product seller), rev'd on other grounds, 526 N.W.2d 625 (Minn. 1995). 
297. See MINN. STAT. § 544.41, subd. 2 (1996). 
298. See id. subd. l. 
299. See id. subd. 3(a). 
300. See id. subd. 3. 
301. See Gorath v. Rockwell Int'l, Inc., 441 N.W.2d 128, 133 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1989). 
302. See MINN. STAT. § 544.41, subd. 3 (1996). 
303. See id. 
304. See id. 
305. See id. 
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be subject to liability, but the used product seller would be subject 
to such liability.306 If the used product seller is part of the chain of 
distribution, but simply passed along a defective product, the seller 
would not be subject to strict liability because it would be able to 
move for dismissal of the strict liability claims against it under sec-
tion 544.41.307 
If the claim against the non-manufacturing defendant is based 
on negligence, or warranty other than implied warranty, section 
308 544.41 has no effect. That leaves as the general rule, for sellers 
of used products as well as other sellers, a general obligation to ex-
ercise reasonable care. 
Melded, the Minnesota common law and statutory rules that 
apply to sellers of used goods are similar to the &statement's rules in 
section 8. 
§ 9. LIABILI1Y OF COMMERCIAL PRODUCT SELLER OR DISTRIBUTOR 
FOR HARM CAUSED BY MISREPRESENTATION 
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distribut-
ing products who, in connection with the sale of a product, makes 
a fraudulent, negligent, or innocent misrepresentation concerning 
the product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property 
caused by the misrepresentation.309 
Commentary 
The rules governing fraudulent and negligent misrepresenta-
tions are contained in sections 310 and 311 of the Restatement 
(Second) oj Torts.'3IO Section 9 provides for the imposition of liability 
on product sellers or distributors for fraudulent, negligent, or in-
nocent misrepresentations concerning the product that caused 
personal injury or property damage.
311 
Section 402B of the Restate-
ment (Second) covers liability for innocent misrepresentations. It 
provides: 
One engaged in the business of selling chattels who, by 
advertising, labels, or otherwise, makes to the public a 
306. See id. 
307. See id. 
308. See id. 
309. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 9. 
310. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 310 and 311 (1965). 
311. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 9. 
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misrepresentation of a material fact concerning the char-
acter or quality of a chattel sold by him is subject to liabil-
ity for physical harm to a consumer of the chattel caused 
by justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation, even 
though 
(a) it is not made fraudulently or negligently, and 
(b) the consumer has not bought the chattel from or en-
tered into any contractual relation with the seller.312 
In Minnesota, claims for fraud and misrepresentation are 
commonly mixed with other products liability claims.
3ls 
Those 
claims are separate and distinct from products liability claims based 
on design defect, failure to warn, or manufacturing flaws.314 Fraud 
and misrepresentation claims may exist even if the product is oth-
. de' 315 efWlse not eJ.ectlve. 
In Minnesota, the terms "fraud" and "misrepresentation" have 
been used interchangeably. As a general proposition, the term 
"fraud" is used where the representation is intentional, and 
"misrepresentation" is used where it is unintentional.
316 
312. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965). 
313. See, e.g., Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683, 685 (Minn. 1990) 
(mixing claim of misrepresentation with claims for negligence, breach of express 
and implied warranties, and strict liability); Beutz v. AO. Smith Harvestore 
Prods., Inc., 431 N.W.2d 528, 529 (Minn. 1988) (mixing claim offraud with claims 
for negligence, breach of implied and express warranties, and strict products li-
ability); Brandt v. Marshall Animal Clinic, 540 N.W.2d 870, 873 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1995) (mixing claims for fraud and misrepresentation with claims for defective 
design, negligence, and breach of implied warranties of merchantability and fit-
ness), review denied, (Minn. Feb. 9, 1996); Parker v. MVBA Harvestore Sys., 491 
N.W.2d 904, 905 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (mixing claims of fraud with claims for 
negligence, strict products liability, and breach of express and implied warran-
ties). 
314. See Hapka, 458 N.W.2d at 688. The commentary to the Civil Jury Instruc-
tion Guides takes a position pursuant to Bilotta. The comments state that: 
submission of a claim for express warranty, along with the design defect 
claim, would be appropriate where it is justified by the evidence .... 
The same result should be achieved with implied warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose. In both situations, statements or representations 
may provide the basis for liability even if, absent the representations or 
statements, the product would not be defective under the reasonable 
care balancing approach. 
JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, supra note 18,jIG 117, Authorities at 83. 
315. See Beutz, 431 N.W.2d at 530. 
316. See JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, supra note 18, JIG 610, Authorities at 407. 
There are eleven elements in a fraud or misrepresentation action in Minnesota. 
Id. at 408. They are as follows: 
1. a representation; 
2. the representation must be false; 
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§ 10. LIABILIlY OF COMMERCIAL PRODUCE SELLER OR DISTRIBUTOR 
FOR HARM CAUSED BY POST-SALE F AlLURE TO WARN 
(a) One engaged in the business of selling or othexwise dis-
tributing products is subject to liability for harm to persons or 
property caused by the seller's failure to provide a warning af-
ter the time of sale or distribution of a product when a reason-
able person in the seller's position would provide such a warn-
mg. 
(b) A reasonable person in the seller's position would pro-
vide a warning after the time of sale when: 
(1) the seller knows or reasonably should know that the 
product poses a substantial risk of harm to persons or 
property; and 
(2) those to whom a warning might be provided can be 
identified and may reasonably be assumed to be unaware of 
the risk of harm; and 
(3) a warning can be effectively communicated to and 
acted on by those to whom a warning might be provided; 
and 
(4) the risk of harm is sufficiently great to justify the 
b d f 'd' . 317 ur en 0 proVl mg a warnmg. 
Commentary 
Section 10 imposes a post-sale duty to warn only when a rea-
sonable Eerson in the product seller's position would provide the 
warning. 18 The standard is objective. As applied to the parties in 
3. the representation must deal with past or present fact; 
4. the fact must be material; 
5. the fact must be susceptible of knowledge; 
6. the representer must know the fact is false or assert it as of is own 
knowledge; 
7. the representer must intend to have the other person induced to act 
or justified in acting on it; 
8. the other person must be induced to act or justified in acting; 
9. that person's actions must be in reliance upon the representation; 
10. that person must suffer damages; and 




Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 10. 
See id. The Reporters state in their notes that they: 
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the chain of distribution, the reasonableness standard may re~uire 
one entity in the chain to provide a warning and not another. 9 A 
manufacturer may have an obligation to provide a warning, but a 
retailer who does not have knowledge of the dangers created by 
the product may not.
320 
If a retailer gains knowledge of the risk, 
the issue then becomes whether a reasonable person in the re-
tailer's position would provide a warning.321 That determination 
requires the application of the factors in subpart (b). 322 
The Restatement (Third) position is similar to that taken in Min-
nesota. In Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber CO.,323 the supreme 
court considered the issue of whether Goodyear had a post-sale ob-
ligation to warn about the dangers created by its multi-piece rim 
assembly.324 The court held that it did. Specifically, the court 
found: 
On the facts of this case, we hold that a continuing 
post-sale duty to warn existed and was adequately submit-
ted. Hundreds of thousands of K-rims have been used in 
millions of tire changes over the years without incident; of 
the 134 or so K-rim explosions which did occur, many are 
explained by improper servicing or misuse. Goodyear 
steadfastly maintains its K-rim is a safe product if used 
properly. Nevertheless, it became evident by the late 
1950s that K-rims could be temperamental.... [W] hen 
explosions did occur, serious i~ury or death usually re-
sulted; and, therefore, that great care was required in the 
handling and servicing of K-rims. Further, Goodyear has 
continued over the years in the tire rim business, and, al-
though all K-rim production was discontinued by 1969, 
Goodyear continued to advertise its K-rims as late as 1977, 
and has continued to sell tires and tubes for use with used 
K-rims. Finally, Goodyear undertook a duty to warn of K-
rim dangers. Under these circumstances, it seem to us 
have not drawn a sharp distinction between failure to warn of risk and 
failure to inform about safety improvements. Where a newly discovered 
risk imposes risk of serious harm and safety improvements can be practi-
cally implemented there may in certain instances be a duty to inform the 
buyer of the availability of such safety improvements. 
[d. Reporters' Note, at 240. 
319. See id. cmt. b. 
320. See id. § 10 cmt. b. 
321. See id. 
322. See id. 
323. 426 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1988), ecrt. denied, 492 U.S. 926 (1989). 
324. See id. at 832-33. 
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that Goodyear had a continuing duty to instruct and to 
warn, so that users of used K-rims would be apprised of 
safety hazards which, at an earlier time, were not fully ap-
preciated. A continuing duty to warn arises only in special 
W th o k th·· h 325 cases. e III IS IS suc a case. 
The court's position follows the Restatement (Third), at least in 
part. At a minimum, the seller either must know or reasonably 
should know that the product poses a substantial risk ofharm.
326 
In 
Hodder, the defendant knew as early as the late 1950s that there 
were problems with the rims, including the risk of serious injury or 
death.327 The defendant continued in business and continued to 
employ the K_rims.328 Although it stopped production of the rims 
in 1969, Goodyear continued advertising the K-rim and to sell tires 
and rims for use with existing rims until 1977; it also provided 
warnings of K-rim dangers at that time.329 Prior warnin&s of the 
dangers involved in using of the K-rims were quite graphic. 30 
The limitation of the theory to "special" cases has required 
subsequent courts faced with the issue to determine the breadth of 
the duty the court contemplated in Hodder. The three factors were 
critical to the United States District Court for the District of Minne-
sota in its consideration of the continuing duty to warn issue in Krr 
ciemba, an intrauterine device case.331 
In Ramstad v. Lear Siegler Diversi/zed Holdings C07fJ.332 a farmer 
sustained injuries when his foot slipped into the intake of a grain 
auger. The United States District Court for the District of Minne-
sota held that there was no continuing duty to warn on the part of 
the manufacturer.333 The court read the "special circumstances" in 
Hodder-slightly differently. It found: 
325. Id. at 833 (citations omitted). 
326. See id. at 832. 
327. See id. at 833. 
328. Seeid. 
329. See id. 
330. See id. at 835. 
331. See Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 707 F. Supp. 1517, 1528 (D. Minn. 
1989). The court also held that a continuing duty to test could be imposed on 
the manufacturer, although it would, of course, also be limited to "special cases." 
The court noted: 
Id. 
Courts should only apply a continuing duty to test when the type of spe-
cial circumstances identified by the Hodder court exist: knowledge of a 
problem with the product, continued sale or advertising of the product, 
and a pre-existing duty to warn of dangers associated with the product. 
332. 836 F. Supp. 1511 (D. Minn. 1993). 
333. See id. at 1517. 
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The special circumstances in Hodder included: (1) the de-
fendant's knowledge of problems with the product since 
the late 1950s, including the knowledge that the product 
might explode with little provocation; (2) the hidden na-
ture of the danger; (3) the fact that when explosions did 
occur, serious injury or death usually resulted; (4) defen-
dant remained in that line of business, continued to sell 
parts for use with the product and had advertised the 
product within five years of the plaintiff's injury; and (5) 
defendant had undertaken a duty to warn of product 
334 
dangers. 
The court's analysis of the special factors led it to conclude 
that there was no duty to warn of the dangers presented by the 
grain auger: 
The court concludes that the special factors which war-
ranted a continuing duty to warn in Hodder do not exist in 
the instant case. Hutchinson had notice of only a handful 
of other accidents. The danger associated with the auger 
was not hidden and was known to users. There is no evi-
dence that Hutchinson had undertaken a duty to warn. 
Hutchinson also adopted a new intake design and ceased 
marketing a shield for grain augers. The only factor that 
favors imposing a continuing duty to warn in this case is 
the gravity of the resulting harm. That factor alone, how-
ever, is insufficient to satisfy the special circumstances re-
quired by Hodder. 335 
In T.H.S. Northstar Associates v. W.R Grace and CO.,336 an asbes-
tos removal case, the Eighth Circuit held that the defendant manu-
facturer of fireproofing material had a continuing duty to warn 
under the circumstances of the case.337 The defendant argued that 
the necessary "special circumstances" required by Hodder were not 
present in the case,338 but the court disagreed: 
In Hodder, the Minnesota Supreme Court imposed such a 
duty based upon the following facts: (1) the manufacturer 
insisted its product was safe if used properly; (2) it be-
came evident to the manufacturer over time that great 
care was required in the handling and servicing of the 
product, or serious injury would occur; and (3) the manu-
334. Id. 
335. Id. 
336. 66 F.3d 173 (8th Cir. 1995). 
337. See id. at 177. 
338. See id. 
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facturer continued in the business of selling related prod-
ucts and undertook a duty to warn users of post-sale haz-
ards .... We agree with the district court that the evi-
dence in this case justified submitting the continuing-
duty-ta-warn issue to the jury. In particular, Grace's pam-
phlets, letters, and extensive publicity discussing the risks 
of asbestos-containing materials and purporting to advise 
building owners on how to manage that risk raise a jury is-
sue under Hodder whether to impose a continuing legal 
339 
duty to warn. 
The T.H.S. Northstar interpretation differs slightly from that of 
the district courts in Kociemba and Ramstad, although the second 
and third factors seem to follow Hodder. The Hodder court limited 
its holding to serious risk of personal injury or death. 34O Yet, T.H.S. 
Northstar extended the duty to cases involving property damage and 
economic loss, although the defendant created a significant health 
risk by the sale of its products.
341 
The Restatement (Third) makes explicit an apparent assumption 
in the Minnesota cases that "those to whom a warning might be 
provided can be identified and may reasonably be assumed to be 
unaware of the risk of harm. ,,342 This is consistent with two general 
principles governing warnings in Minnesota. One limits recovery 
for failure to warn to nonobvious dangers.
343 
The other gauges the 
obligation of a product seller to warn according to the feasibility of 
effectively reaching the person placed at risk.
344 
339. Id. (citations omitted). 
340. See Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d 826, 833 (Minn. 
1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 926 (1989). The facts of Hodder are limited to seri-
ous injury or death. See id. 
341. See T.H.S. Northstar, 66 F.3d at 174-75. 
342. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 10(b) (2). 
343. See Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assocs. Architects, Inc., 
354 N.W.2d 816, 821 (Minn. 1984) (explaining "there is no duty to warn if the 
user knows or should know the potential danger"), overruled on other grounds by 
Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683, 687 (Minn. 1990). See also Drager v. 
Aluminum Indus. Corp., 495 N.W.2d 879, 884 (Minn. Ct. App.) (holding that 
there is no duty to warn when the user is aware of the risk), review denied, (Minn. 
April 20, 1993); Willmar Poultry Co. v. Carns Chern. Co., 378 N.W.2d 830, 835 
(Minn. Ct. App.1985) (holding there is no duty to warn when a user is aware of 
product dangers), review denied, (Minn. Feb. 14 and 19, 1986); Dahlbeck v. DICO 
Co., 355 N.W.2d 157, 163 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (no duty to warn when product 
dangers are within user's professional knowledge) (citing Strong v. E.!. DuPont de 
Nemours Co., 667 F.2d 682, 687 (8th Cir. 1981), review denied, (Minn. Feb. 6, 
1985). 
344. See Hill v. Wilmington Chern. Corp., 279 Minn. 336,341, 156 N.W.2d 898, 
902 (1968) (holding that a manufacturer of an ingredient had no duty to warn 
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The third factor in section 10 provides that a warning can be 
effectively communicated to and acted on by those to whom a 
warning might be provided. It intends to ensure that the seller is 
reasonably able "to communicate the warning to those identified as 
appropriate recipients."345 If there are sales records identifying the 
purchasers, then a direct warning might be feasible.
346 
If records 
are not available, the seller may have to rely on the public media 
for warnings.347 In addition, as the size of the group to be warned 
increases, so does the cost.348 The ability of the seller to warn seems 
implicit in Minnesota law.349 As such, the seller's ability to warn is a 
question of law for the courts in Minnesota. 35o The courts use fea-
sibility as one factor to make that determination.351 
The fourth factor in the Restatement (Third) analysis questions 
whether the risk of harm is sufficiently great to justify a warning.352 
This issue seems implicit in Minnesota cases emphasizing that the 
duty to warn is a question of law for the courts to decide in the first 
instance.353 In Hodder, the court concluded that liability could be 
based on a post-sale obligation to warn. This decision is clearly is 
based on a balancing of the interests.354 The balancing act 
the ultimate consumer where the manufacturer of the final product knew of the 
ingredient's dangerous propensities and placed the product on the market with a 
warning label). 
345. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 10 cmt. g. 
346. See id. 
347. See id. 
348. See id. 
349. See Hil~ 279 Minn. at 341, 156 N.W.2d at 902. 
350. See, e.g., Huber v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 430 N.W.2d 465, 467 
(Minn. 1988) (determining that a manufacturer's duty to warn is a question of 
law); Balder v. Haley, 399 N.W.2d 77, 81 (Minn. 1987) (holding that the existence 
of a duty to warn is a legal question); Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 
N.W.2d 922, 924 (Minn. 1986) (holding that whether a duty to warn exists is a le-
gal issue). 
351. See Balder, 399 N.W.2d at 81 (no duty to warn where no particular hazard 
to warn about potential harm); Hill, 279 Minn. at 341, 156 N.W.2d at 902 (no duty 
to warn where no contract with and no opportunity to warn the ultimate con-
sumer). 
352. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 10(b)(4). 
353. See, e.g., Balder, 399 N.W.2d at 81; Germann, 395 N.W.2d at 924-25. 
354. See Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d 826, 832-34 
(Minn. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 926 (1989). In Bilotta,Justice Simonett's con-
curring opinion forthrightly balances the interests involved in a design defect 
case. See Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 626 (Minn. 1984) (Simonett, j., 
concurring specially). He has taken the same approach in other areas of tort law. 
See, e.g., Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165 (Minn. 1989). In Erickson, he 
applied a risk-utility inquiry that involved the use of various policy factors, includ-
ing a cost-benefit analysis, to determine the liability of a hotel owner for a parking 
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prompted the court's conclusion that the post-sale duty to warn 
should be imposed only in special cases and that this was one of 
them.355 The Restatement makes explicit what is implicit in the Min-
nesota and federal cases involving post-sale duty to warn issues. It 
is explicit in the design cases, where risk versus utility is a critical 
Issue. 
Comment a following section 10 states that: 
As with all rules that raise the question whether a duty 
exists, courts must make the threshold decisions that, in 
particular cases, triers of fact could reasonably find that 
product sellers can practically and effectively discharge 
such an obligation and that the risks of harm are suffi-
ciently great to justifY what is typically a substantial post-
sale undertaking. In deciding whether a claim based on 
breach of a post-sale duty to warn should reach the trier 
of fact, the court must determine whether the require-
ments in Subsection (b) (1) through (4) are supported by 
proof. The legal standard is whether a reasonable person 
would provide a post-sale warning. In light of the serious 
potential for overburdening sellers in this regard, the 
court should carefully examine the circumstances for and 
against imposimr a duty to provide a post-sale warning in a 
. I 3llti partxcu ar case. 
Blending Minnesota products liability law with section 10 
means that the initial determination of whether there is a jury issue 
on post-sale failure to warn first has to be made by the court, keep-
ing in mind the supreme court's cautionary note in Hodder. Once 
the court decides that there is a jury issue the case would be sub-
mitted to the jury pursuant to instructions that would incorporate 
the Bilotta357 risk-utility standard, inviting an evaluation of the rea-
sonableness of the manufacturer's conduct. 
ramp assault. He wrote: 
Presumably we do not live in a risk-free society; if this is so, a cost-benefit 
analysis is unavoidable. To post security guards at each parking ramp 
level 24 hours a day might be the most effective crime deterrent, but the 
cost may be prohibitive for both the property owner and the customer. 
A parking ramp cannot be a fortress. In this case, for example, plaintiff 
apparently considered cost as a factor in choosing the Curtis ramp for 
parking rather than another ramp or taking the bus. The question of 
how much security is adequate raises, therefore, the further question of 
how much risk is an acceptable risk for members of the public. 
Id. at 169. 
355. See Hodder, 426 N.W.2d at 833. 
356. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 10 cmt. a. 
357. See Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 626 (Simonett,J., concurring specially). 
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§ 11. LIABILI1Y OF COMMERCIAL PRODUCT SELLER OR DISTRIBUTOR 
FOR HARM CAUSED BY POST-SALE FAILURE TO RECALL PRODUCT 
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distribut-
ing products is subject to liability for harm to persons or property 
caused by the seller's failure to recall a product after the time of 
sale or distribution if: 
(a) (1) a statute or other governmental regulation specifi-
cally requires the seller or distributor to recall the product; 
or 
(2) the seller or distributor, in the absence of a recall 
requirement under Subsection (1), undertakes to recall the 
product; and 
(b) the seller or distributor fails to act as a reasonable per-
son in recalling the product.
358 
Commentary 
The Restatement (Third) imposes liability only when a statute or 
regulation requires a recall.
359 
If a recall is voluntarily initiated, the 
seller or distributor is required to act as a reasonable person in re-
calling the product.!I6O The restrictive position on recalls is based 
on the excessive burden that could be imposed on product sellers 
or distributors if any improvement in product safety triggered a re-
call. 361 Even if a product is deemed defective under sections 2 - 4, 
the Restatement leaves recalls to government agencies best equipped 
ak th d 
.. 362 
to m e e etermmatlon. 
If recall is specifically required by a statute or regulation, liabil-
ity may not be imposed under section 11, unless a specific recall 
order is initiated by the responsible agency. This is so even though 
the agency possesses the unexercised power to do SO.363 If the stat-
ute or regulation specifically provides for a product recall, then vio-
lation by the seller constitutes negligence under section 4 of the 
Restatement.
364 
358. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 11. 
359. See id. 
360. See id. 
361. See id. cmt. a .. 
362. See id. § 11. 
363. See id. cmt. h. 
364. See id. 
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The Re~orters' Note regarding section 11 cites Gregory v. Cin-
cinnati, Inc., 65 a 1995 Michigan Supreme Court decision, as the 
most significant case that supports the general rule of nonliability 
. g66 
for failure to recall a product. In Comstock v. General Motors 
Corp.g67 the Michigan Supreme Court held that once a manufac-
turer discovers a postmanufacture latent defect, the manufacturer 
g68 
has a duty to warn of those defects. In Gregory, the court ques-
tioned whether the obligation should be extended to include 
product recalls.
g69 
The differences, however, convinced the Gregory 
court to reject the plaintiff's argument. The court noted: 
In this case, plaintiff does not allege that the press 
brake should have had a point-of-manufacture warning at-
tached to it, nor does he contend that Cincinnati 
breached the duty to warn of a latent defect in accordance 
with Comstock. Instead, he maintains that Cincinnati had a 
duty to repair, fix, or recall the product, reasoning that, if 
a duty to warn exists under Comstock, a duty to repair also 
must exist. We disagree. 
We find Comstock substantially different from this case 
because Comstock premised the postmanufacture duty to 
warn on the basis of latency. In the case at bar, plaintiff 
did not allege that the defect was latent, but instead contended 
that Cincinnati knew or should have known of the dan-
gerous condition of this product absent certain safety de-
vices. We are persuaded that resolution of this risk-utility 
test (knew or should have known) forecloses considera-
tion of a latent defect discovered post manufacture. If the 
manufacturer should have known of the problem, liability 
attaches at that point, not post manufacture. 
In Prentis, we held that design defect cases require a 
risk-utility balancing test. With the focus on conduct 
rather than simply the product, proof of a defect by the 
risk-utility test resolves any issue of latency because the re-
sult of the test is a finding that the manufacturer either 
knew or should have known of the danger at the point of 
manufacture. Accordingly, a design defect cannot, practi-
cally speaking, be deemed undiscoverable at the point of 
manufacture. In other words, constructive knowledge 
365. 538 N.W.2d 325 (Mich. 1995). 
366. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 11 Reporters' Note, at 248. 
367. 99 N.W.2d 627 (Mich. 1959). 
368. See id. at 634. 
369. See Gregory, 538 N.W.2d at 330. 
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imputed to the manufacturer under the state of the art at 
the time of design renders the concept of latency at issue 
in Comstock moot in a design defect case. There being no 
issue of latency, the question becomes whether any post-
manufacture duty is imposed. 
Because a prima facie case is established once the risk-
utility test is proven, we are persuaded that it is unneces-
sary and unwise to impose or introduce an additional duty 
to retrofit or recall a product. Focusing on postmanufac-
ture conduct in a negligent design case improperly shifts 
the focus from point-of-manufacture conduct and consid-
ers postmanufacture conduct and technology that accord-
ingly has the potential to taint a jury's verdict regarding a 
defect. 
Moreover, we believe the duty to repair or recall is 
more properly a consideration for administrative agencies 
and the Legislature who "are better able to weigh the 
benefits and costs involved in locating, recalling, and ret-
rofitting products," as well as other economic factors af-
fecting businesses and consumers. Courts have tradition-
ally not been suited to consider the economic effect of 
such repair or recall campaigns. In this case, with liability 
premised on the risk-utility test, a continuing duty instruc-
tion adds nothing to plaintiff's case but potential confu-
sion. 
In any event, when appropriate, i.e., when the protec-
tion of vital interests was deemed necessary, policymakers 
have explicitly delegated such authority to administrative 
agencies. Plaintiff did not rely on and cites no statute im-
posing such a duty to repair or recall so as to provide a 
basis for a legal duty in a negligence action. If he had, 
and in the appropriate case, failure to follow a recall or-
der mandated by statute and agency might provide the 
basis for a duty to recall in a negligence action. 
Cases that have imposed a duty to repair or recall have 
been few and have primarily been reserved for extraordi-
nary cases, i.e., airplane safety, in which the potential 
danger is severe and widespread. We elect not to follow 
such precedent in the instant case. Indeed, other courts 
have been unwilling to impose such an onerous duty ex-
cept where there is an assumption of the duty or some 
special, controlling relationship between the manufac-
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turer and the owner of the machine.
370 
One of the "extraordinary cases" noted by the Michigan Su-
preme Court was Kociemba 371 from the United States District Court 
for the District of Minnesota.372 The Kociemba court discussed the 
duty to recall in the context of a discussion of a continuing duty to 
test an intrauterine device. The court stated: 
This Court has already held that the duty to test is a 
subpart of the duty to warn. It is logical that a continuing 
duty to warn would have as a subpart a continuing duty to 
test. Although Minnesota courts have up until now only 
recognized a continuing duty to warn, recognizing a con-
tinuing duty to test which is subsumed as a part of the 
continuing duty to warn is a consistent extension of exist-
ing law. Therefore, this Court holds that its instructions 
to the jury concerning a manufacturer's continuing duty 
to test is not erroneous. 
Of course, any continuing duty to test would also be 
limited to "special cases." Courts should only apply a con-
tinuing duty to test when the type of special circumstances 
identified by the Hodder court exist: knowledge of a prob-
lem with the product, continued sale or advertising of the 
product, and a pre-existing duty to warn of dangers asso-
ciated with the product. 
Limiting the continuing duty to test to cases where the 
manufacturer has knowledge of problems with a product 
alleviates defendant's concern that this duty will impose a 
crushing burden on manufacturers to retest products. If a 
manufacturer has no information concerning potential 
dangers associated with a product, it will be under no duty 
to continually test the product. Conversely, if a manufac-
turer does obtain sufficient credible information that a 
product already in use is potentially dangerous, the manu-
facturer should test that product to determine the extent 
of any danger, and then issue an appropriate warning or 
373 
product recall. 
370. Id. at 333-35 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
371. Kociemba is known as the intrauterine device case. See Kociemba v. G.D. 
Searle & Co., 707 F. Supp. 1517, 1528 (D. Minn. 1989). 
372. See Gregory, 538 N.W.2d at 334-35 n.33. Other "extraordinary cases" have 
been those with potential severe and widespread danger, such as airplane safety 
cases. See id. at 334-35 and n.34 (citing Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d 
232 (3d Cir. 1964); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 411 F.2d 451 (2d 
Cir.1969». 
373. Kociemba, 707 F. Supp. at 1528-29. 
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As the Gregory court noted, Kociemba's discussion is only a 
"suggestion" that the obligation to recall would be imposed by the 
Minnesota Supreme Court.
374 
The suggestion is based on the 
court's opinion in Hodder-.375 The caution expressed by the court in 
Hodder and other post-sale obligation to warn cases, however, indi-
cate that the court would perhaps take a conservative approach on 
the question. 
§ 12.LIABILI1Y OF SUCCESSOR FOR HARM CAUSED BY DEFECTIVE 
PRODUCTS SOLD COMMERCIALLY BY PREDECESSOR 
A successor corporation or other business entity that acquires 
assets of a predecessor corporation or other business entity is sub-
ject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by a defec-
tive product sold or otherwise distributed commercially by the 
predecessor if the acquisition: 
(a) is accompanied by an agreement for the successor to as-
sume such liability; or 
(b) results from a fraudulent conveyance to escape liability 
for the debts or liabilities of the predecessor; or 
(c) constitutes a consolidation or merger with the predeces-
sor; or 




The Restatement rule is derived from both products liability and 
corporate law principles.377 Where a successor purchases the assets 
of the predecessor piecemeal, and there is no subsequent continu-
ity of operations between the two corporations or other business 
entities, the successor is not liable for harm caused by a defective 
product sold by the predecessor.
378 
The rule of nonliability is based 
primarily on the fact that the successor does not fall within the ba-
sic rule in section 1 of the Restatement. Section 1 applies only to 
374. See Gregory, 538 N.W.2d at 334-35 n.33. 
375. See Kociemba, 707 F. Supp. at 1528 (citing Hodder, 426 N.W.2d at 833). 
376. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 12. 
377. See id. cmt. a. 
378. See id. 
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"[ 0] ne ... who sells or distributes a defective product is subject to li-
b ·l· C h "379 a 1 Ity lor arm .... 
Corporate law will provide protection, within limits, to a tort 
plaintiff with a judgment against the predecessor corporation at 
the time of a transfer of assets and dissolution of that corpora-
tion.
380 
However, tort claimants who attempt to recover only after 
the transfer of assets to a successor company will face difficulty in 
bringing their claims within the applicable law. 381 Their claims usu-
ally accrue after the lawful distribution of assets by the predecessor, 
and as such, they were not judgment creditors at the time of the 
transfer of assets. These claimants usually have no recourse against 
382 
the shareholders of the predecessor. If they are unable to sue 
the successor corporation, or reach other funds provided by exist-
ing insurance or statute, the tort claimants' only remedy may be 
against retailers and wholesalers in the chain of distribution.
383 
The Restatement enumerates the limited circumstances under 
which the successor corporation may be held liable for a defective 
product sold by the predecessor corporation. The circumstances 
include: 
Few precedents recognize tort claims against the suc-
cessor corporation for harm caused by defective products 
sold by the predecessor unless the transaction by which 
productive assets are acquired meets criteria established 
by one of several traditional exceptions. These exceptions 
apply generally to creditors whose claims accrue after dis-
solution of the predecessor, and are not limited to prod-
ucts liability claimants. They fall into two basic categories: 
those in which some conduct of the successor, in addition 
to acquiring the predecessor's assets, justifies holding the 
successor responsible (the successor either contractually 
agrees to be liable or knowingly participates in a fraudu-
lent asset transfer); and those in which the successor itself 
can be said to have sold or distributed the defective prod-
ucts because the successor constitutes the same juridical 
entity as the predecessor, perhaps in somewhat different 
form (the successor merges with, or constitutes a "mere 
continuation" of, the predecessor). Under this Section, a 
products liability claimant has a recognized claim against 
379. Id. (emphasis in original). 
380. See id. 
381. See id. 
382. See id. 
383. See id. 
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a successor for harm caused by defective products distrib-
uted by the predecessor in these circumstances.
384 
The Restatement's rationale is based on efficiency and fairness 
considerations.
385 
Minnesota law governing successor liability was 
provided by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Niccum v. Hydra Tool 
Corp.,386 which followed the earlier decision of JF. Anderson Lumber 
Co. v. Myers. 387 Both cases parallel the Restatement. Niccum specifi-
cally notes: 
[W] here one corporation sells or otherwise transfers all of 
its assets to another corporation, the latter is not liable for 
the debts and liabilities of the transferor, except: (1) 
where the purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to as-
sume such debts: (2) where the transaction amounts to a 
consolidation or merger of the corporation; (3) where the 
purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of the 
selling corporation; and (4) where the transaction is en-
tered into fraudulently in order to escape liability for such 
debts. 388 
The Niccum court also concluded that the legislature, through 
the enactment of a 1981 statute governing transferee liability, in-
tended to limit any additional expansion of successor liability be-
yond the traditional exceptions established by the supreme court 
in JF. Anderson.389 The statute, subdivision 4 of section 302A.661, 
reads as follows: 
tion: 
The transferee is liable for the debts, obligations, and li-
abilities of the transferor only to the extent provided in 
the contract or agreement between the transferee and the 
transferor or to the extent provided by this chapter or 
th f th
o 390 
o er statutes 0 IS state. 
The Reporters' Note to the statute demonstrated the limita-
Subdivision 4 of this section is aimed at limiting the civil 
liabilities of transferors assumed by transferees to those 
agreed to between the parties or imposed by law, even if 
the transferee is operating the corporation in exactly the 
same manner as it was operated by the transferor. This 
384. [d. 
385. See id. cmt. b. 
386. 438 N.W.2d 96 (Minn. 1989). 
387. 296 Minn. 33, 206 N.W.2d 365 (1973). 
388. Niccum, 438 N.W.2d at 98. 
389. See id. at 99. 
390. MINN. STAT. § 302A.661, subd. 4 (1996). 
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limits, for example, exposure to product liability claims 
for items manufactured by the transferor.391 
In Niccum, the plaintiffs asked the court to expand the third 
exception, the mere continuation rule, to include cash-for-assets 
sales.392 The court rejected the argument,393 and instead applied 
the liberal products liability case of Turner v. Bituminous Casualty 
Co., a Michigan Supreme Court decision. 394 The Niccum court also 
rejected the product line exception adopted by the California Su-
preme Court in Ray v. Alad Carp. 395 The exception holds a succes-
sor, who continues to manufacture a product of the business it ac-
quired, strictly liable for products manufactured by the 
predecessor, regardless of the means of acquiring the predecessor 
or any possible assignment of fault. 396 
§ 13. LlABILI1Y OF SUCCESSOR FOR HARM CAUSED BY SUCCESSOR'S 
OWN POST -SALE F AlLURE TO WARN 
(a) A successor corporation or other business entity that 
acquires assets of a predecessor corporation or other business 
entity, whether or not liable under the rule stated in § 12, is 
subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by 
the successor's failure to warn of a risk created by a product 
sold or distributed by the predecessor when: 
(1) the successor undertakes or agrees to provide seIV-
ices for maintenance or repair of the product or enters into 
a similar relationship with purchasers of the predecessor's 
products giving rise to actual or potential economic advan-
tage to the successor, and 
(2) a reasonable person in the position of the successor 
would provide a warning. 
(b) A reasonable person in the position of the successor 
would provide a warning when: 
(1) the successor knows or reasonably should know that 
the product poses a substantial risk of harm to persons or 
391. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.661, General Comment (West 1985). 
392. See Niccum, 438 N.W.2d at 99. 
393. See id. at 100. 
394. 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976). 
395. 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977). 
396. See Niccum, 438 N.W.2d at 99-100. 
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property; and 
(2) those to whom a warning might be provided can be 
identified and can reasonably be assumed to be unaware of 
the risk of harm; and 
(3) a warning can be effectively communicated to and 
acted upon by those to whom a warning might be provided; 
and 
(4) the risk of harm is sufficiently great to justify the 
b d f ·d· . 397 ur en 0 proVl mg a warnmg. 
Commentary 
Unlike section 12, this section of the Restatement imposes liabil-
ity on a successor corporation for its own failure to warn when the 
specified conditions are met and when a reasonable person in the 
successor's position would provide a warning.
39B 
Liability under 
section 13 is similar to the liability imposed by section 10 for post-
sale failure of a product seller to warn, even when the product was 
not defective at the time of sale.
399 
The rationale for imposing li-
ability on the successor under these circumstances is based on the 
fact that the successor is frequently in a favorable position to dis-
cover problems with the use of the predecessor's product and to 
act in preventing harm to consumers or their property.400 Fur-
thermore, "[w]hen the relationship between the successor and pre-
transfer purchasers of the predecessor's products gives rise to ac-
tual or potential economic benefit to the successor, it is both fair 
and efficient to require the successor to act reasonably to prevent 
such harm. "401 
In Niccum, the supreme court held that Hodder was inapplica-
ble to post-sale failure to warn claims brought against a successor.
402 
Instead, the court followed Travis v. Harris Carp.,403 in which the 
Seventh Circuit listed factors to use in determining whether to im-
pose a duty to warn on a successor: 
Succession to a predecessor's service contracts, coverage 
397. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 13. 
398. See id. cmt. a. 
399. Seeid. 
400. See id. 
401. [d. 
402. See Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96,100 (Minn. 1989). 
403. 565 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1977). 
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of the particular machine under a seIVice contract, seIVice 
of that machine by the purchaser corporation, a pur-
chaser corporation's knowledge of defects and of the lo-
cation or owner of that machine, are factors which may be 
considered in determining the presence of a nexus or re-
lationship effective to create a duty to warn. 404 
Niccum arose out of injuries sustained by the plaintiff while op-
erating a press brake.
405 
The press brake was designed by the Wis-
consin Machine Corporation, which in February of 1973 sold cer-
tain designs and patents, including the press brake design, to the 
Wisconsin Equipment Corporation.
406 
The Wisconsin Machine 
Company dissolved in December of 1973.
407 
In May of 1973, Wis-
consin Equipment manufactured and sold a press brake to Alloy 
Hard Facing & Engineering.
408 
In 1985, it was owned by the plain-
tiff's employer, but the chain of previous ownership is unknown.
409 
Mter the sale of the press brake, HTC, Inc., purchased all the 
assets of Wisconsin Equipment.
41o 
HTC was a wholly owned sub-
sidiary of Hydra Tool Corp., the defendant in the suit.
411 
The pur-
chase agreement between HTC and Wisconsin Equipment was 
412 
structured as a purchase of assets for cash. The agreement spe-
cifically stated that HTC would not assume liability for injuries 
caused by Wisconsin Equipment products already on the market.
413 
Rather, Wisconsin Equipment was to retain liability for those inju-
ries.
414 
Wisconsin Equipment dissolved in 1977, but HTC had no 
prior knowledge that Wisconsin Equipment would dissolve.415 
Applying the Travis list to the facts of the case, the Niccum 
court held that no duty to warn existed. It specifically noted: 
Hydra Tool never succeeded to any seIVice contracts held 
by WEC and never seIViced any of the press brakes under 
a seIVice contract. Hydra Tool was not aware of any par-
ticular defects associated with the press brake. Hydra 
Tool did not know the location of the machine at the time 
404. [d. at 449. 
405. See Niccum, 438 N.W.2d at 97. 
406. See id. 
407. See id. 
408. See id. 
409. See id. 
410. See id. at 98. 
411. See id. 
412. See id. 
413. See id. 
414. See id. 
415. See id. 
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Niccum was injured. Hydra Tool also developed its own 
customer lists and did not use those supplied by WEC. 
Under these facts we find no independent duty to warn 
416 
on the part of respondent Hydra Tool. 
The Reporters' Note indicates that the Reporters: 
have not made the existence of a service contract a sine 
qua non for the imposition of a duty to warn on a succes-
sor corporation. Other similar relationships with pur-
chasers of the predecessor's products giving rise to actual 
or potential economic advantage to the successor may suf-
fice to create a duty to act reasonably and provide warn-
• 417 
mgs. 
It is not clear if the Minnesota courts would make the exis-
tence of service contracts an absolute prerequisite for imposition of 
a duty to warn on a successor corporation. The Restatement (Third) 
approach, however, is consistent with the supreme court's willing-
ness to engage in balancing the relevant factors in deciding duty 
lssues. 
§ 14. SELLING OR OTHERWISE DISTRIBUTING AS ONE'S OWN A 
PRODUCT MANUFACTURED BY ANOTHER 
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distribut-
ing products who sells or distributes as its own a product manufac-
tured by another is subject to the same liability as though the seller 
or distributor were the product's manufacturer.418 
Commentary 
The rule in section 14
419 
is derived from section 400 of the Re-
statement (Second) oJ Torts.
420 
The rule is recognized in a clear major-
ity ofjurisdictions.
421 
The rules governing manufacturer liability of 
chattels in the Restatement (Second) oj Torts were fault-based and 
treated product manufacturers differently from other sellers in the 
416. [d. at 1Q0-01. 
417. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 13 Reporters' Note, at 278. 
418. !d. § 14. 
419. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 14 cmt. a (citing REsrATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 (1965». 
420. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 (1965) (stating that "[o]ne 
who puts out as his own product a chattel manufactured by another is subject to 
the same liability as though he were its manufacturer"). 
421. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 14 Reporters' Note, at 281. 
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h · f .. c: d d' 'b' 422 caIn 0 manlllacture an Istn utlOn. 
Section 400 incorporates sections 394-398 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts by reference to outline the manufacturer's poten-
tialliability.423 
The adoption of section 402A subjected all sellers to strict li-
ability claims. As such, section 400 had questionable validity. 
However, Minnesota and other states have special rules limiting the 
liability of nonmanufacturer parties in the chain of distribution 
under a strict liability theory. These states may use the negligence 
rules of the Restatement to prevent the nonmanufacturer parties 
from opting out of liability. 
Section 544.41 of the Minnesota Statutes distinguishes sellers 
in the chain of distribution from product manufacturers ap.d ex-
empts them from liability if the product manufacturer is solvent 
and subject to jurisdiction in Minnesota.424 However, there are 
specific exceptions to the rule. These exceptions follow: 
Subd. 3. A court shall not enter a dismissal order 
relative to any certifying defendant even though full com-
422. See id. cmt. a. 
423. SeeREsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 (1965). Section 394 states that 
"a manufacturer of a chattel which he knows or has reason to know to be, or to be 
likely to be, dangerous for use ... subject to the liability of a supplier of chattels 
with such knowledge." [d. § 394. Section 395 sets out the standard negligence 
formula, making a manufacturer who fails to exercise reasonable care in the 
manufacture of a chattel liable if the manufacturer recognizes that the chattel, 
unless carefully made, will involve an "unreasonable risk of causing physical harm 
to those who use it for a purpose for which the manufacturer should expect it to 
be used .... " [d. § 395. Section 396 makes the manufacturer subject to liability 
under sections 394 and 395 even though the dangerous character of the chattel is 
discoverable "by an inspection which the seller or any other person is under a 
duty to the person injured to make." [d. § 396. Section 397's rule is a special ap-
plication of the rule in section 395. See id. § 397. It imposes an obligation to warn 
on the manufacturer of a chattel compounded under a secret formula or a for-
mula which, although disclosed, is not likely to be understood by users of the 
chattel. See id. Section 398, which is also a special application of the general neg-
ligence rule in section 395, applies to chattels manufactured under a plan or de-
sign that makes the chattel dangerous for the uses for which it is manufactured. 
See id. § 398. It makes the manufacturer liable for physical harm caused by the 
manufacturer's "failure to exercise reasonable care in the adoption of a safe plan 
or design," and extends the manufacturer's liability "to others whom he should 
expect to use the chattel or to be endangered by its probable use for physical 
harm." [d. § 398. Section 399, which stands independent of section 400, makes 
the seller of a chattel that is manufactured by a third person subject to liability 
when the seller sells the chattel, "knowing that it is, or is likely to be, dangerous." 
[d. § 399. Section 399 incorporates the rules in sections 388 - 390 of the Restate-
ment (Second) by reference. See id. 
424. See MINN. STAT. § 544.41, subd. 3 (1996). 
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pliance with subdivision 1 has been made where the plain-
tiff can show one of the following; 
(a) That the defendant has exercised some signifi-
cant control over the design or manufacture of the prod-
uct, or has provided instructions or warnings to the manu-
facturer relative to the alleged defect in the product 
which has caused the injury, death or damage; 
(b) That the defendant had actual knowledge of the 
defect in the product which caused the injury, death or 
damage; or 
(c) That the defendant created the defect in the 
product which caused the injury, death or damage.425 
These exceptions apply to prevent dismissal on the strict liabil-
ity claim asserted against the nonmanufacturing defendant. It 
seems clear that the negligence rules set out in section 400, and by 
reference, sections 394-398, establish liability rules that are broader 
than the specific exceptions in subdivision 3 of section 544.41. Sec-
tion 400 uses standard negligence rules to impose liability on sell-
ers who offer as their own products manufactured by others.426 
Those rules do not require that a defendant exercise "some sia-nificant control over the design or manufacture of the product," 7 
nor do they require a showing that the defendant provided instruc-
tions or warnings to the manufacturer concerning the alle~ed de-
fect in the product that caused the injury, death, or damage. 28 The 
rules do not require a showing of actual knowledge of the defect, 
nor do they require a showing that the defendant created the de-
fect in the product.429 
Minnesota has not specifically adopted section 400 of the Re-
statement (Second). However, an earlier case, Tiedje v. Haney,430 was 
cited in the Restatement Appendix as one of the decisions that sup-
ported a broadening of the early rule in the Restatement of Torts 
covering the liability of product sellers.
431 
Tiedje arose out of the 
sale of a drug that contained poison which, when ingested by the 
plaintiff, caused severe injuries.
432 
The plaintiff brought suit 
425. Id. 
426. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 (1965). 
427. MINN. STAT. § 544.41, subd. 3(a) (1996). 
428. See id. subd. 3(b). 
429. See id. subd. 3(c). 
430. 184 Minn. 569, 239 N.W. 611 (1931). 
431. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 app. at 449 (1965). 
432. See Tiedje, 184 Minn. at 570, 239 N.W. at 612. 
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against all the defendants who manufactured and sold the plaintiff 
the harmful tablets.
4S3 
The druggist argued that the evidence con- . 
clusively established that the drug he sold was a proprietary medi-
cine, and that he was relieved by statute from liability for selling the 
drug.
434 
The statute provided that a druggist was liable for the qual-
ity of all drugs, chemicals, and medicine he sold other than pro-
prietary medicines and other articles sold in their original pack-
ages.
435 
The court explained the common law liability of a druggist 
as follows: 
At common law, a druggist is bound to exercise toward 
his patrons that degree of care which is commensurate 
with the hazards and dangers to which his patrons are ex-
posed .... It has been said that the ordinary care which a 
druggist is bound to exercise in filling his prescriptions 
and in the sale of drugs and medicines is the highest pos-
sible degree of prudence, thoughtfulness, and diligence, 
and the employment of the most exact and reliable safe-
guards consistent with the reasonable conduct of the 
business, in order that human life may not be exposed to 
the danger following the substitution of deadly poison for 
harmless medicine .... As to the quality of nonproprie-
tary medicines, the statute has now imposed responsibility 
upon the vendor. In other respects, and as to proprietary 
medicines, the law requires the same degree of care which 
was required prior to the enactment of section 5813. 
In connection with the sale of proprietary medicines in 
the original package, the druggist is not required to ana-
lyze the medicine or drug when sold for the purpose for 
which compounded, and if the manufacturer is a reputa-
ble one, he may rely, under ordinary circumstances, on 
the rectitude of the manufacturer and the correctness of 
his cOPlpound. Ordinary care under such circumstances 
does not require a greater degree of diligence.436 
The rules are different with respect to the druggist's sale of 
drugs sold under his own name. Those rules state: 
[W]here the druggist obtains from a manufacturer tablets 
or medicine which he does not sell under the name of the 
manufacturer, but under his own name, accompanied by 
a statement that it was manufactured or prepared for him, 
433. See id. 
434. See id. at 573,239 N.W. at 613. 
435. See id. 
436. Id. at 573-74, 239 N.W. at 613. 
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in our opmlOn the druggist assumes a responsibility 
equivalent to that of the manufacturer of the drugs, and 
the rule in that regard laid down in Wills-on v. Faxon . .. 
applies. It is true that in that case the druggist sold a 
harmful preparation under a label which indicated that 
the druggist was the manufacturer thereof, but we think 
that he is equally responsible where he sells the medicine 
as prepared or manufactured for himself and does not 
disclose the name of the manufacturer.437 
Minnesota has also adopted, in general terms, the negligence 
principles in the Restatement (Second) of Torts in a variety of pre-
McCormack cases.
438 
Those cases establish bedrock products liability 
law in Minnesota. Coupled with Tiedje, the cases would support 
application of section 14. Given that background, there is no rea-
son to presume that the Minnesota courts would decline to follow 
the rule in section 14 in an appropriate case, or that the negligence 
theory it adopts would be insufficient to block dismissal of a non-
manufacturing product seller in a case involving section 544.41 of 
the Minnesota Statutes. 
§ 15. GENERAL RULE GoVERNING CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN 
PRODUCT DEFECT AND HARM 
Whether a product defect caused harm to persons or property 
is determined by the prevailing rules and principles governing cau-
•• 439 
satton m tort. 
Commentary 
Sections 1, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts re-
quire the pU!E0rted defect in the product to cause injury to person 
or property. The Restatement takes the position that the rules 
generally governing causation in tort law also apply in products li-
ability cases. This does not include the exception for the special 
rule on causation in section 16, which covers cases involving an in-
437. [d. (citation omitted). 
438. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Draper, 274 Minn. 1l0, 117, 142 N.W.2d 628, 633 
(1966) (adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 298, 302-303 (1965) for 
negligence in products liability cases in Minnesota); Gresser v. Taylor, 276 Minn. 
440,444, 150 N.W.2d 869, 872 (1967) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
344 (1965» (holding that a golf course was negligent for failing to exercise rea-
sonable care toward invitees). 
439. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 15. 
440. See id. §§ 1, 5-8. 
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creased risk of harm created by a product defect.441 In Minnesota, 
the standard causation rule in negligence cases also applies to strict 
liability cases.442 
The last two comments to section 15 cover two issues. The first 
concerns the relationship of misuse, alteration, and modification of 
a product to the causation issue.443 The second concerns causation 
and proportionate liability.444 Comment b covers misuse, altera-
tion, and modification of a product. It notes that once the plaintiff 
establishes the existence of a product defect, an issue may arise as 
to whether a third party's misuse, alteration, or modification of the 
product "contributed to the plaintiff's harm in such a way as to ab-
solve the defendant from liability, in whole or in part. "445 The issue 
should be determined "under the prevailing rules and principles 
governing causation or the prevailing rules and principles govern-
ing comparative responsibility, as the case may be."446 
The Reporters' Note following section 15 notes the differing 
ways in which product misuse, alteration, and modification have 
been treated in products liability cases involving misuse or proxi-
mate cause issues.447 Factual variances make the cases difficult to 
reconcile, which typically creates a jury question.448 Furthermore, 
while the plaintiff has the burden of persuasion, the Note recog-
nizes that "more often than not as a practical matter the defendant 
must raise the issue of causation and argue that even if the desi~ 
had been different the same harm would have occurred anyway." 9 
In Minnesota, the misuse, alteration, or modification of a 
product may prevent the plaintiff from proving the existence of a 
defect for which the product manufacturer is liable, either because 
the defect may have arisen due to alterations after manufacture, 450 
441. See id. §§ 15-16. 
442. See JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, supra note 18,JIG 116, at 80. The instruc-
tion uses the direct cause instruction in JIG 140. See id. (citing JURY INSTRUCTION 
GUIDES, supra note 18, JIG 140, at 113). A direct cause is "a cause which had a 
substantial part in bringing about the" accident. [d. 
443. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 15 cmt. b. 
444. See id. cmt. c. 
445. [d. cmt. b. 
446. [d. 
447. See id. Reporters' Note, at 286. 
448. See id. 
449. /d. at 286-87. 
450. See, e.g., Rients v. International Harvester Co., 346 N.W.2d 359, 362-63 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that a plaintiff must prove that the product 
reached him without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold by 
the manufacturer). 
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or because the plaintiff's misuse of the product was so unforesee-
able that the manufacturer neither owed a duty to design the 
product to make it safe for that use 451 nor to warn against the mis-
use.
452 
However, if the plaintiff establishes that the product is de-
fective, the misuse issue arises again, but as an asgect of contribu-
tory negligence under the Comparative Fault Act.4 
Because the misuse, alteration, or modifications issues usually 
go to the issue of whether a product is defective in the first place, 
and if it is, whether the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in us-
ing the product, only in unusual cases is it likely that those issues 
will relate to the causation question. Two examples, however, illus-
trate how proximate cause could be implicated. In Laubach v. 
/saacson,454 a thirteen-year-old boy was burned when he and three of 
his friends poured gasoline antifreeze on a skateboard and ignited 
it.
455 
The court of appeals concluded that the manufacturer of the 
antifreeze owed no duty to warn that antifreeze was explosive be-
cause the use the boys made of it was not foreseeable.
456 
The plain-
tiffs, however, also argued that the design of the antifreeze bottle 
was defective because the bottle could be resealed and stood up-
right, which allowed storage of a partially used bottle. They also 
argued that the shape of the bottle acted as a "flamethrower," 
which made it an unreasonably dangerous product.
457 
The court 
rejected the argument on causation grounds: 
While a different design may have precluded storage of a 
partially used bottle and may have caused the contents to 
behave differently while burning, we conclude these al-
leged defects are not causally related to Daniel's injuries. 
An act or a failure to act is a "proximate cause" when 
451. See Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 626 n.2 (Minn. 1984) 
(Simonett,j., concurring specially). 
452. See, e.g., Huber v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 430 N.W.2d 465, 468 
(Minn. 1988) (holding it not foreseeable that safety device permanently attached 
to fully assembled machine would be removed and manufacturer therefore had 
no duty to warn against such misuse); Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 
N.W.2d 922, 925 (Minn. 1986) (finding that manufacturer had duty to warn 
where it was foreseeable that detachable safety device would be removed and that 
there was a risk it might be reattached improperly). 
453. See MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. la (1996) (mandating that misuse is sub-
ject to comparison as an element of "fault" under the Comparative Fault Act). 
454. No. C0-91-1984, 1992 WL 31367 (Minn. Ct. App.), review denied, (Minn. 
Apr. 29, 1992). 
455. See id. at *1. 
456. See id. at *2. 
457. See id. 
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the consequences naturally follow in unbroken sequence 
without an intervening cause. Further, proximate cause 
exists if the negligent conduct was a substantial factor in 
bringing about the harm .... 
The boys admitted they were looking for something to 
burn and were attracted to the antifreeze bottle because it 
said "FLAMMABLE." An unopened bottle differently de-
signed would not have deterred them from prying the cap 
off and lighting the contents on fire. The design of the 
bottle was not a substantial factor in bringing about Dan-
iel's injuries.458 
In the second case, Rimts v. International Harvester CO.,459 the 
plaintiff was injured when a tractor manufactured by International 
Harvester overturned while he rode it.
460 
The tractor was manufac-
tured in 1955 and bought by the plaintiff from a dealer in used 
farm implements in 1972.461 In 1977, after numerous alterations to 
the tractor, including replacement of the narrow front wheels with 
a wide front axle, the accident occurred.
462 
The court of appeals 
noted the plaintiff's obligation to prove a causal link between the 
alleged defect and the injury.463 The plaintiff introduced expert 
testimony that the axle was defective because it used a cotter key to 
hold the tie rod pins, and that other, safer designs existed to per-
form the function.
464 
The court of appeals noted the impact of the 
other modifications of the tractor: 
It is uncontroverted ... that numerous modifications and 
repairs had been made on the axle. The brakes were 
worn. The steering gear arm, previously modified by re-
moval of a piece with a cutting torch, broke at a weld. 
The grease fitting on the steering arm, abraded by the 
added rock box, was not accessible or functional. The tie 
rods and steering knuckles were bent. Considering this 
uncontroverted evidence, even if a jury found a design de-
fect, it would be sheer speculation for a jury to find that 
the design defect caused the accident rather than any of 
these other possible causes.
465 
458. [d. at *2 (citations omitted). 
459. 346 N'w.2d 359 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). 
460. See id. at 360. 
461. See id. 
462. See id. at 360-61. 
463. See id. at 362. 
464. See id. 
465. [d. 
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The second issue addressed in the comments to section 15 is 
proportionate liability.466 In cases involving generic toxic sulr 
stances, plaintiffs are unable to identify which manufacturer among 
several made the product that caused the plaintiff's injuries. Some 
courts have altered traditional causation rules and have permitted 
the plaintiff to recover without identifying the manufacturer who 
was the causal producer. These courts instead permit recovery 
against all producers of the product, according to their relative 
market shares.
467 
The comment notes that courts have considered 
a variety of factors in determining whether a proportional liability 
rule should be adopted. Those factors include: 
(1) the generic nature of the product; (2) the long la-
tency period of the harm; (3) the inability of plaintiffs to 
discover which defendant's product caused plaintiff's 
harm, even after exhaustive discovery; (4) the clarity of 
the causal connection between the defective product and 
the harm suffered by plaintiffs; (5) the absence of other 
medical or environmental factors that could have caused 
or materially contributed to the harm; and (6) the avail-
ability of sufficient "market share" data to support a rea-
sonable apportionment of liability.466 
The American Law Institute "leaves to developing law the 
question of whether, given the appropriate factors, a rule of pro-
portional liability should be adopted.,,469 However, the comment 
states that if a court does decide to adopt such a theory, "the liabil-
ity of each defendant is prorerly limited to the individual defen-
dant's share of the market.,,47 
Proportional liability in the form of alternative liability has 
been rejected by the Minnesota Court of Appeals 471 and the Eighth 
Circuit, applying Minnesota law.472 The Minnesota Court of Ap-
466. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 15 cmt. c. 




471. See Bixler v. Avondale Mills, 405 N.W.2d 428,432 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). 
472. See Souder v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 939 F.2d 647, 650 (8th Cir. 
1991). The issue was also raised in Erickson v. Whirlpool Corp., 731 F. Supp. 
1426, 1430 (D. Minn. 1990), but the court declined to rule on it. See id. at 143l. 
In dictum, the court discussed the theory but found it lacking because the defen-
dants in the case had not been found to be negligent. See id. at 1431. Also, be-
cause the primary impact of the alternative liability theory in Summers v. Tice, 199 
P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1948) is to shift the burden of proof to the defendants, and be-
cause the plaintiff had not previously suggested that the case be submitted to the 
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peals rejected an alternative liability theory in Bixler v. Avondale 
Mills,473 a case where severe burns were sustained by a minor wear-
ing a homemade cotton flannelette nightshirt that caught on 
fire. 474 The plaintiffs brought suit against the retailer of the mate-
rial and five fabric mills that were possible suppliers of the mate-
rial. 475 The retailer and one of the mills settled pursuant to Pier-
. 1 476 Th th £ ·11 . d 477 nnger-type re eases. e 0 er our ml s remame . 
Prior to the settlements, the plaintiffs moved to amend their 
complaint to add the other four mills and to add a count in mar-
ket-share liability.478 The supreme court reversed the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment for the defendants on the market-
share liability issue, ruling that consideration of the issue was pre-
mature.479 Following additional discovery, which failed to identify 
the manufacturer of the material, the defendants again moved for 
summary judgment. This time, the trial court granted summary 
judgment, concluding that alternative liability was inapplicable in 
the case.480 The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the 
elements of the alternative liability theory, as defined by the Michi-
gan Supreme Court in Abel v. Eli Lilly and CO.,481 were not met.482 
The Abel court listed three primary elements for alternative liabil-
ity: 
First, it must be shown that all the defendants have acted 
tortiously. . .. [S]econd, that the plaintiffs have been 
harmed by the conduct of one of the defendants (in or-
jury on that basis, the court refused to allow the plaintiff a "second bite at an alto-
gether different apple," after having litigated the case instead on an aggregation 
theory. Erickson, 731 F. Supp. at 1430-31. 
473. 405 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). 
474. See id. at 429. 
475. See id. 
476. See id. Pieninger releases address the problem of piecemeal settlements. 
See Peter B. Knapp, Keeping the Pieninger Promise: Fair Settlements and Fair Trials, 20 
WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1, 13 (1994). Generally under such releases, a plaintiff set-
tles with those defendants so willing, but preseIVes all causes of actions against any 
nonsettling defendants. See id. In return, the plaintiff releases all settling defen-
dants, agrees to discharge the claim to the extent a jury later determines the set-
tling defendants are partially responsible for the injuries, and agrees to indemnify 
all settling defendants against future claims of contribution. See id. 
477. See Bixler, 405 N.W.2d at 429. 
478. See id. 
479. See id. 
480. See id. at 430. 
481. 343 N.W.2d 164, 171 (Mich.1984), cen denied sub nom., E.R. Squibb & 
Sons, Inc. v. Abel, 469 U.S. 833 (1984). 
482. See Bixler, 405 N.W.2d at 430-31. 
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der to support this second requirement, the plaintiffs 
must bring before the court all the actors who may have 
caused the injury in fact); third, that the plaintiffs, 
through no fault of their own, are unable to identify 
which actor causes the injury.483 
First, the court of appeals in Bixler concluded that the evidence 
failed to establish that the manufacture of one hundred percent 
cotton flannelette is a tortious act. 484 Second, the court concluded 
that not all of the companies that supplied cotton flannelette to 
J.C. Penney were before the court.
485 
Third, the court noted that 
one of the tortfeasors, J.C. Penney, was identified, and that the 
plaintiff was not faultless.
486 
Unlike the DES cases, where the dan-
ger was not discoverable until years later,487 the court noted that the 
plaintiffs had ample opportunity to initiate discovery to attempt to 
discover the manufacturer of the flannelette. 488 
In Souder v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,489 the Eighth Circuit 
also rejected alternative liability in a wrongful death action brought 
against several asbestos manufacturers for the death of a pipefitter 
who died of lung cancer.
490 
Ten defendants moved for summary 
judgment in the case on the ground that the plaintiff failed to show 
specific evidence that the pipefitter was exposed to their materi-
als.
491 
The plaintiff argued that she demonstrated causation pursu-
ant to the alternative liability theory, which, she argued, justified 
shiftin~ the burden of proof on the causation issue to the defen-
dants.
42 
Without citing Bixler, the Eighth Circuit noted that in 
Leuer v. Johnson,493 the Minnesota Court of Appeals specifically re-
jected the alternative liability theory494 as formulated by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in Summers v. Tice.
495 
The Summers court 
483. Abe~ 343 N.W.2d at 173 (citations and footnote omitted). In this case, 
the plaintiffs were daughters of woman who had taken DES, a synthetic estrogen 
product, during pregnancy. See id. at 166. They were suing the manufacturers of 
the synthetic estrogen product known. See id. 
484. See Bixler, 405 N.W.2d at 43l. 
485. Seeid. 
486. Seeid. 
487. See, e.g., Abel, 343 N.W.2d at 166. DES is a synthetic estrogen product. 
See id. 
488. See id. 
489. 939 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1991). 
490. See id. at 649. 
491. See id. at 650. 
492. See id. 
493. 450 N.W.2d 363, 365 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). 
494. See Souder, 939 F.2d at 650. 
495. 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948). 
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shifted the burden of proof on the causation issue to two hunters 
who negligently fired their shotguns in the direction of a third 
hunter, when it was unclear which hunter fired the shot that struck 
the plaintiff.
496 
While the Minnesota Supreme Court had not yet 
ruled on the issue, the Eighth Circuit was not convinced that the 
supreme court would rule differently than the court of appeals on 
the alternative liability theory.497 
That leaves alternative liability at least as a possibility in Min-
nesota. However, as the Eighth Circuit noted in Souder, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court has only incidentally cited Summers on two oc-
casions, neither adopting nor rejecting it as an appropriate theory 
in products liability cases. 498 In Hoven v. Rice Memorial Hosp.,499 the 
supreme court rejected the California Supreme Court's opinion in 
Ybarra v. Spangard.
500 
This decision was a significant factor for the 
court of appeals in rejecting Summers v. Tice in the Leuer case.
50l 
In general, the appellate courts in Minnesota have demon-
strated continuing antipathy to burden of proof shifting devices. 
The only case in which the supreme court shifted the burden of 
proof where there were several potential wrongdoers was Mahowald 
v. Minnesota Gas CO.
502 
Mahowald involved a natural gas explosion 
caused by a pipe leak that could have been caused by anyone of 
several defendants who worked near the gas line.
503 
Using the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur, the court shifted the burden of proof on 
the negligence issue to the gas company. In so doing, it found that 
the gas company had not caused the injury because the company 
possessed superior knowledge of its gas distribution system, in-
spected the system, and was responsible for the system's safety.504 
So far, Mahowald has been confined to its facts. 505 
496. See id. at 4. 
497. See Souder, 939 F.2d at 650. 
498. See id. 
499. 396 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1986) (refusing to adopt the Ybarra analysis). 
500. 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944) (shifting the burden of proof on the negligence 
issue to health care professionals who all attended the plaintiff in the course of a 
surgical procedure that resulted in an unexplained injury to his ann). 
501. See Leuer v.Johnson, 450 N.w'2d 363, 365 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (noting 
that "because the Summers decision had as its basis Ybarra, and because Ybarra has 
been consistently rejected by the Minnesota Supreme Court, we must reject Sum-
mers as well"). 
502. 344 N.W.2d 856 (Minn. 1984). 
503. See id. at 858. 
504. See id. at 863. 
505. See Lever, 450 N.W.2d at 366. 
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§ 16. INCREASED HARM DUE TO PRODUCT DEFECT 
(a) When a product is defective at the time of sale and the 
defect is a substantial factor in increasing the plaintiff's harm 
beyond that which would have resulted from other causes the 
product seller is subject to liability for the increased harm. 
(b) If proof supports a determination of the harm that 
would have resulted from other causes in the absence of the 
product defect, the product seller's liability is limited to the in-
creased harm attributable solely to the product defect. 
(c) If proof does not support a determination under Sub-
section (b) of the harm that would have resulted in the absence 
of the product defect, the product seller is liable for all of the 
plaintiff's harm attributable to the defect and other causes. 
(d) A seller of a defective product who is held liable for 
part of the harm suffered by the plaintiff under Subsection (b), 
or all of the harm suffered by the plaintiff under Subsection 
(c), is jointly and severally liable with other parties who bear le-
gal responsibility for causing the harm, determined by applica-
ble rules of joint and severalliability.506 
Commentary 
Section 16 requires the plaintiff in an enhanced injury case to 
prove the existence of a product defect under the rules established 
in sections 1-4 of the Restatement.
507 
If the plaintiff alleges a design 
defect, the factors provided in the Restatement contro1.508 Under the 
rule in section 16(a), the plaintiff must prove that the defect was a 
substantial factor in increasing the harm suffered by the plaintiff 
when compared to potential harm from other causes.
509 
Under 
subsection (b), if the proof supports a finding of the harm that the 
plaintiff would have suffered from other causes absent the product 
defect, then the liability of the product seller is limited only to the 
increased harm that is attributed solely to the product defect.
5lo 
Under subsection (c), if the proof does not support that determi-
nation, the product seller is liable both for the harm attributed to 
506. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 16 (emphasis in original). 
507. See id. 
508. See id. § 2 cmt. f. 
509. See id. § 16(a). 
510. See id. § 16(b). 
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the product defect and the other causes.5I1 The Reporters' Note 
explains that section 16(c) "does not fonnally shift any burden of 
proof to the defendant.,,512 If the plaintiff proves that a defect in 
the product increased the plaintiff's harm beyond what would have 
occurred if the product had not been defective, and at the close of 
the case the proof is insufficient to support a detennination of what 
harm the plaintiff would have suffered in absence of a product de-
fect, the defendant then is liable for all of the hann the plaintiff 
sufIered.
51s 
Subsection (d) finds the seller of a defective product, who is 
liable for part of the plaintiff's hann as detennined according to 
subsection (b) or all the hann under subsection (c), jointly and 
severally liable with the other parties who caused hann to the 
plaintiff.514 The rule of joint and several liability is required be-
cause of the lack of another practical method to apportion respon-
sibility that reflects the causal contributions of the tortfeasors who 
caused the plaintiff's injuries.515 The joint and several liability de-
tennination is, of course, subject to any applicable state limitations 
of the rule.516 Under Minnesota's Comparative Fault Act, a defen-
dant's joint and several liability is limited to no more that four 
times its percentage of fault when its fault is 15 percent or less.517 
Therefore, a defendant whose fault is 10 percent, would be liable 
to the plaintiff for no more than 40 percent of the plaintiff's dam-
ages.51B In the products liability context, however, if a party in the 
chain of manufacture and distribution is unable to pay its fair share 
of the judgment, that share is reallocated only to the remaining 
parties in the chain, and not to the plaintiff or other parties in the 
. 519 
sUlt. 
The position taken in section 16(c), the majority view, is re-
ferred to in the Reporters' Note as the Fox-Mitchell view. This view 
is named after two early cases that outlined the position now pro-
511. See id. § 16(c). 
512. [d. Reporters' Note, at 300. 
513. See id. 
514. See id. § 16(d). 
515. See id. 
516. See id. § 16 cmt. e. 
517. MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subds. 2-3 (1996). 
518. The application of the rules limiting joint and several liability is not en-
tirely clear in Minnesota law. See Michael K. Steenson, Joint and Several Liability 
Minnesota Style, 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 969 (1989). 
519. MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subd. 3 (1996); Marcon v. Kmart Corp., No. C2-97-
1319,1998 WL 49162 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 1998). 
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vided in section 16(c): Fox v. Ford Motor CO.,520 a 1978 Tenth Circuit 
case, and Mitchell v. Volkswa~enwerk, AG,521 a 1982 Eighth Circuit 
case applying Minnesota law. 22 In Mitchel~ the court rejected the 
defendant's argument that the plaintiff in an enhanced injury case 
should be required to prove the designer was the sole cause of the 
enhanced injury; it also rejected that the plaintiff would not other-
wise have suffered injuries absent a defect. The Mitchell court 
stated: 
By placing the burden of proof on a plaintiff to prove that 
the designer was the sole cause of not only an enhanced 
indivisible injury, but, in addition, that he would not oth-
erwise have received injuries absent a defect, the injured 
victim is relegated to an almost hopeless state of never be-
ing able to succeed against a defective designer. The pub-
lic interest is little served. We write to reaffirm that Larsen 
was not intended to create a rule which requires the 
plaintiff to assume an impossible burden of proving a 
negative fact. A rule of law which requires a plaintiff to 
prove what portion of indivisible harm was caused by each 
party and what might have happened in lieu of what did 
happen requires obvious speculation and proof of the 
impossible. This approach converts the common law 
rules governing principles of lellal causation into a morass 
f _c,' d . 52!P o COll~USlOn an uncertamty. 
Mter examining Minnesota law on the rule of joint and several 
liability, the court's assessment of Minnesota law was as follows: 
[U]nder Minnesota law the plaintiffs' burden of proof 
should be deemed satisfied against the manufacturer if it 
is shown that the design defect was a substantial factor in 
producing damages over and above those which were 
probably caused as a result of the original impact or colli-
sion. Furthermore, the extent of the manufacturer's li-
ability depends upon whether or not the injuries involved 
are divisible such that the injuries can be clearly separated 
and attributed either to the manufacturer or the original 
tortfeasor. If the manufacturer's negligence is found to 
be a substantial factor in causing an indivisible injury such 
as paraplegia, death, etc., then absent a reasonable basis 
to determine which wrongdoer actually caused the harm, 
520. 575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978). 
521. 669 F.2d 1199 (8th Cir. 1982). 
522. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 16 Reporters' Note, at 300. 
523. Mitchell, 669 F.2d at 1204-{)5. 
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the defendants should be treated as joint and several tort-
feasors. 524 
The court concluded that under Minnesota law, the defen-
dants seeking apportionment of damages have the burden of proof 
on the issue. The burden of proof is as follows: 
[T]his placement of the burden of proof is justified by 
considerations of fairness. IT we were to impose upon an 
injured party the necessity of proving which impact in a 
chain collision did which harm, we would actually be ex-
pressing a judicial policy that it is better that a plaintiff, in-
jured through no fault of his own, take nothing, than that 
a wrongdoer pay more than his theoretical share of the 
damages arising out of a situation which his wrong has 
helped to create. In other words, the rule is a result of a 
choice made as to where a loss due to failure of proof 
shall fall-on an innocent plaintiff or on defendants who 
525 
are clearly proved to have been at fault. 
The position of the Mitchell court differs from the Restatement 
on the burden of proof issue. 
Mitchell has not specifically been adopted by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court, although it was cited with approval in Rebehn v. 
General Motors Corp.,526 an unpublished court of appeals decision. 
During the course of trial in Rebehn, both parties presented exten-
sive evidence on the issue of whether the plaintiff would have suf-
fered his spinal cord injury if certain components of the truck, 
such as the sea~ back and steering column, had been designed dif-
ferently.527 The plaintiff requested the following jury instruction at 
trial: 
You are instructed that the term "crashworthiness" 
means the protection that a motor vehicle affords its pas-
sengers against a personal injury or death as a result of a 
motor vehicle accident. 
A manufacturer is under a duty to use reasonable care 
in the design of its vehicle to avoid subjecting the user to 
an unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a collision. 
Collisions with or without the fault of the user are clearly 
524. [d. at 1206 (citing Mathews v. Mills, 288 Minn. 16, 178 N.W.2d 841 
(1970». 
525. [d. at 1208. 
526. No. CX-94-1568, 1995 WL 146662, at *1 n.2 (Minn. Ct. App.), review de-
nied, (Minn. May 31,1995) (citing Mitchell). 
527. See id. at *1. The plaintiffs pickup truck hit a bridge, causing his injuries. 
See id. 
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foreseeable by the manufacturer and are statistically inevi-
table. This duty of reasonable care and design rests on 
common law negligence that a manufacturer of an article 
should use reasonable care in the design and manufac-
ture of his product to eliminate any unreasonable risk of 
foreseeable injury. The duty of reasonable care in design 
should be viewed in light of the risk. While all risks cannot 
be eliminated, nor can a crash-proof vehicle be designed 
under the current state of the art, there are many com-
mon sense factors in design which are or should be well 
known to the manufacturer that will minimize or lessen 
the injurious effects of a collision. The standard of rea-
sonable care as applied in other negligent situations is 
also applicable to the plaintiffs claim that the motor vehi-
cle in issue did not provide reasonable occupant protec-
tion to plaintiff John Rebehn. 
You are instructed that the plaintiff has the burden of 
proving that the alleged defect was a substantial factor in 
producing damages over and above those which were 
probably caused as the result of the original impact or col-
lision. The plaintiff does not have the burden of proving 
what injuries plaintiff John Rebehn would have incurred 
in the absence of the alleged defect(s) in the motor vehi-
cle in issue. Thus, in this case, plaintiff must present suf-
ficient evidence for the trier of fact to reasonably find that 
the vehicle contained one or more defects and that the 
defects were substantial factors in producing the injuries 
which ultimately resulted in damage to the spinal cord 
that caused Mr. Rebehn's paralysis and/or paraplegic 
condition. If the plaintiff fails to show that the defects 
were a substantial factor, there can be no recovery against 
defendant General Motors Corporation relative to plain-
tiffs claim that the motor vehicle was not "crashworthy" 
or that the vehicle did not provide reasonable occupant 
protection. However, if the defects are shown to be a sub-
stantial factor, then and in that event, defendant General 
Motors Corporation is considered to be a joint tortfeasor 
and you should not attempt to apportion the plaintiff's to-
tal damages between defendant General Motors Corpora-
tion, plaintiff John Rebehn, and other entities who may 
be found to be at fault who are not parties to this litiga-
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• 528 llon. 
The trial court rejected the requested instruction in favor of 
the standard design defect instruction inJIG 117.529 The trial court 
also used a special verdict form that asked the jury to determine 
whether the truck was in a defective condition and if so, whether 
the defect was a direct cause of the plaintiff's spinal cord injury.530 
In addition, the jury was also asked to determine whether the plain-
tiff was at fault, and if so, whether his fault was a direct cause of his 
own injury.53) Assuming the questions were answered in the af-
firmative, the jury was then asked to apportion fault between the 
defendant and plaintiff.532 However, the jury found that the truck 
was not defective.
533 
The court of appeals accepted Mitchell, but de-
termined that the trial court did not err in giving the general de-
sign defect instruction over the specific crashworthiness instruction 
requested by the plaintiff. The court held that the general instruc-
tion adequately incorporated the plaintiff's theory of defect.534 
The seat belt issue in products liability cases has prompted a 
variety of legislative and judicial approaches, particularly on the is-
sue of plaintiff fault.
535 
By statute, proof of seat belt evidence is in-
admissible in Minnesota: 
Proof of the use or failure to use seat belts or a child pas-
senger restraint system as described in subdivision 5, or 
proof of the installation or failure of installation of seat 
belts or a child passenger restraint system as described in 
subdivision 5 shall not be admissible in evidence in any 
litigation involving personal injuries or property damage 
resulting from the use or operation of any motor vehi-
536 
cleo 
The statute consequently bars the introduction of seat belt 
evidence to establish the plaintiff's contributory negligence in an 
enhanced injury case.537 However in Olson v. Ford Motor CO,538 the 
Minnesota Supreme Court also held that the statute precludes the 
528. Id. at *1 n.2. 





534. Id. at *4. 
535. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 16 Reporters' Note, at 313-14. 
536. MINN. STAT. § 169.685, subd. 4 (1996). 
537. See id. 
538. 558 N.W.2d 491 (Minn. 1997). 
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plaintiff in an enhanced injury case from introducing evidence that 
properly worn seat belts were defective and resulted in increased 
injuries.
5Sg 
In Olson, the plaintiff was injured in a two-car colli-
sion.540 The plaintiff alleged he was wearing his seat belt at the 
time of the accident and the seat belt failed, materially contribut-
ing to his injuries.
541 
He argued that the seat belt statute was inap-
plicable to crashworthiness claims. The court, however, rejected 
the argument because it found the statute clear~ worded; it pro-
hibited the introduction of any seat belt evidence. 2 
The Comparative Fault Act takes the position that an 
"unreasonable failure to avoid aggravating an injury or to mitigate 
damages may be considered only in determining the damages to 
which the claimant is entitled. It may not be considered in deter-
mining the cause of an accident.,,54s That means that the plaintiff's 
negligent failure to avoid an i~ury by using a safety device that 
would have reduced injuries is not compared to the defendant's 
fault in causing the accident. However, the plaintiff's fault will be 
compared to the defendant's with respect to the damages the 
plaintiff sustained. 544 The plaintiff would thus be entitled to re-
cover even if more at fault than the defendant. 
§ 17. APPORTIONMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY BETWEEN OR AMONG 
PLAINTIFF, SELLERS AND DISTRIBUTORS OF DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS, 
AND OTHERS 
(a) A plaintiff's recovery of damages for harm caused by a 
product defect may be reduced if the conduct of the plaintiff 
combines with the product defect to cause the harm and the 
plaintiff's conduct fails to conform to generally applicable rules 
establishing appropriate standards of care. 
(b) The manner and extent of the reduction under Subsec-
tion (a) and the apportionment of plaintiff's recovery among 
multiple defendants are governed by generally applicable rules 
apportioning responsibility.545 . 
539. See id. at 497. 
540. See id. at 493. 
541. See id. 
542. See id. at 497. 
543. MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. la (1996). 
544. See Foley v. City of West Allis, 335 N.W.2d 824, 829 (Wis. 1983). 
545. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 17. 
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Commentary 
The comments to section 17 make a number of points con-
cerning defenses in products liability cases, while leaving the form 
of comparative fault up to each jurisdiction.
546 
Section 17 and its 
comments coincide with Minnesota law on most issues. The com-
ments note that product misuse, product alteration, and product 
modification relate to three different issues in products liability 
cases. 547 They relate to the issue of whether the product is defec-
tive, and if so, whether the defect was a direct cause of the plain-
tiff's injury.546 They also relate to the plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence if the plaintiff in some way alters, misuses, or modifies the 
549 
product. The &statement does not allocate the burden of proof 
for the misuse, modification, and alteration issues; it leaves the is-
sue to local law. 550 
Comment d addresses the issue of whether there should be 
separate treatment for certain forms of plaintiff misconduct m 
products liability cases. Comment d notes: 
Some courts accord different treatment to special cate-
gories of plaintiff conduct. For example, some decisions 
hold that when the plaintiff's negligence consists in the 
failure to discover a product defect, reduction of damages 
on the basis of apportionment of responsibility is im-
proper, reasoning that a consumer has a right to expect a 
defect-free product and should not be burdened with a 
duty to inspect for defects. Other decisions hold that ap-
portionment of responsibility is improper when the prod-
uct lacked a safety feature that would protect against the 
risk that resulted in the injury in question, reasoning that 
defendant's responsibility should not be diminished when 
the plaintiff engages in the very conduct that the product 
design should have prevented. On the other hand, some 
decisions hold that a plaintiff's assumption of the risk is a 
complete defense to a products liability action, not merely 
a basis for apportionment of responsibility. Product mis-
use, alteration, and modification have been treated by 
some courts as an absolute bar to recovery and by others 
as a form of plaintiff fault that should be compared with 
546. See id. crnts. a-d. 
547. See id. crnt. c. 
548. See id. 
549. See id. 
550. See id. 
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that of other parties to reduce recovery. 551 
Under the Restatement approach, all forms of plaintiff miscon-
duct when the plaintiff fails to conform to the applicable standard 
of care are subject to apportionment.552 The purpose of the ap-
proach is twofold: it is first intended to avoid the stilted approach 
to defenses that has produced a significant amount of appellate 
litigation devoted to tigeonholing the plaintiff's conduct into an 
exempted category,55 and second, to facilitate the allocation of 
fault in multiple party litigation where parties other than the plain-
tiff and product seller are involved.554 Although the Restatement re-
fuses to slot plaintiff misconduct into separate categories, the trier 
of fact is nonetheless able to take varying degrees of plaintiff mis-
conduct into consideration in its allocation offault.555 
Minnesota's basic approach to Rroducts liability defenses is set 
out in the Comparative Fault Act.5 6 Minnesota has a Wisconsin-
modified form of comparative fault557 in which a plaintiff is barred 
from recovery only if the plaintiff's fault is greater than the party 
from whom recovery is sought.558 While the act requires individual 
comparisons of fault,559 aggregation of fault is permitted in joint 
duty cases, such as joint ventures.560 Whether aggregation of the 
fault of parties in the chain of manufacture and distribution has 
not yet been answered by the supreme court.561 
The broad definition of "fault" in the Comparative Fault Act 
aligns Minnesota with the Restatement. It defines: 
"Fault" includes acts or omissions that are in any meas-
ure negligent or reckless toward the person or property of 
the actor or others, or that subject a person to strict tort 
liability. The term also includes breach of warranty, un-
reasonable assumption of risk not constituting an express 
551. [d. cmt. d. 
552. See id. 
553. See id. 
554. See id. 
555. See id. 
556. See MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. 1 (1996). 
557. See Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377, 393 (Minn. 1977). 
558. See MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. 1 (1996). 
559. See Cambern v. Sioux Tools, Inc., 323 N .W.2d 795, 798 (Minn. 1982). 
560. See Krengel v. Midwest Automatic Photo, Inc., 295 Minn. 200, 208-09, 203 
N.W.2d 841, 846-47 (1973). 
561. In Marcon v. Kmart Corp., No. C2-97-1319, 1998 WL 49162 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Feb. 10, 1998), the court of appeals treated parties in the chain of distribu-
tion as a unit for purposes of applying the loss reallocation statute, MINN. STAT. § 
604.02, subd. 3 (1996). See id. at *4. 
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consent or primary assumption of risk, misuse of a prod-
uct and unreasonable failure to avoid an i~ury or to miti-
gate damages, and the defense of complicity under sec-
tion 340A.801. Legal requirements of causal relation 
apply both to fault as the basis for liability and to con-
tributory fault. The doctrine of last clear chance is abol-
ished. 
Evidence of unreasonable failure to avoid aggravating 
an injury or to mitigate damages may be considered only 
in determining the damages to which the claimant is enti-
tled. It may not be considered in determining the cause 
f 'd 562 o an acCl en t. 
The Act makes negligence, strict liability, and implied warranty 
subject to comparison, along with various aspects of contributory 
negligence, including secondary assumption of risk, product mis-
use, unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages, 
and the defense of complicity under the Civil Damages Act.
563 
The 
listing of potential defenses does not mean that the defenses are 
separately considered in litigation, however. The defenses collapse 
into the single defense of contributory negligence making the sin-
gle defense issue in products liability cases whether plaintiffs have 
exercised reasonable care for their own safety564 leaving defendants 
free to prove and argue the ways in which the plaintiffs failed to do 
so. 
Minnesota is somewhat equivocal about whether there should 
be exceptions to the general rule that all forms of contributory 
negligence, either by act or omission, are subject to comparison. 
In Busch v. Busch Construction, Inc.,565 a pre-Comparative Fault Act 
case, the Minnesota Supreme Court tailored the available defenses 
in products liability cases to protect "the consumer's reliance on 
the product's safety." The court stated: 
To insure protection of this interest, we hold that a con-
sumer's negligent failure to inspect a product or to guard 
against defects is not a defense and thus may not be com-
pared with a distributor's strict liability. All other types of 
consumer negligence, misuse, or assumption of the risk 
562. MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. la (1996). 
563. See MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. la (1996) (citing section 340A.801 of the 
Civil Damages Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 340A.801-.802 (1996). 
564. See JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, supra note 18, JIG 202, Authorities at 55-58 
(Supp. 1997). 
565. 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977). 
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must be compared with the distributor's strict liability un-
566 der the statute. 
The Busch exception may no longer be good law in light of the 
Comparative Fault Act's language requiring the comparison of 
"acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless to-
ward the person or property of the actor or others.,,567 The failure 
to inspect or to guard against product defects is certainly an 
"omission" that may be subject to comparison under the Act. 568 
While the continued viability of the Busch exception is ques-
tionable after the passage of the Comparative Fault Act in 1978, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court clearly perceives that it has the authority 
to alter the rules governing comparative fault to except from the 
comparison certain forms of plaintiff misconduct. In Tomfohr v. 
Mayo Foundation,569 the Minnesota Supreme Court responded to a 
certified question from the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Minnesota concerning a wrongful death case resulting from 
the suicide of a psychiatric patient at the defendant hospital. The 
question was whether it is error, as a matter of law, "for the trial 
court not to submit a capacity based instruction to the jury con-
cerning the patient's comparative fault?,,57o 
In response, the supreme court noted the liberal application 
of comparative fault principles in Minnesota, even in situations 
where other jurisdictions have refused to apply comparative fault.571 
As examples, the court noted the Comparative Fault Act's inclusion 
of the defenses of consumer ne~ligence, assumption of risk, and 
misuse in products liability cases, 2 the flexible standard applied to 
gauge the fault of injured children,573 and its limitation of defenses 
in cases involving the breach of statutes intended to protect a spe-
cific class of persons.574 The court also noted its willingness to use a 
reduced capacity standard in comparative fault assessments where 
566. [d. at 394. 
567. MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. 1a (1996). 
568. See id. 
569. 450 N.W.2d 121 (Minn. 1990). 
570. [d. at 122. 
571. See id. at 123. 
572. See id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. 1a. (1988); Seim v. Garavalia, 
306 N.W.2d 806, 809 (Minn. 1981». 
573. See id. (citing Toetschinger v. Inhot, 312 Minn. 59, 63-65, 250 N.W.2d 
204,207-08 (1977». 
574. See id. at 124. (citing Seim v. Garavalia, 306 N.W.2d 806, 811 (Minn. 
1981»; Zerbyv. Warren, 297 Minn. 134, 140-41,210 N.W.2d 58, 64 (1973); Dart v. 
Pure Oil Co., 223 Minn. 526,535,27 N.W.2d 555, 561 (1947». 
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the plaintiff suffers from a mental deficiency or mental disorder. 575 
Having established its credentials for flexible comparative fault 
interpretation, the court concluded that because the hospital owed 
a duty to protect against the very harm that occurred (the patient's 
suicide), it could not assert the patient's contributory negligence as 
a defense in the wrongful death action.
576 
However, the court has-
tened to add that while the certified question was answered in the 
negative, the ruling was limited to the fact paradigm presented in 
the case: "an attempted suicide committed by a mentally ill patient 
admitted to a locked hospital ward where the medical staff was 
aware of his suicidal ideations. ,,577 
The court also cautioned that its decision should not be con-
strued as a per se rejection of a "capacity-based comparative fault 
standard" in other settings: 
[O]ur holding today only stands for the proposition that 
cases may exist, such as this one, where a trial judge may 
rule, as a matter of law, that the patient could not be at 
fault because he lacked the capacity to be responsible for 
his own well being, and that the obligation of self care was 
transferred to the health care provider when it admitted 
th 
. .. 578 
e patIent mto Its care. 
Whether Tomjohr's approach would be applied by the court in 
a case where the Busch exception is directly presented is uncertain. 
The factual differences and attendant policy distinctions between 
the two cases, together with the court's apparent intent to hold the 
line in establishing these sorts of exceptions, likely invalidate the 
Busch exception. 
§ 18. DISCLAIMERS, LIMITATIONS, WAIVERS, AND OTHER 
CONTRACTUAL EXCULPATIONS AS DEFENSES TO PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
CLAIMS FOR HARM TO PERSONS 
Disclaimers and limitations of remedies by product sellers or 
other distributors, waivers by product purchasers, and other similar 
contractual exculpations, oral or written, do not bar or reduce oth-
erwise valid products liability claims against sellers or other dis-
575. See id. at 124. (citing Quick v. Benedictine Sisters Hosp. Ass'n, 257 Minn. 
470,485,102 N.W.2d 36, 47 (1960». 
576. See id. at 125. 
577. Id. 
578. Id. 
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tributors of new products for harm to persons.579 
Commentary 
Section 18 of the Restatement (Third) states that disclaimers and 
limitations of liability by product sellers or other distributors will 
not bar or reduce otherwise valid products liability claims against 
sellers or distributors of new products.
580 
Section 21 covers dis-
I . £ h . I 581 C almers or arm to property or economIc oss. 
Comment d notes that section 18 applies in cases where 
"commercial product sellers attempt unfairly to disclaim or other-
wise limit their liability to the majority of users and consumers who 
are presumed to lack information and bargaining power adequate 
th . . "582 to protect elr mterests. 
Section 18 is limited, however: 
This Section does not address whether consumers, espe-
cially when represented by informed and economically 
powerful consumer groups or intermediaries, with full in-
formation and sufficient bargaining power, may contract 
with product sellers to accept curtailment of liability in 
exchange for concomitant benefits, or whether such con-
sumers might be allowed to agree to substitute alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms in place of traditional ad-
judication. When such contracts are accompanied by al-
ternative nontort remedies that serve as an adequate quid 
pro quo for reducing or eliminating rights to recover in 
tort, arguments may support giving effect to such agree-
ments. Such contractual arrangements raise policy ques-
tions different from those raised by this Section and re-
. fi I 'd . b th 58S qUIre care u consl eratlOn y e courts. 
The Reporters' Note refers to various sources that suggest al-
ternatives to products liability litigation to resolve disputes, some 
legislative and some private.584 Section 18 takes no position on the 
579. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 18. 
580. See id. 
581. See id. § 18 cmt. a & § 21. 
582. Id. § 18 cmt. d. 
583. Id. 
584. See id. Reporters' Note, at 331-32 (citing Jeffrey O'Connell, Elective No-
Fault Liability by Contract: With or Without an Enabling Statute, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 59, 
65-71 (1975); Jeffrey O'Connell, Offers that Can't be Refused: Foreclosure of Personal 
Injury Claims by Defendants' Prompt Tender of Claimants' Net Economic Losses, 77 Nw. 
U. L. REv. 589 (1982); 2 A.L.I., REpORTERS' STUDY: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
PERSONAL Ir-{JURY 517-536 (1991); The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 
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prudence of the proposals. Rather, it covers "only ... traditional 
disclaimers that function unfairly to deny or limit liability to per-
sons who lack either information or bargaining power to protect 
th . . "585 elr mterests. 
Minnesota law is the same. While the Minnesota Supreme 
Court has not had the occasion to specifically hold disclaimers of 
liability invalid in products liability cases, the principles supporting 
the adoption of strict liability as enunciated by the court in McCor-
mack v. Hankscra!, CO.,586 and as applied in cases involving property 
damage claims,57 make it certain that Minnesota would adopt the 
same position with respect to disclaimers in personal injury cases. 
§ 19. DEFINITION OF "PRODUCT" 
For purposes of this Restatement: 
(a) A product is tangible personal property distributed 
commercially for use or consumption. Other items, such as 
real property and electricity, are products when the context of 
their distribution and use is sufficiently analogous to the distri-
bution and use of tangible personal property that it is appro-
priate to apply the rules stated in this Restatement. 
(b) Services, even when provided commercially, are not 
products. 
(c) Human blood and human tissue, even when provided 
commercially, are not subject to the rules of this Restatement.588 
Commentary 
Section 19 of the Restatement (Third) defines a product for pur-
poses of its liability rules.
58g 
The plaintiff may diminish the signifi-
cance of the issue when the theory of recovery is design defect or 
1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1-300aa-24 (1994); Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty 
Mahshigian, National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: An Ad Hoc Remedy or a 
Window for the Future?, 48 OHIO ST. LJ. 387 (1987». 
585. Id. Reporters' Note, at 332. 
586. 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967). For the policy justifications see 
supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
587. See Lloyd F. Smith Co. v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 11, 14-16 (Minn. 
1992). 
588. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 19. 
589. See id. cmt. a. 
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failure to warn, since risk-utility principles apply to those claims,590 
but the issue nonetheless remains important because of the con-
tinuing viabili~ of strict liability theory in cases involving manufac-
turing defects. 91 Whether or not something is a "product" is a 
question of law for the court.
592 
Under the definition most products will be tangible personal 
property: 
Component parts are products, whether sold or distrib-
uted separately or assembled with other component parts. 
An assemblage of component parts is also, itself, a prod-
uct. Raw materials are products, whether manufactured, 
such as sheet metal; processed, such as lumber; or gath-
ered and sold or distributed in raw condition, such as un-
1 593 washed grave and farm produce. 
The comments to section 19 note the division of authority on 
the issue of whether living animals may be products for purposes of 
deciding the tort liability of a commercial seller.594 For example, in 
cases where diseased livestock are sold and have to be destroyed, 
the plaintiff's claim is for the damage to the product itself.
595 
The 
Restatement (Third) treats that claim as economic loss not covered 
under the its liability rules.
596 
However, if the diseased animals 
cause harm to other animals, that harm to other property is com-
597 
pensable under the Restatement. 
Section 19 also distinguishes between services and products.59B 
Services, even if provided commercially, are not deemed to be 
products for purposes of the Restatement (Third).599 It is irrelevant if 
the service that is performed relates to a commercially distributed 
600 product. The comments use the example of a person who con-
tracts to inspect, repair, and maintain machinery owned by an-
other.
60l 
In such a case the service provider is considered separate 
from the provider of the product.602 
590. See id. 
591. See id. Reporters' Note, at 338. 
592. See id. cmt. a. 
593. [d. cmt. h. 
594. See id. 
595. See id. 
596. See id. 
597. See id. 
598. See id. cmt. f. 
599. See id. 
600. See id. 
601. See id. 
602. See id. 
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Blood and human tissue, while they meet the requirements of 
section 19 (a), are excluded from the Restatement (Third) under 
subpart (c) for policy reasons.603 Most jurisdictions address the is-
sue legislatively, exempting sellers of blood and human tissue from 
strict liability. Such sellers do remain liable under negligence rules 
as providers of professional services, however.604 
Intangible personal property includes two primary catego-
.605 0 . fb ks .. lh 606 1 nes. ne consIsts 0 00 ,maps, or naVlgatlona carts. n 
general, liability is not imposed for information contained in a 
book, although the book is clearly a product, because the plaintiff's 
claim is based on the information in the book and not the book it-
self. 607 Free speech concerns have led most courts to refuse to im-
pose strict liability on book sellers.
60B 
The second category of intangible property "involves the 
transmission of intangible forces such as electricity and X rays.,,609 
A majority of courts have held that the transmission of electricity 
becomes a product only when it is delivered to the plaintiff's house 
610 through the meter. 
In cases involving injury caused by X rays and radiation treat-
ment, the claim is based on the improper administration of the 
treatments by medical technicians, rather than on an allegation 
611 that the X rays are themselves harmful. Courts have refused to 
impose liability in those cases absent a showing that the X rays or 
forms of radiation treatment were defective or that the technicians 
1
. 612 were neg 1gent. 
The application of products liability principles to improve-
ments to real property has been problematic. Housing contractors 
who build one house at a time do not readily fit the pattern of a 
mass producer of products, and, according to the comments, "nor 
is such a builder perceived to be more capable than are purchasers 
of controlling or insuring atlainst risks presented by weather condi-
tions or earth movements." 3 However, courts have treated sellers 
603. See id. cmt. c. 
604. See id. 
605. See id. cmt. d. 
606. See id. 
607. See id. 
608. See id. 
609. [d. 
610. See id. 
611. See id. 
612. See id. 
613. [d. cmt. e. 
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of improved real property as product sellers in some contexts. An 
example would be a building contractor that sells a building con-
taining appliances or other manufacturing equipment.
614 
Under 
those circumstances, the builder, along with the manufacturer of 
the equipment and other distributors, are all held to be product 
sellers, though the built-in equipment may have become an at-
tachment to real property.615 A builder may also be a product seller 
with respect to the building itself, when, for examgle, the building 
is prefabricated and put together on- or off-site. 6 Courts could 
also impose strict liability on a mass producer of new homes, such 
. I al h· . 617 as a contractor m a arge sc e ousmg proJect. 
Minnesota products liability law has tracked section 19 of the 
Restatement,6lB although without a formal definition of the term 
"product." Minnesota courts have applied products liability law, 
including strict liability theory, to a variety of products that fit 
within the definition of tangible personal property.619 
In Harmon Contract Glazing, Inc. v. Liblfy-Owens-Ford CO.620 two 
unsecured wood crates containing heavy glass panes fell off a 
trailer, killing one man and injuring another, while the men were 
assisting in unloading the trailer that held the crates.621 Libby-
Owens-Ford Company (LOF) manufactured· and sold the glass and 
Harmon Contract Glazing purchased it.
622 
Harmon purchased the 
glass for office building installation.
623 
The trial court held that the 
crating, bracing, and shoring of the glass panes were an integral 
part of the product shipped by LOF. 4 The court therefore tried 
the case as a products liability case.
625 
LOF argued that the case in-
volved negligent loading procedures, rather than the negligent de-
614. See id. 
615. See id. 
616. See id. 
617. See id. 
618. See Hofstedt v. International HaIVester Co., 256 Minn. 453, 460, 98 
N.W.2d 808, 813 (Minn. 1959) (holding that a manufacturer of a chattel may be 
liable to those who use the chattel if the manufacturer fails to exercise reasonable 
care in the design of the chattel). 
619. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 19 Reporters' Note, at 340-44. 
620. 493 N.W.2d 146 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), review denied, (Minn. Feb. 12, 
1993). 
621. See id. at 148. 
622. See id. 
623. See id. 
624. See id. at 149. 
625. See id. 
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sign of a product.626 The court of appeals agreed, holding that "a 
product's packaging does not extend to the method used to secure 
or load it for shipment."627 The court concluded that the products 
involved were the glass panes, which could also include the wood 
crates, because LOF sold them as a unit.
628 
Harmon argued that 
the crate was a part of the product's "package," but the court of 
appeals rejected the argument and decided that the ~lass and brac-
ing system "were not sold as an integrated whole." 29 The court 
viewed the bracing as simply the method of securing the load for 
shipping.630 More generally, the court observed that the method 
used to secure a product for shipping cannot be viewed as an inte-
gral part of the product itself.
631 
In light of the Restatement (Third) comments noting that the 
significance of determining whether a product is involved is less-
ened because of the risk-utility principles that govern design and 
defect claims,632 the court's opinion in the Harmon case is interest-
ing for the distinction it draws between a manufacturer's duty as a 
shipper and the manufacturer's duty as a product designer. 
Distilled to its essential point, the Harmon court's holding is 
that the manufacturer's added responsibility to keep informed of 
current scientific knowledge imposes a greater duty on it as a 
manufacturer than as a shipper or loader of products.6s3 The trial 
court's submission of the case to the jury under a products liability 
failure to warn theory meant that the defendant "was allocated un-
compromising duties it would not have had under simple negli-
,,634 
gence. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has not treated electricity as a 
product for products liability purposes, although the possibility 
remains open. The court has also determined that strict liability 
principles applicable to abnormally dangerous activities do not ap-
ply to electricity, although the court has held gower companies to a 







632. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 19 cmt. a. 
633. See Harmon Glass Glazing, 493 N.W.2d at 151. 
634. [d. 
635. See Ferguson v. Northern States Power Co., 307 Minn. 26, 33, 239 N.W.2d 
190, 194 (1976). 
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6~6 
In ZumBerge v. Northern States Power Co., a 1992 court of ap-
peals case, the plaintiffs brought suit against NSP for a decline in 
performance of, and various ,Physical problems with, their dairy 
herd caused by stray voltage.6~ The plaintiffs sued on negligence, 
breach of warranty, and strict liability theories.
638 
The court of ap-
peals' opinion focused on the relationship between the plaintiffs 
and NSP. 6~9 The trial court had concluded that the provision of 
electricity was a sale of goods under Article 2 of the V.C.C., a ques-
tion the court of appeals noted is undecided in Minnesota.
640 
However, the court of appeals also noted that even if the sale of 
electricity is controlled by Article 2, that determination did not re-
solve die plaintiff's claim.
64
! The court of appeals was concerned 
that the supreme court's limitations on the right to recover for 
economic loss in commercial transactions might limit the plaintiff's 
right to recover. The majority, however, concluded that the plain-
tiff's claims did not fit the erevailing definition of "economic loss" 
so as to bar their recovery. 2 There was no indication in the case 
that the electricity failed to perform according to the purposes for 
which it was sold.64~ Rather, the plaintiffs' claim was based on 
NSP's failure to control or to warn the plaintiffs of injurious stray 
voltage.644 Therefore, their claim arose independent of the transac-
tion, entitling the plaintiffs to recover for their losses free from the 
limitations on recovery for economic loss imposed by the supreme 
court in cases involving commercial transactions.
645 
Minnesota products liability cases involving real property or 
improvements to real property frequently involve the Minnesota 
statutes of repose and limitations for improvements to real prop-
erty.646 If the plaintiff seeks to recover, either under a strict liability 
636. 481 N.W.2d 103 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). 
637. See id. at 105. 
638. See id. 
639. See id. at 106-07. 
640. See id. at 107. 
641. See id. at 108. 
642. See id. 
643. See id. 
644. See id. 
645. See id. 
646. See MINN. STAT. § 541.051 (1996) (containing a statute of limitations and 
repose for actions based on improvements to real property). The statute reads as 
follows: 
Subd. 1. (a) Except where fraud is involved, no action by any 
person in contract, tort, or otherwise to recover damages for any injury 
to property, real or personal, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, 
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or negligence claims, and the basis for the claim is an improvement 
to real property, the two-year statute of limitations and ten-year 
outside statute of repose present significant obstacles to recovery.647 
There is an exception, adopted in 1990, for manufacturers or sup-
pliers of "any equipment or machinery installed upon real prop-
[d. 
arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement 
to real property, nor any action for contribution or indemnity for 
damages sustained on account of the injury, shall be brought against 
any person performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervi-
sion, materials, or observation of construction or construction of the 
improvement to real property or against the owner of the real prop-
erty more than two years after discovery of the injury or, in the case of 
an action for contribution or indemnity, accrual of the cause of action, 
nor, in any event shall such a cause of action accrue more than ten 
years after substantial completion of the construction. Date of sub-
stantial completion shall be determined by the date when construction 
is sufficiently completed so that the owner or the owner's representa-
tive can occupy or use the improvement for the intended purpose. 
(b) For purposes of paragraph (a), a cause of action accrues 
upon discovery of the injury or, in the case of an action for contribu-
tion or indemnity, upon payment of a final judgment, arbitration 
award, or settlement arising out of the defective and unsafe condition. 
(c) Nothing in this section shall apply to actions for damages re-
sulting from negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection 
of the real property improvement against the owner or other person in 
possession. 
(d) The limitations prescribed in this section do not apply to the 
manufacturer or supplier of any equipment or machinery installed 
upon real property. 
Subd. 2. Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision 1, in the 
case of an action which accrues during the ninth or tenth year after 
substantial completion of the construction, an action to recover dam-
ages may be brought within two years after the date on which the ac-
tion accrued, but in no event mayan action be brought more than 12 
years after substantial completion of the construction. 
Subd. 3. Nothing in this section shall be construed as extending 
the period prescribed by the laws of this state for the bringing of any 
action. 
Subd. 4. This section shall not apply to actions based on breach 
of the statutory warranties set forth in section 327A.02, or to actions 
based on breach of an express written warranty, provided such actions 
shall be brought within two years of the discovery of the breach. 
647. See Farnham v. Nasby Agri-Systems, Inc., 437 N.W.2d 759 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1989); Thorp v. Price Bros. Co., 441 N.W.2d 817 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); 
O'Connor v. M.A. Mortenson Co., 424 N.W.2d 92 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); Sartori 
v. Harnischfeger Corp., 432 N.W.2d 448 (Minn. 1988); Citizen's Sec. Mut. Ins. Co. 
of Red Wing v. General Elec. Corp., 394 N.W.2d 167 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); 
Kemp v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 390 N.W.2d 848 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Moen v. 
Rexnord, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 988 (D. Minn. 1987), afj'd, 845 F.2d 1027 (8th Cir. 
1988). 
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erty.,,648 The exception was intended to exclude routine products 
liability cases from the scope of section 541.051.649 
The statutes of repose and limitations aside, products liability 
claims have been brought in Minnesota for a defective manufac-
d h 650 d £. . kl 651 d· 1 ture orne, a e ectlve spnn er system, an an Improper y 
installed fumace.
652 
In the last case, O'Laughlin v. Minnesota Natural 
Gas CO.,65S the Minnesota Supreme Court cited Schipper v. Levitt & 
654 
Sons, Inc., a landmark 1965 New Jersey Supreme Court case hold-
ing a mass producer of homes liable for failure to properly install a 
mixing valve for hot water delivery to sink tapS.655 While Minnesota 
has not formally articulated a rule for the application of products 
liability principles to real estate improvements, the supreme court 
has imposed liability under varying theories for defects in those 
. 656 
Improvements. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has not firmly decided if it will 
apply products liability theory to services that are improperly per-
formed. The court appeared to apply strict liability in O'Laughlin 
for the services that a contractor performed in installing a fur-
nace,657 but in Valley Farmers' Elevator v. Lindsay Brothers Corp.,658 the 
court examined hybrid transactions in greater detail. The Valley 
Farmers' case involved a dispute over a grain storage system the 
648. Act of May 3, 1990, ch. 555, § 13, 1990 Minn. Laws 1562 (amending 
MINN. STAT. § 541.051, subd. 1). 
649. See MINNESOTA I~URY COMPENSATION STUDY COMMISSION, REpORT TO THE 
LEGISlATURE 20-21 (1990). 
650. See Zimprich v. Stratford Homes, Inc., 453 N.W.2d 557 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1990). 
651. See Red Wing Motel Investors v. Red Wing Fire Dep't, 552 N.W.2d 295 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1996), review denied, (Minn. Oct. 29, 1996). 
652. See O'Laughlin v. Minnesota Natural Gas Co., 253 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 
1977). 
653. 253 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1977). 
654. See id. at 831 n.3 (citing Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314 
(NJ.1965». 
655. See Schipper, 207 A.2d at 321-23. 
656. See, e.g., Fudally v. Ching Johnson Builders, Inc., 360 N.W.2d 436, 439 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (affirming a jury verdict based on a breach of contract 
claim for negligent construction of a porch); Patton v. Yarrington, 472 N.W.2d 
157, 161 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that smoke detectors were 
"improvements" within the meaning of MINN. STAT. § 541.051 and that wrongful 
death action based on defect in the improvement was brought in a timely fash-
ion). 
657. See O'Laughlin v. Minnesota Natural Gas Co., 253 N.W.2d 826, 830-31 
Minn. 1977). 
658. 398 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1987). 
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plaintiff purchased from the defendant.
659 
Flaws in the system re-
sulted in damage to one of the storage bins.660 Valley alleged neg-
ligent design of the system and failure to warn about the need for 
an automatic switch to control the aeration fans in the system, and 
strict liability for the damage to the grain storage bin.66! The plain-
tiff argued on appeal that the economic loss it sustained was com-
pensable under negligence and strict liability theories because the 
transaction between it and the defendant was a hybrid commercial 
transaction involving the provision of services and the sale of 
662 
goods. 
The court noted that it could discern virtually no distinction 
between the plaintiff's claim that Lindsay should have installed an 
automatic shut-off device to stop the aeration fan after frost accu-
mulation, and the claims advanced in O'Laughlin, which involved a 
furnace that was improperly installed bi a contractor who failed to 
include a metal liner in the chimney.66 To clarify the law in Min-
nesota, the supreme court adopted the "predominant factor" test, 
the application of which is usually a question of law for the court.664 
As applied, the court concluded that the transaction between the 
plaintiff and defendant was predominantly a sale of goods. 665 
The impact of the decision on O'Laughlin is not clear. It may 
be that the court's decision in O'Laughlin, which appeared to im-
pose strict liability on a contractor for the services he performed,666 
is now suspect because of Valley Farmers,.667 Mter all, the supreme 
court noted that the two cases were indistinguishable on their facts, 
althou~ O'Laughlin involved property damage and not personal 
injury. In addition, O'Laughlin can be viewed as a case involving 
a product that was defective as installed.
669 
The plaintiff paid for a 
finished product that should have worked as intended, but because 
of installation defects did not.
670 
. 
However, even if the supreme court continues to impose strict 
659. See id. at 554. 
660. See id. 
661. See id. at 555. 
662. See id. 
663. See O'Laughlin, 253 N.W.2d at 830-31. 
664. See Valley Farmers', 398 N.W.2d at 556. 
665. See id. 
666. See O'Laughlin, 253 N.W.2d at 826. 
667. See Valley Farmers', 398 N.W.2d at 555-56. 
668. See id. 
669. See O'Laughlin, 253 N.W.2d at 832. 
670. See id. 
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liability for the kinds of sernces performed by contractors in per-
sonal injury cases, then classification of the case as involving sales 
or sernces would be irrelevant, because strict liability theory can 
apply to both, depending on the circumstances. Conversely, in 
cases involving economic loss, classification of a case as involving 
the sale of goods rather than sernces makes the case subject to the 
Uniform Commercial Code and its limitations on liability. In fact, 
the plaintiff in Valley Farmers', once subject to the U.C.C., lost be-
cause the four-year statute of limitations on its claim had run,67! 
whereas the statute of limitations for improvements to real prop-
672 erty would not have run. 
The supreme court has held that strict liability does not apply 
in pure professional sernces cases.
673 
However, in City of Mounds 
View v. Walijarvi,674 a city sued an architect for negligence and 
breach of express and implied warranties for an addition to the city 
hall designed by the architect and his firm.675 One of the issues on 
appeal was whether an architect's agreement to design a structure 
includes an implied warranty that the structure will be fit for its in-
676 
tended purpose. 
The reasoning underlying the majority rule applied to archi-
tects and other vendors of professional sernces, including doctors, 
engineers, attorneys, and others, is that such professionals are con-
stantly required to exercise skilled judgment in dealing with some-
h . . 677 Th . ak I w at mexact SCIences. e uncertamty m es comp ete accuracy 
impossible in every instance. Following the majority rule, the su-
preme court concluded that liability could not be imposed except 
according to the prevailing standard of care applicable to profes-
sionals: 
We have reexamined our case law on the subject of pro-
fessional sernces and are not persuaded that the time has 
yet arrived for the abrogation of the traditional rule. 
Adoption of the city's implied warranty theory would in 
effect impose strict liability on architects for latent defects 
671. See Valley Farmers', 398 N .W.2d at 557. 
672. See id. at 556. 
673. See Jenson v. Touche Ross & Co., 335 N.W.2d 720, 728 (Minn. 1983) 
(holding that it is inappropriate to impose a strict liability standard on the defen-
dant because it would result in using a consumer protection statute to second-
guess the professional judgment of accounting practitioners). 
674. 263 N.W.2d 420 (Minn. 1978). 
675. See id. at 421. 
676. See id. at 422. 
677. See id. at 424. 
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in the structures they design. That is, once a court or jury 
has made the threshold finding that a structure was 
somehow unfit for its intended purpose, liability would be 
imposed on the responsible architect in spite of his dili-
gent application of state-of-the-art design techniques. If 
every facet of structural design consisted of little more 
than the mechanical application of immutable physical 
principles, we could accept the rule of strict liability which 
the city proposes. But even in the present state of relative 
technological enlightenment, the keenest engineering 
minds can err in their most searching assessment of the 
natural factors which determine whether structural com-
ponents will adequately serve their intended purpose. 
Until the random element is eliminated in the application 
of architectural sciences, we think it fairer that the pur-
chaser of the architect's services bear the risk of such un-
foreseeable difficulties.678 
The Restatement (Third)'s policy judgment with respect to hu-
man blood and tissue appears to be supported by Minnesota law.
679 
In Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc.,68o a se-
rum hepatitis case arising from a blood transfusion, the supreme 
court held that "the furnishing of blood is more in the nature of a 
service than in the sale of goods," and that warranty principles were 
inapplicable as a matter of public policy: 
We find it difficult to give literal application of principles 
of law designed to impose strict accountability in com-
mercial transactions to a voluntary and charitable activity 
which serves a humane and public health purpose. The 
activities involved in the transfusion of whole blood, a 
component of the living body, from one human being to 
another may be characterized as sui generis in that the 
sequence of events involve acts common to legal concepts 
of both a sale and a service. Moreover, it seems to us that 
under the facts in the case before us it would be unrealis-
tic to hold that there is an implied warranty as to qualities 
of fitness of human blood on which no medical or scien-
tific information can be acquired and in respect to which 
plaintiffs' physician has the same information, knowledge, 
and experience as the supplier.68) 
678. Id. 
679. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 19 ernt. c. 
680. 270 Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965). 
681. Id. at 159, 132 N.W.2d at 811. 
HeinOnline -- 24 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 117 1998
1998] RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS liABILITY 117 
The second case involving the issue is Doe v. Travenol Laborato-
ries, Inc.,682 a federal district court case applying Minnesota law.683 
The plaintiff, a hemophiliac, contracted the AIDS virus through a 
blood transfusion.
684 
The court noted the supreme court's conclu-
sion that provision of blood is a service and not a sale, but resolved 
the case on the basis of the blood shield statute in the Uniform 
Anatomical Gift Act,685 adopted some four years after Balkowitsch 
was decided.686 The court read the statute, which stated that the 
use of any part of a body "shall be construed, for all purposes what-
soever, as a rendition of a service by each and every person partici-
pating therein ... " as a legislative effort in light of Balkowitsch to 
protect entities such as the defendant in the case from being sub-
jected to liability without fault.
687 
The blood shield statute was repealed in 1992,688 leaving Balk-
owitsch as the prevailing law in Minnesota. It is consistent with the 
limitations most states have imposed on the liability of blood and 
tissue suppliers.
689 
§ 20. DEFINITION OF "ONE WHO SELLS OR OTHERWISE DISTRIBUTES" 
For purposes of this Restatement: 
(a) One sells a product when, in a commercial context, one 
transfers ownership thereto either for use or consumption or 
for resale leading to ultimate use or consumption. Commercial 
product sellers include, but are not limited to, manufacturers, 
wholesalers, and retailers. 
(b) One otherwise distributes a product when, in a com-
mercial transaction other than a sale, one provides the product 
682. 698 F. Supp. 780 (D. Minn. 1988). 
683. See id. 
684. See id. at 781. 
685. MINN. STAT. § 525.928 (1986) (repealed 1992). The statute read as fol-
lows: 
The use of any part of a body for the purpose of transplantation in the 
human body shall be construed, for all purposes whatsoever, as a rendi-
tion of a service by each and every person participating therein and shall 
not be construed as a sale of such part for any purpose whatsoever. 
"Part" was defined in section 525.921, subd. 6, as "organs, tissues, eyes, bones, ar-
teries, blood, other fluids and any other portions of a human body." Id. 
686. See Doe, 698 F. Supp. at 784. 
687. See id. at 783. 
688. See Act of May 27,1991, ch. 202, § 42,1991 Minn. Laws 562. 
689. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 19 cmt. c. 
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to another either for use or consumption or as a preliminary 
step leading to ultimate use or consumption. Commercial 
nonsale product distributors include, but are not limited to, 
lessors, bailors, and those who provide products to others as a 
means of promoting either the use or consumption of such 
products or some other commercial activity. 
(c) One also sells or otherwise distributes a product when, 
in a commercial transaction, one provides a combination of 
products and services and either the transaction taken as a 
whole, or the product component thereof, satisfies the criteria 
in Subsection (a) or (b). 690 
Commentary 
Section 20 of the Restatement (Third) applies the current under-
standing concerning the kinds of product sellers and distributors 
subject to its products liability provisions.
691 
It specifically includes 
commercial product sellers, such as: manufacturers, wholesalers, 
and retailers, although the Restatement does not limit section 20 ex-
clusively to those sellers.
692 
Section 20 defines sale to include a 
transfer of ownership "either for use or consumption or for resale 
I d · I . . ,,693 ea mg to u tImate use or consumptIon. 
Sales may occur at all levels in the chain of distribution.
694 
The 
definition is broad enough to include product give-aways as part of 
a commercial sales promotion.695 The commercial sale need not be 
the last transaction in order for the seller to be subject to a prod-
ucts liability claim. One person could, for example, buy a product 
at a store and give it to a friend, who is subsequently injured.
696 
Section 20 subjects commercial lessors of new or almost-new 
used products to the rules governing sellers of new products.697 
Rental of a new or almost-new product on a short term basis, where 
the lessee does not have a chance to inspect the product, and 
where the lessor draws the product from a pool of new and almost-
new units, with no attempt made by the leasing agent to distinguish 
690. See id. § 20. 
691. See id. cmt. a. 
692. See id. cmt. h. 
693. [d. § 20(a). 
694. See id. cmt. h. 
695. See id. 
696. See id. 
697. See id. cmt. c. 
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the units on the basis of age or condition, makes the lessor subject 
to strict liability.698 
The Restatement (Third) also includes other nonsale product 
distributors, including certain forms of bailments, where there is a 
charge for use of a product.
699 
Bailors furnishing products that are 
an integral part of their sales or marketing operations, however, 
are strictly liable for the harm caused by defective products that are 
bailed even if there is no separate charge for their use.
7OO 
Com-
mercial bailors who provide products for use as a convenience but 
do not charge for the products' use, such as a grocer who provides 
shopping carts, are not subject to the strict liability rules.701 
Cases involving combinations of sales and services may be 
problematic.
702 
If the sales component is clearly kept separate from 
a service provided along with the product, the person who provides 
the services and products may be deemed to be a product seller. 703 
The Restatement (Third) comments use the example of a lawn-care 
firm that bills separately for a fertilizer that is applied to the lawn of 
a customer, or a company that replaces a component part and bills 
704 
separately. 
However, courts differ in their treatment of transactions if the 
parties do not clearly separate the sales from the services aspects. 705 
The judicial treatment depends on which of two categories the 
transaction fits. 706 In cases where a product is consumed during the 
course of providing a service, such as a case where hair dye is used 
by a hair stylist, the product will usually be treated as a sale of 
dye.
707 
But when the product is not consumed or permanently 
transferred to the customer, such as defective scissors that cut the 
customer, the transaction will be treated as solely furnishing a serv-
. 708 
Ice. 
In contrast, Minnesota products liability law has been applied 
to a variety of product sellers and distributors, although it has not 
been worked out as completely. It is clear that products liability 
698. See id. 
699. See id. cmt. f. 
700. See id. 
701. See id. Reporters' Note, at 365. 
702. See id. cmt. d. 
703. See id. 
704. See id. 
705. See id. 
706. See id. 
707. Seeid. 
708. See id. 
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law will be applied to parties in the chain of manufacture and dis-
tribution, although parties lower in the chain may move for dis-
missal if the product manufacturer is solvent and subject to Minne-
sota jurisdiction.709 It has been applied to leases of defective 
products,710 and bailments,711 although the issue of whether strict 
liability applies to either a lease or a bailment for compensation 
has not yet been decided by the supreme court.712 
In dealing with the sales-service hybrid transactions, the su-
preme court adopted the "predominant factor" test in Valley Farm-
ers 713 The application of the test depends largely on whether there 




McCarthy Well Co. v. St. Peter Creamery, Inc. the supreme court, ap-
plying Valley Farmers', held that a well company hired to restore a 
creamery's artesian well to its original capacity performed a service 
rather than entered into a sale of goods: 
We conclude that the predominant purpose of the 
McCarthy Well-St. Peter Creamery contract was the provi-
sion of services. The creamery hired McCarthy Well to re-
store the creamery's artesian well to its original capacity. 
709. See MINN. STAT. § 544.41 (1996). 
710. See, e.g., Clark v. Rental Equip. Co., 300 Minn. 420, 220 N.W.2d 507 
(1974) (concerning scaffolding without a safety railing); Rediske v. Minnesota Val-
ley Breeder's Ass'n, 374 N.W.2d 745, 747 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (involving a de-
fective solid animal waste recycling system). 
711. See Butler v. Northwestern Hosp., 202 Minn. 282, 285, 278 N.W. 37, 38 
(1938) (involving a plaintiff-patient who sustained hot water bums due to defect 
in clamp in proctolysis delivery system). The Butler-court took the position that: 
It is well established that one who furnishes an instrumentality for a spe-
cial use or service impliedly warrants the article furnished to be reasona-
bly fit and suitable for the purpose for which it is expressly let out, or for 
which, from its character, he must be aware it is intended to be used and 
is liable for injuries to the bailee or third persons for injuries proxi-
mately resulting from any defect due to his want of due care. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
712. SeeWegscheiderv. Plastics, Inc., 289 N.W.2d 167,170 (Minn. 1980). The 
plaintiff, a truck driver, was injured when he fell off a tanker trailer while unload-
ing it. See id. at 169. The plaintiff's employer owned the tractor used to pull the 
tanker trailer. See id. The tanker trailer was supplied by Plastics, Inc. See id. The 
plaintiff had requested a jury instruction based on section 402A, but because the 
plaintiff had assumed the risk of injury, the court concluded that it was unneces-
sary to "address the issue of whether strict liability as stated in § 402A should be 
applied to cases such as this, where the defective product was not sold but merely 
supplied by defendant to plaintiff. n Id. at 170. 
713. See Valley Farmer's Elevator v. Lindsay Bros. Corp., 398 N.W.2d 553, 556 
(Minn. 1987). 
714. See id. 
715. 410 N.w.2d 312 (Minn. 1987). 
HeinOnline -- 24 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 121 1998
1998] RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS UABILITY 121 
Toward this end, McCarthy Well pulled a liner out of the 
well casing, airlifted sand out of the well, televised the 
well, attempted to remove a donut from the well casing, 
exploded dynamite at the bottom of the well, and in-
stalled a new pump. Mter installing the pump, McCarthy 
Well billed the creamery $34,573.27; of this amoun~ only 
$8,329.45 is identified as the cost of the new pump.71 
Because the court held that the transaction was not a 
"commercial transaction," the creamery was entitled to recover un-
der a negligence theory for the economic loss it sustained.
717 
In Butler v. Northwestern HospitaC8 the plaintiff-patient, in the 
hospital for an appendectomy, sustained serious bums due to de-
fect in a clamp that was used in a proctolysis delivery system.
719 
The 
clamp that was used to prevent the hot water drip was ordinarily 
used in the administration of enemas, but the clamp was being 
used for the usual purpose of preventing the flow of water. 720 The 
court took the position that: 
It is well established that one who furnishes an instru-
mentality for a special use or service impliedly warrants 
the article furnished to be reasonably fit and suitable for 
the purpose for which it is expressly let out, or for which, 
from its character, he must be aware it is intended to be 
used and is liable for injuries to the bailee or third per-
sons for injuries proximately resulting from any defect 
due to his want of due care. 721 
However, the court did not impose liability on the basis of 
strict liability in tort, but concluded that the evidence was sufficient 
to establish that the defect in the clamp was "discoverably defec-
~; ,,722 uve. 
§ 21. DEFINITION OF "HARM TO PERSONS OR PROPER1Y": RECOVERY 
FOR ECONOMIC Loss 
For purposes of this Restatement, harm to persons or property 
716. [d. at 315. The court also noted in a footnote that "the purchase and in-
stallation of the pump was not a separate transaction. This was a single agreement 
executed over an extended period of time, of which the pump was but one part." 
[d. at n.1. 
717. See id. at 312. 
718. 202 Minn. 282, 278 N.W. 37 (1938). 
719. See id. at 284-85,278 N.W. at 37. 
720. See id. 
721. [d. at 285,278 N.W. at 38. 
722. [d. at 287,278 N.W. at 39. 
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includes economic loss if caused by harm to: 
(a) the plaintiff's person; 
[Vol. 24 
(b) the person of another when harm to the other inter-
feres with a legally protected interest of the plaintiff; or 
(c) the plaintiff's property other than the defective product 
. If 723 Itse . 
Commentary 
The comments to section 21 note the two constraints that 
prompted the limitations on the right to recover for economic 
10ss.72 The first is that "~roducts liability lies at the boundary be-
tween tort and contract." 25 Some losses seem to straddle the two 
theories, but are more appropriately assigned to contract law and 
the remedies of the V.C.C., with its attendant limitations on recov-
ery, including notice, privity, and disclaimer limitations.
726 
The 
second constraint is that there are some forms of economic loss 
that "have traditionally been excluded from the realm of tort law 
even when the plaintiff has no contractual remedy for a claim.,,727 
Economic loss that arises from personal injury is included in 
the Restatement (Third)'s definition of harm to the person.
728 
Sub-
part (b) includes actions for loss of consortium or wrongful 
death,729 and both are clearly covered under Minnesota products 
liability law. 730 It also includes losses such as injury to reputation, 
subject to rules of legal causation, even where the plaintiff has not 
suffered personal injury.731 Minnesota does not appear to have a 
723. Proposed Finetl Draft, supra note 6, § 2l. 
724. See id. cmt. a. 
725. Id. 
726. See id. 
727. Id. 
728. Seeid.§21(b). 
729. See id. cmt. c. 
730. See, e.g., Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377, 400 (Minn. 1977) 
(affirming ajury award for loss of consortium); Horvath v. Liquid Controls Corp., 
455 N.W.2d 60, 64 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that if death of employee was 
causally related to the negligence of designer and installer of work facility, the 
cause of action is governed by the wrongful death statute, MINN. STAT. § 573.02 
(1996». 
731. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 21 illus. 1. It provides the follow-
ing example: 
A machine that is used to anesthetize dental patients is delivered to Dr. 
Smith with the labels for nitrous oxide and oxygen reversed. Dr. Smith, 
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analogue. 
Part (c) includes as harm to property, damage to "the plain-
tiffs property other than the defective product itself.,,732 Harm to 
the defective product itself is not included as a recoverable element 
of damage under products liability principles.
733 
Damage to the 
product itself is excluded from the Restatement (Third) because "the 
law covering commercial transactions sets forth a comJlrehensive 
scheme governing the rights of the buyer and seller.,,7 Harm to 
the product itself is not covered even where the product is in a de-
fective condition that makes it unreasonably dangerous.
735 
The 
comments note that a plausible argument exists that such cases 
should be covered by products liability law, but that a majority of 
jurisdictions to consider the issue have taken the position that 





Even a catastrophic loss that results in death will not jus-
tify recovery for damage to the product by the owner under a 
products liability theory.738 If there is harm to other property, sec-
tion 21 permits recovery not only for the harm to the product but 
1 L' • 'd tal . 1 739 a so J.or Inci en economIC oss. 
Id. 
The comments set aside the asbestos cases: 
In the case of asbestos contamination in buildings, most 
courts have taken the position that the contamination 
constitutes harm to the building as other property. The 
serious health threat caused by asbestos contamination 
has led the courts to this conclusion. Thus, actions seek-
believing she was administering oxygen to a patient, mistakenly adminis-
tered nitrous oxide which caused the patient to die. Due to the adverse 
publicity arising from accurate media reporting of the case, Dr. Smith 
suffered a sharp drop in her practice and substantial economic loss. Dr. 
Smith's damages for economic loss are recoverable in tort from the seller 
of the machine under Subsection (b). 
732. Seeid.§21(c). 
733. See id. cmt. d. 
734. Id. 
735. See id. 
736. See id. Reporters' Note, at 371. 
737. See SJ. Groves & Sons v. Aerospatiale Helicopter, 374 N.W.2d 431, 434 
(Minn. 1985) (holding the V.C.C. is designed to provide remedies for unsatisfac-
tory results of products and that plaintiff should not be allowed to seek remedies 
under tort theories). 
738. See id. 
739. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 21 cmt. e. The determination of 
when incidental economic loss will be compensable is controlled by the RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 430-461 (1965). 
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ing recovery for the costs of asbestos removal have been 
held to be within the purview of products liability law 
rather than commercial law. 740 
From Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Curp.,741 to Lloyd F. Smith 
Co. v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc.,742 and 80 South Eighth Street Limited Partnership 
v. Carey-Canada, Inc.,743 the Minnesota Supreme Court has been in 
the process of developing a set of rules to govern claims for eco-
nomic loss and property damage.
744 
740. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 21 cmt. e. 
741. 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981). 
742. 491 N.W.2d 11 (Minn. 1992). 
743. 486 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1992). 
744. In Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Nishika Ltd., 565 N.W.2d 16 (Minn. 
1997), a suit was brought in Texas state court by four independent companies that 
were involved in the three-dimensional photography business. See id. at 18. Two 
individuals who together owned the four companies, developed a plan for manag-
ing a three-dimensional photography company through their four businesses. See 
id. One of the individuals met with 3M officials to obtain assistance with the film 
development process. See id. Because of problems in the development of the 
process, the company ultimately failed. See id. at 19. 
The jury concluded that 3M breached an express warranty for the emul-
sion used in the development process and implied warranties for the emulsion 
and backcoat sauce used in the process, and that the breaches directly caused 
harm to each of the plaintiffs. See id. The jury fixed damages at $50,000,000 for 
the group. See id. Damages were reduced by the 49% fault attributable to the 
plaintiffs. See id. 
Nishika and American 3D, two of the plaintiffs, did not deal directly with 
3M. See id. They did not use, purchase, or otherwise secure the 3M products at 
issue in the case. See id. Nishika was not even in existence at the time the goods 
were sold by 3M. See id. 
The Texas Supreme Court certified two questions to the Minnesota Su-
preme Court: 
1. For breach of warranty under [Minn. Stat. § 336.2-318], is a seller li-
able to a person who never acquired any goods from the seller, directly 
or indirectly, for pure economic damages (e.g. lost profits), unaccompa-
nied by any injury to the person or the person's property? 
2. If the answer to Question 1 is "yes," may several such persons, who 
mayor may not be related, and who mayor may not include the buyer of 
the goods, recover damages jointly as a single economic unit? 
[d. The Minnesota Supreme Court answered the first question in the negative. 
Minnesota Statutes section 336.2-318, the privity provision in the V.C.C., 
states that a seller's warranty, express or implied, "extends to any person who may 
reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is 
injured by breach of the warranty." MINN. STAT. § 336.2-318 (1996). The term 
"person" includes corporations and other business organizations. See Nishika, 565 
N.W.2d at 19 (citing MINN. STAT. § 336.2-318). The court held that although in 
the past it had permitted recovery of lost profits from a remote seller's breach of 
warranty, and had permitted plaintiffs who had not purchased, used, or otherwise 
acquired a product to recover as third-party beneficiaries for property damage, it 
had never permitted recovery by a plaintiff "seeking lost profits unaccompanied 
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The set of rules the supreme court has developed
745 
coincide 
with the rules in the Restatement. In 80 South Eighth Street, the su-
preme court, on certified questions from the United States District 
Court for the District of Minnesota, held that the owner of a build-
ing with fireproofing containing asbestos was not barred from re-
covering for "damages relating to the maintenance, removal and 
replacement" of the fireproofing.
746 
Rather than slotting the claim 
into the economic loss decisions that would have barred recovery 
by the plaintiff, the court concluded that the policies of tort law 
should apply due to the dangers presented by asbestos.
747 
While 
that decision can be disputed, the court's policy analysis makes it 
clear, as does the Restatement, that the asbestos cases are unique.
748 
The court viewed one objective of tort law as being deterrence of 
unreasonable risks of harm.
749 
Building owners should be encour-
aged to abate asbestos hazards rather than waiting for personal in-
jury to occur. 750 The court intended for its decision to accomplish 
th b · . 751 at 0 ~ectJ.ve. 
A few months after 80 South Eighth Street, the supreme court 
decided Den-Tal-Ez, further refining the economic loss doctrine in 
a case involving property damag;e caused by an electrical defect in a 
dental chair that caused a fire, 52 but no personal injuries. 753 Suit 
was brought by the dentist who owned the chair, the owner of the 
building where the dentist practiced, and other tenants in the 
building against the manufacturer of the chair and the chair's mo-
tor.
754 
The court held that the property damage they sustained was 
compensable: 
[W]e hold that the U.C.C. provides the exclusive remedy 
by physical injury or property damage and who never used, purchased, or other-
wise acquired the goods in question." Id. at 20. The court concluded that constru-
ing the statute to reach such claims would constitute an expansion of warranty be-
yond the intent of the legislature. See id. 
745. For a more detailed analysis, see Jacquelyn K. Brunmeier, Note, Death by 
Footnote: The Life and Times of Minnesota's Economic Loss Doctrine, 19 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REv. 871 (1993). 
746. See 80 S. Eighth Street, 486 N.W.2d at 398. 
747. See id. at 397. 
748. See id. 
749. See id. at 398. 
750. See id. 
751. See id. 
752. See Lloyd F. Smith v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 11, 12-13 (Minn. 
1992). 
753. See id. at 12-13. 
754. See id. at 13. 
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for other property damages arising out of a sale of goods 
only when that sale fits Hapka's narrow definition of a 
"commercial transaction," i.e., where the parties to the 
sale are dealers in the same goods or, to use a more pre-
cise term, "merchants in goods of the kind." In actions 
for damages to other property which arise from a sale of 
goods between parties who are not "merchants in goods 
of the kind," such as in the case here, the tort remedies of 
negligence and strict liability are always available, even if 
the parties can sue under the U.C.C. as well. And, of 
course, an action for damage to the defective Rroduct it-
self its always limited to a V.C.C. based recovery.755 
The Den-Tal-Ez court narrowly interpreted its earlier decision 
in Hapka v. Paquin Farms,756 a claim by potato farmers for the eco-
nomic loss they sustained because of diseased seed potatoes grown 
from defective seed purchased from the defendants. 757 The Hapka 
court held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover for the 
economic loss they sustained because they entered into a commer-
cial transaction for the purchase of the seed,758 and that the V.C.C. 
controls "exclusively with respect to damages in a commercial 
transaction which involves property damage only.,,759 Den-Tal-Ez 
limits Hapka to transactions between "merchants in goods of the 
kind.,,760 
In response to the court's decision in Hapka, the legislature 
enacted a specific statute to deal with the issue of economic loss 
arising from the sale of goods: 
(a) Economic loss that arises from a sale of goods 
that is due to damage to tangible property other than the 
goods sold may be recovered in tort as well as in contract, 
but economic loss that arises from a sale of goods between 
parties who are each merchants in goods of the kind is 
not recoverable in tort. 
(b) Economic loss that arises from the sale of goods, 
between merchants, that is not due to damage to tangible 
property other than the goods sold may not be recovered 
in tort. 
(c) The economic loss recoverable in tort under this 
755. Id. at 17. 
756. 458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990). 
757. See id. at 684. 
758. See id. at 688. 
759. Id. 
760. SeeDen-Tal-Ez, 491 N.W.2d at 15. 
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section does not include economic loss due to damage to 
the goods themselves. 
(d) The economic loss recoverable in tort under this 
section does not include economic loss incurred by a 
manufacturer of goods arising from damage to the manu-
factured goods and caused by a component of the 761 
goods. 
Subpart (a) of the statute permits recovery for economic loss 
arising from a sale of goods due to "damage to tangible property 
other than the goods sold" in tort as well as contract.
762 
However, 
there is an exemption from tort liability for the economic loss aris-
ing from "a sale of goods between parties who are each merchants 
in goods of the kind."763 Consequently, damage to other property 
is not recoverable in tort where the transaction is between mer-
chants in goods of the kind. 764 
Subpart (b) precludes recovery in tort for economic loss aris-
ing from the sale of goods between merchants, where the loss is 
"not due to damage to tangible property other than the goods 
sold."765 The converse seems to be that where the sale of goods is 
not between merchants, economic loss other than loss due to dam-
age to tangible property other than the goods sold may be com-
pensable in tort. 
Subpart (c) states that the economic loss that is recoverable in 
tort under the section "does not include economic loss due to 
damage to the goods themselves.,,766 Finally, subpart (d) defines 
the recoverable economic loss under the section to exclude 
"economic loss incurred by a manufacturer of goods arising from 
damage to the manufactured goods and caused by a component of 
767 
the goods." 
In Regents of the University of Minnesota v. Chief Industries, Inc. ,768 
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the impact of sec-
tion 604.10 on a case involving a products liability claim by the 
University of Minnesota for property damage allegedly caused by a 
761. Act of May 5, 1993, ch. 91, § 2, 1993 Minn. Laws 274 (amending MINN. 
STAT. § 604.10). 
762. MINN. STAT. § 604.10 (1996). 
763. Id. 




768. 106 F.3d 1409 (8th Cir. 1997). 
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grain dryer that caught fire because of a defective solenoid.769 A 
subsidiary of Chief Industries manufactured the ~ain dryer.770 The 
solenoid was manufactured by Parker-Hannafin. 71 The University 
brought suit against both companies, alleging strict liability, failure 
to warn, and negligent design and manufacture.772 The sole issue 
the Eighth Circuit considered was whether the University was "a 
merchant in goods of the kind" under the statute.773 The court 
concluded that a person need not be an actual dealer of a product 
in order to be a "merchant in goods of the kind.,,774 The court fo-
cused instead on the University's specialized knowledge with re-
spect to the grain dryer in concluding that the University fit the 
definition: 
In the present case, the University's knowledge and 
experience with respect to grain dryers constituted 
"knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods in-
volved in the transaction." Minn. Stat. § 336.2-104(1). 
The University had purchased a number of such units 
over the prior thirty years, and had the advantage of a 
centralized purchasing department that solicited bids for 
the purchase. Before purchasing the unit, the Southwest 
station's superintendent (who had been responsible for 
other such purchases) consulted a prominent expert in 
grain drying, who provided advice on such specifications 
for the unit as fan size and BTU requirements. 
To be sure, not all large, sophisticated purchasers are 
necessarily merchants in goods of the kind they buy, just 
as an informed and careful individual consumer does not 
become a "merchant." But based on the particular and 
undisputed facts of this case, we agree with the district 
court that the University possessed specialized knowledge 
with respect to the grain drying unit, and that "[t]his 
knowledge informed the University of the risks posed by 
the product and the potential damage to both the prod-
uct and other property that could result from product 
failure." The district court properly concluded that, as a 
matter of law, the University was a merchant of goods of 
769. Seeid.at1410-11. 
770. See id. at 1410. 
771. See id. 
772. See id. 
773. Seeid.at1411. 
774. See id. at 1412. 
HeinOnline -- 24 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 129 1998
1998]· RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS liABIliTY 129 
the kind and that section 604.10 bars any action in tort.775 
Judge Lay dissented in the case.
776 
Based on the legislative his-
tory and relevant supreme court authority, he argued that the Uni-
versity was not a merchant in goods of the kind for purposes of the 
statute.
777 
He interpreted Den-Tal-Ez as providing a "narrow defini-
tion" of "commercial transaction.,,778 Den-Tal-Ez held that the 
U.C,C. provides the exclusive remedy only in cases where the par-
ties to the sale are dealers in the same goods or merchants in goods 
of the kind.
779 
Because the University and Parker-Hannafin were 
not both dealers in goods of the kind, Judge Lay would not have 
applied U.C.C.limiting principles. He explained: 
Section 604.10 (a) governs this claim. When it enacted 
§ 604.10 in 1991, had it so desired, the Minnesota legisla-
ture could have chosen the broad term "merchant" as 
generally defined by § 336.2-104(1) instead of "merchants 
in goods of the kind." The legislature'S choice instead to 
incorporate the limiting language manifests its intent to 
narrow application of the economic loss doctrine. There 
is no inconsistency in this obvious, clarifYing provision, 
with § 336.2-104(1). The intended purpose of § 604.10 
was to overcome Hapka's broad language, based on § 
336.2-104(1), so that ordinary consumers will not be de-
nied their "economic loss arising from the sale of 
goods.,,780 
The case is not binding on the Minnesota courts, of course, 
which leaves the final interpretation of the statute to the Minnesota 
Supreme Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability provides a 
yardstick for measuring products liability law in each individual 
state. Minnesota's law is largely similar to the rules set out in the 
Restatement. While Minnesota has not yet adopted all of the posi-
tions in all of the rules, the Minnesota Supreme Court has taken 
positions on the rules governing liability, which are substantially 
775. Id. at 1412 (citation omitted). 
776. See id. 
777. See id. at 1412-13,1415. 
778. See id. at 1413. 
779. See Lloyd F. Smith Co v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 11, 17 (Minn. 
1992). 
780. Chief Industries, 106 F.3d at 1413 (footnotes omitted). 
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the same. It no longer seems possible to argue that negligence 
principles do not control in cases involving design defect and fail-
ure to warn. The strict liability vernacular may still be used in de-
sign defect cases, but the important question is whether the su-
preme court's statement in Kallio v. Ford Motor CO.,781 that proof of a 
feasible alternative is not part of the plaintiff's prima facie case in a 
design case,782 establishes a meaningful wall between the theories. 
Any realistic appraisal of the supreme court and court of appeals 
decisions in design defect cases, including Kallio, will have to bow 
to the reality and practical necessity of establishing the feasible al-
ternative in most cases. In failure to warn cases the supreme court 
has acknowledged that negligence principles control strict liability 
failure to warn cases. In other words, they really are negligence 
cases. The only detail that has to be developed in the Minnesota 
failure to warn cases is the appropriate division of responsibility be-
tween judge and jury. 
A section-by-section comparison requires an understanding of 
Minnesota products liability law and an appraisal of any gaps in the 
law. The Restatement (Third) is more likely to be a gap filler than an 
impetus for any significant change in the law. In areas where the 
law is not fully roughed out, such as cases involving post-sale duty 
to warn, the Restatement may provide useful guidelines for resolving 
those cases. In others, such as economic loss cases, it provides reaf-
firmation of economic loss rules that have been worked out in this 
state over the course of some twenty years. 
The Restatement (Third) should be an excellent resource for 
evaluating the evolution of Minnesota products liability law and a 
roadmap, although not the only one, for the development of the 
law in the future. 
781. 407 N.W.2d 92 (Minn. 1987). 
782. See id. at 97. 
